Kristian Bonn

The appellants, pediatric neurologists, appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for medical negligence in their treatment of an infant with a rare seizure disorder.

The trial judge found that the appellants breached the standard of care by prematurely concluding that a pyridoxine trial was ineffective and failing to reintroduce it when seizures returned.

The trial judge also found a breach of the duty to obtain informed consent for failing to disclose the pyridoxine trial to the parents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings on the standard of care were grounded in expert evidence, the failure to disclose a reasonable alternative treatment constituted a breach of informed consent, and the causation finding was supported by a commonsense approach to the evidence.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his summary judgment motion, which sought to dismiss the respondent's personal injury action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident in November 2015 but did not commence her action until November 2021.

The motion judge found the claim was timely because the respondent only discovered her injuries met the 'permanent serious impairment' threshold under the Insurance Act in July 2020, following a meeting with a neuropsychologist.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by failing to consider whether the respondent reasonably ought to have known her injuries met the threshold earlier.

Given the persistence of her debilitating symptoms and earlier medical advice that she might never fully recover, the Court held the claim was discoverable more than two years before it was commenced.

The action was dismissed.

The appellant physician appealed a trial judgment finding her liable for the respondent's catastrophic brain injury following an acute asthmatic attack.

The trial judge found the appellant breached the standard of care by delaying intubation and failing to call for help sooner.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge improperly relied on a critical care note containing double hearsay and opinion evidence regarding the respondent's hypoxemia, and erred in his causation analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding the note was admissible under the business records exception and as a party admission, and that the trial judge's causation findings were supported by the expert evidence.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against two pediatric neurologists for their treatment of an infant's intractable seizures in 2003.

The infant suffered from a rare condition, pyridoxine-dependent epilepsy (PDE).

The court found that the defendants breached the standard of care by setting an insufficient observation period during a pyridoxine empirical trial, improperly concluding the treatment was ineffective, and failing to reconsider pyridoxine when seizures returned.

The court also found the defendants breached their duty to obtain informed consent by failing to advise the parents of the trial and alternative treatment options.

The court concluded these breaches caused or contributed to the infant's severe intellectual and developmental delay.

The plaintiff suffered a severe asthma attack and was admitted to the hospital.

The defendant internist assumed care but failed to promptly consult an intensive care specialist or arrange for timely intubation by an experienced clinician.

The plaintiff was eventually intubated by a respiratory therapist after multiple attempts and suffered a hypoxic brain injury, rendering her an incomplete quadriplegic.

The court found the defendant breached the standard of care by failing to consult a specialist sooner, delaying the decision to intubate, and failing to ensure the most experienced clinician performed the procedure.

The court also found that these breaches caused the plaintiff's brain injury.

Judgment was granted for the plaintiffs.

This appeal concerned a severe brain injury sustained by Megan Desrochers in an ATV accident.

The trial judge found Patrick McGinnis liable for negligence, with 10% contributory negligence by Megan, but dismissed claims against Grant and Catherine McGinnis.

Patrick appealed his liability.

The Desrochers cross-appealed the dismissal of claims against Grant and Catherine, both in tort and under s. 192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act (HTA).

The Court of Appeal dismissed Patrick's appeal, upholding his liability.

It also dismissed the Desrochers' cross-appeal regarding Catherine's tort liability.

However, the Court allowed the Desrochers' cross-appeal regarding Grant's liability under HTA s. 192(2), finding that "negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle" includes the negligent transfer of care and control of the vehicle to an unfit person.

The plaintiffs sought damages arising from a catastrophic ATV crash involving an inexperienced adult rider on an unlit rural road with a sharp curve.

The court held that all defendants owed a prima facie duty of care, but only the boyfriend who had instructed and accompanied the rider breached the standard of care by allowing her to ride alone without adequate training, without a helmet, and toward a dangerous curve he knew she could not safely negotiate.

Applying the but for causation test, the court inferred from circumstantial and expert evidence that the accident was caused by the rider's inability to properly turn the ATV.

The claims against the owner and his spouse were dismissed, statutory owner liability was rejected, and contributory negligence was fixed at 10%.

The plaintiff, Owen Lightfoot, brought a motion seeking leave to amend his Statement of Claim to proceed under Rule 76 (simplified procedure) and to strike the defendants' jury notice.

The court granted leave to bring the motion, finding that the January 1, 2020 amendment to Rule 76 and the COVID-19 pandemic constituted substantial and unexpected changes in circumstances.

The court further granted leave to amend the Statement of Claim to limit damages to $200,000, thereby bringing the action within Rule 76.

The court held that jury trials are incompatible with the summary trial process mandated by the amended Rule 76, and that the transition provision in Rule 76.14 means pre-January 1, 2020 jury notices are preserved but require the action to proceed in ordinary procedure.

Finding that proceeding with a 3-week jury trial in ordinary procedure would be contrary to the interests of justice and proportionality compared to a 5-day non-jury summary trial under Rule 76, the court struck the defendants' jury notice.

Costs of the motion were reserved.

The plaintiff moved to certify a class action against the estate of an orthodontist for surreptitiously video recording patients and sought approval of a settlement.

The court granted certification for settlement purposes and approved the settlement, finding it fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, given the limited assets of the estate and the challenges of individual proof of damages.

The settlement provided $425,000, including $350,000 for class members, an administration fund, and partial indemnity costs.

A plaintiff who sustained a wrist injury in July 2007 attended an urgent care clinic where an x-ray was ordered.

The radiologist's report recommended a follow-up x-ray, but this recommendation was not communicated to the plaintiff.

She subsequently required two surgeries.

The plaintiff commenced an action against the clinic and the treating physician in May 2012.

