Kristian Bonn

The appellant physician appealed a trial judgment finding her liable for the respondent's catastrophic brain injury following an acute asthmatic attack.

The trial judge found the appellant breached the standard of care by delaying intubation and failing to call for help sooner.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge improperly relied on a critical care note containing double hearsay and opinion evidence regarding the respondent's hypoxemia, and erred in his causation analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding the note was admissible under the business records exception and as a party admission, and that the trial judge's causation findings were supported by the expert evidence.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against two pediatric neurologists for their treatment of an infant's intractable seizures in 2003.

The infant suffered from a rare condition, pyridoxine-dependent epilepsy (PDE).

The court found that the defendants breached the standard of care by setting an insufficient observation period during a pyridoxine empirical trial, improperly concluding the treatment was ineffective, and failing to reconsider pyridoxine when seizures returned.

The court also found the defendants breached their duty to obtain informed consent by failing to advise the parents of the trial and alternative treatment options.

The court concluded these breaches caused or contributed to the infant's severe intellectual and developmental delay.

The plaintiff suffered a severe asthma attack and was admitted to the hospital.

The defendant internist assumed care but failed to promptly consult an intensive care specialist or arrange for timely intubation by an experienced clinician.

The plaintiff was eventually intubated by a respiratory therapist after multiple attempts and suffered a hypoxic brain injury, rendering her an incomplete quadriplegic.

The court found the defendant breached the standard of care by failing to consult a specialist sooner, delaying the decision to intubate, and failing to ensure the most experienced clinician performed the procedure.

The court also found that these breaches caused the plaintiff's brain injury.

Judgment was granted for the plaintiffs.

This appeal concerned a severe brain injury sustained by Megan Desrochers in an ATV accident.

The trial judge found Patrick McGinnis liable for negligence, with 10% contributory negligence by Megan, but dismissed claims against Grant and Catherine McGinnis.

Patrick appealed his liability.

The Desrochers cross-appealed the dismissal of claims against Grant and Catherine, both in tort and under s. 192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act (HTA).

The Court of Appeal dismissed Patrick's appeal, upholding his liability.

It also dismissed the Desrochers' cross-appeal regarding Catherine's tort liability.

However, the Court allowed the Desrochers' cross-appeal regarding Grant's liability under HTA s. 192(2), finding that "negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle" includes the negligent transfer of care and control of the vehicle to an unfit person.

The plaintiff, Owen Lightfoot, brought a motion seeking leave to amend his Statement of Claim to proceed under Rule 76 (simplified procedure) and to strike the defendants' jury notice.

The court granted leave to bring the motion, finding that the January 1, 2020 amendment to Rule 76 and the COVID-19 pandemic constituted substantial and unexpected changes in circumstances.

The court further granted leave to amend the Statement of Claim to limit damages to $200,000, thereby bringing the action within Rule 76.

The court held that jury trials are incompatible with the summary trial process mandated by the amended Rule 76, and that the transition provision in Rule 76.14 means pre-January 1, 2020 jury notices are preserved but require the action to proceed in ordinary procedure.

Finding that proceeding with a 3-week jury trial in ordinary procedure would be contrary to the interests of justice and proportionality compared to a 5-day non-jury summary trial under Rule 76, the court struck the defendants' jury notice.

Costs of the motion were reserved.

The plaintiff moved to certify a class action against the estate of an orthodontist for surreptitiously video recording patients and sought approval of a settlement.

The court granted certification for settlement purposes and approved the settlement, finding it fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, given the limited assets of the estate and the challenges of individual proof of damages.

The settlement provided $425,000, including $350,000 for class members, an administration fund, and partial indemnity costs.

A plaintiff who sustained a wrist injury in July 2007 attended an urgent care clinic where an x-ray was ordered.

The radiologist's report recommended a follow-up x-ray, but this recommendation was not communicated to the plaintiff.

She subsequently required two surgeries.

The plaintiff commenced an action against the clinic and the treating physician in May 2012.

By August 2013, the plaintiff became aware that a second clinic physician (not the named defendant) had reviewed the x-ray report and failed to advise her of the follow-up recommendation.

In January 2017, the plaintiff moved to add this second physician as a defendant.

The motion judge granted the motion, finding the claim was not statute-barred.

The appellants appealed, arguing the plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence in identifying the second physician.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that by August 29, 2013, the plaintiff knew all material facts except the defendant's name and was obliged to exercise reasonable diligence to obtain it within the two-year limitation period.

The plaintiff's failure to make inquiries for one year constituted a failure to exercise reasonable diligence, rendering the claim statute-barred.

This costs endorsement followed a personal injury action that settled for $75,000 shortly before trial.

The court assessed the plaintiffs' claim for costs and disbursements, addressing several contested issues.

Key determinations included the compensability of adverse costs insurance premiums as a disbursement, the recoverability of disbursements related to a defaulted defendant, and the reasonableness of retaining multiple experts given the complexity and anticipated trial.

The court applied the principle of proportionality to fix the final costs and disbursements.

This appeal concerns the calculation of damages in a motor vehicle accident case involving statutory accident benefits (SABs) deductions, prejudgment interest rates, and statutory deductibles.

The plaintiff was injured in a 2008 collision caused by an impaired driver.

At trial, a jury awarded $220,000 in compensatory damages, but after deductions for SABs and the statutory deductible, the trial judge reduced the judgment to $34,000.

The appellate court addressed three key issues: (1) whether SABs for income replacement should be deducted from both past and future income loss awards; (2) whether punitive damages should have been put to the jury; and (3) the temporal application of amendments to prejudgment interest rates and statutory deductibles.

The court also addressed the defendant's cross-appeal regarding HKHM benefits deductions and the statutory deductible amount.