Steven Daniel Baldwin

The plaintiffs moved to strike the jury in a motor vehicle collision trial, alleging a breach of the rule in Browne v. Dunn by the defence.

The defence cross-examined the plaintiffs' medical experts on an alleged inconsistent symptom (fluid leaking from the ear) reported by the plaintiff to the Mayo Clinic, without having put this specific inconsistency to the plaintiff during his cross-examination.

The court found a serious breach of the Browne v. Dunn rule, which impaired trial fairness and the jury's ability to assess credibility.

The court determined that neither a correcting instruction nor recalling the plaintiff would remedy the damage, and therefore granted the motion to strike the jury.

This urgent motion concerned a parenting dispute over parenting time and decision-making for two children.

The respondent father sought increased parenting time, alleging the applicant mother was unjustifiably denying it.

The mother filed an affidavit that the court found to be non-compliant with evidentiary rules, mixing facts, opinions, and submissions.

The court granted the father interim parenting time and struck the mother's affidavit, emphasizing the importance of proper affidavit evidence in family law proceedings.

The father was also granted costs.

The defendants sought an order to cross-examine the plaintiff's counsel's assistant, Laurel Saunders, on an affidavit filed in an upcoming motion to enforce a settlement.

The plaintiff's counsel argued the affidavit only attached uncontentious correspondence and that Ms. Saunders had nothing relevant to add, citing privilege.

The court granted the defendants' motion, affirming the prima facie right to cross-examine under Rule 39.02(1) and finding no sufficient reason to prevent it, especially given potential future evidentiary developments from non-party lawyer examinations.

Costs were awarded to the successful defendants.

Braebury Development Corporation appealed a Small Claims Court decision regarding two issues: the proration of an insurance premium and the validity of a steel audit report used to justify a price reduction in a purchase agreement.

The appeal court dismissed both grounds of appeal.

It found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's decision to prorate the insurance premium.

On the steel audit issue, the court affirmed that the "Christmas Steel Report" did not constitute a "thorough audit" as required by the purchase agreement, and therefore, Braebury was not entitled to the claimed price reduction.

This ruling addresses the final terms of judgment following a trial where liability was apportioned 60% to Ultramar and 40% to the plaintiffs.

The court resolved disputes between the parties regarding the precise wording of the judgment, specifically concerning the subrogated claim, Ultramar's crossclaim for indemnity, and the inclusion of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.

The court largely adopted the plaintiffs' proposed judgment wording, emphasizing that a judgment must reflect the enforceable result rather than the underlying calculations or reasons for decision.

Pre-judgment interest and costs were noted as subjects for a subsequent order.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a contested motion where the defendants successfully obtained independent medical examinations, but on terms largely advocated by the plaintiff.

The court found success was divided, with the plaintiff being "more successful" on the central issue of the conditions for the medical assessments, particularly regarding "ghostwriting" concerns.

Applying Rule 57, the court awarded the plaintiff partial fixed costs, acknowledging the legitimate differences of opinion on novel issues.

The defendant Jamie Macari moved for an order compelling the plaintiff to undergo two independent medical examinations (IMEs) and to pay a late cancellation fee for a missed appointment.

The plaintiff sought additional conditions for the IMEs, specifically regarding "ghost writing" of expert reports, and opposed paying the cancellation fee.

The court allowed the defendant's motion in part, imposing modified conditions for the IMEs to ensure expert reports are solely authored by the examining doctor and are compliant with Rules 33.06 and 53.03(2.1), and ordered the plaintiff to pay a reduced portion of the cancellation fee.

The defendant sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion for summary judgment in a dental malpractice action.

The primary issues were the admissibility of a treating cardiologist's opinion on causation without strict compliance with Rule 53.03 and whether conflicting expert opinions could be resolved at the summary judgment stage.

The court, applying the principles from Westerhof v. Gee Estate, determined that the treating cardiologist was a "participant expert" whose opinion was admissible.

Given the presence of conflicting medical expert opinions on causation and questions surrounding the defendant's missing dental records, the court found that a genuine issue requiring a trial existed.

Consequently, the motion for leave to appeal was dismissed, and the matter was directed to proceed to trial.

The plaintiff, Arnold Hennessy Holdings Inc., moved for summary judgment against Flapperless Inc. and Philip Hennessy for unpaid royalties under licensing agreements for "tip-tank" toilet technology.

The defendants argued the claim should be brought by Arnold Hennessy's estate, was statute-barred, and that an oral agreement amended the written contracts.

They also raised procedural issues regarding disclosure and counsel.

The court dismissed the defendants' preliminary objections and found Hennessy Holdings to be the proper plaintiff.

The action was deemed not statute-barred, as the plaintiff discovered the breach within the limitation period.

The court rejected the existence of an oral agreement to vary the written terms, finding Philip Hennessy's uncorroborated evidence insufficient.

While Philip Hennessy was a proper party, the court found no basis to pierce the corporate veil to hold him personally liable for Flapperless's financial obligations.

The plaintiff was granted judgment for unpaid royalties against Flapperless Inc. but denied a declaration seeking to enjoin the transfer of intellectual property to Philip Hennessy, as the transfer had already occurred upon Arnold Hennessy's death and damages were an adequate remedy.

The plaintiff brought a motion to establish a timetable for its summary judgment motion.

The defendants opposed, insisting on receiving the plaintiff's Affidavit of Documents first, citing Rule 30.03.

The court, referencing amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure and Supreme Court guidance on summary judgment, ruled that an Affidavit of Documents is not a prerequisite in the absence of a discovery plan or when a summary judgment motion is pending.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, setting a timetable for the summary judgment proceedings and dismissing the defendants' objection.

The plaintiff, Gauvreau & Associates Professional Corporation, sought an interlocutory injunction against the defendants, Pelton & Co. Professional Corporation and Laurie Pelton, to enforce a non-competition agreement.

The agreement stemmed from the sale of Pelton's accounting practice to Gauvreau, which included goodwill and a client list, alongside an independent contractor agreement.

The defendants, after Pelton left Gauvreau, began servicing clients from the sold list.

The court, treating the agreement primarily as a business sale contract but also considering employment interests, found the seven-year, Ontario-wide non-competition clause unduly restrictive.

While acknowledging a serious issue to be tried regarding the enforceability and potential "reading down" of the clause, and finding irreparable harm in the loss of goodwill, the court granted a limited injunction.

This injunction prohibited the defendants from *further* soliciting clients on the sold list until trial, but did not prevent them from accepting business from clients who had already switched or those who had not yet retained them.

Costs were reserved to the trial judge.

This is a costs decision in a child protection matter where the respondent father sought costs against the Hastings Children's Aid Society following a 14-day trial.

The Society had brought a protection application alleging the children were at risk of sexual and emotional harm from the father.

The court found the father had not posed a risk of sexual harm and dismissed the Society's application on that ground.

Only the older child was found to be at risk of emotional harm, unrelated to the father's actions.

The court awarded costs of $50,000 against the Society, finding it had failed to conduct a thorough investigation, relied almost exclusively on the mother's allegations, and failed to meet its ongoing obligation to investigate and present all relevant facts to the court.