By August 2013, the plaintiff became aware that a second clinic physician (not the named defendant) had reviewed the x-ray report and failed to advise her of the follow-up recommendation.

In January 2017, the plaintiff moved to add this second physician as a defendant.

The motion judge granted the motion, finding the claim was not statute-barred.

The appellants appealed, arguing the plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence in identifying the second physician.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that by August 29, 2013, the plaintiff knew all material facts except the defendant's name and was obliged to exercise reasonable diligence to obtain it within the two-year limitation period.

The plaintiff's failure to make inquiries for one year constituted a failure to exercise reasonable diligence, rendering the claim statute-barred.

This costs endorsement followed a personal injury action that settled for $75,000 shortly before trial.

The court assessed the plaintiffs' claim for costs and disbursements, addressing several contested issues.

Key determinations included the compensability of adverse costs insurance premiums as a disbursement, the recoverability of disbursements related to a defaulted defendant, and the reasonableness of retaining multiple experts given the complexity and anticipated trial.

The court applied the principle of proportionality to fix the final costs and disbursements.

This appeal concerns the calculation of damages in a motor vehicle accident case involving statutory accident benefits (SABs) deductions, prejudgment interest rates, and statutory deductibles.

The plaintiff was injured in a 2008 collision caused by an impaired driver.

At trial, a jury awarded $220,000 in compensatory damages, but after deductions for SABs and the statutory deductible, the trial judge reduced the judgment to $34,000.

The appellate court addressed three key issues: (1) whether SABs for income replacement should be deducted from both past and future income loss awards; (2) whether punitive damages should have been put to the jury; and (3) the temporal application of amendments to prejudgment interest rates and statutory deductibles.

The court also addressed the defendant's cross-appeal regarding HKHM benefits deductions and the statutory deductible amount.

Following a jury trial where the plaintiff's slip and fall claim was dismissed, the successful defendant sought costs on a partial and substantial indemnity scale.

The plaintiff argued that no costs should be awarded due to his serious injuries and limited ability to pay.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding the case was not exceptional.

The court also rejected the argument for zero costs, noting insufficient evidence of impecuniosity.

Applying principles of proportionality and access to justice, the court reduced the defendant's claimed costs and fixed the award at $12,500.

Following a four‑week jury trial arising from a motor vehicle collision caused by an impaired driver, the plaintiffs obtained a damages verdict of $220,000 but a much smaller net judgment after statutory deductions and accident benefits offsets.

Both parties sought costs, relying on competing Rule 49 settlement offers and arguments concerning proportionality and the impact of statutory deductibles.

The court held that statutory deductibles are not considered when determining entitlement to costs and rejected the defendant’s argument that its offers were more favourable.

After reviewing the complexity of the trial, expert evidence, motions, and proportionality considerations, the court fixed the plaintiffs’ costs at $250,000 in fees plus $126,598.48 in disbursements and applicable HST.

The court further concluded that recent amendments to the Insurance Act affecting cost calculations should not apply retroactively to this litigation.

Following a jury award in a personal injury action, the parties sought clarification of the terms of judgment concerning deductions for statutory accident benefits relating to housekeeping expenses and disclosure of litigation insurance.

The defendant argued that housekeeping benefits previously received under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule should be deducted from both past and future housekeeping awards.

The plaintiffs submitted that benefits for past housekeeping could only be deducted from the jury’s award for past housekeeping losses and not from future losses.

The court accepted the plaintiffs’ position, holding that past benefits cannot be deducted from future losses, and confirmed the higher judgment amount.

The defendant’s request for disclosure of litigation insurance was found to be premature and unnecessary at that stage.

Following a civil jury verdict arising from a motor vehicle accident, the court was asked to settle the terms of judgment including deductions for statutory accident benefits, the applicable statutory deductible under the Insurance Act, and the appropriate prejudgment interest rate.

The defendant sought to deduct the full amount allocated to income replacement benefits in a prior accident benefits settlement, while the plaintiffs argued only amounts clearly matching the jury award should be deducted.

The court held the settlement allocation for income replacement benefits was binding and deductible.

However, it accepted the plaintiffs’ position that the increased statutory deductible introduced shortly before trial should not apply retrospectively, maintaining the earlier deductible amount.

Exercising discretion under the Courts of Justice Act, the court also set prejudgment interest at 3%.

The defendant brought a threshold motion under s. 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act arguing the injured plaintiff had not sustained a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function following a motor vehicle collision.

Conflicting medical evidence was presented regarding chronic pain, psychiatric impairment, and the causal connection between the collision and the plaintiff’s symptoms.

The court accepted expert evidence linking facet joint injuries and chronic pain to the accident and found the plaintiff’s condition substantially interfered with his ability to perform the heavy physical duties of his construction business.

The court also rejected suggestions that the plaintiff was malingering.

The plaintiff met the statutory threshold for non‑pecuniary damages.

The Insurer brought a motion for the production of various documents, including the Applicant's Ontario Scholastic Record and a medical report obtained in a related tort matter.

The Arbitrator dismissed the motion, finding that the request for the scholastic record was not relevant to the narrow issue of attendant care benefits.

Furthermore, the medical report was subject to the implied undertaking rule, and the Arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to order its production without a waiver from the court having jurisdiction over the tort action.

The motion was deemed premature, and the Applicant was awarded expenses.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, noting that the trial judge had acceded to a joint submission and that the respondent would have already served the sentence had the proper order been made.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that evidence obtained during a strip search should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged that strip searches are inherently intrusive and should not be routine, citing Golden.

However, the Court found no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion to admit the evidence and dismissed the appeal.