Steven Daniel Baldwin

The plaintiffs moved to strike the jury in a motor vehicle collision trial, alleging a breach of the rule in Browne v. Dunn by the defence.

The defence cross-examined the plaintiffs' medical experts on an alleged inconsistent symptom (fluid leaking from the ear) reported by the plaintiff to the Mayo Clinic, without having put this specific inconsistency to the plaintiff during his cross-examination.

The court found a serious breach of the Browne v. Dunn rule, which impaired trial fairness and the jury's ability to assess credibility.

The court determined that neither a correcting instruction nor recalling the plaintiff would remedy the damage, and therefore granted the motion to strike the jury.

The defendants and the third party, His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario (Ministry of Transportation), agreed to dismiss the third party claim against the Ministry but disagreed on costs.

The court found that it was not unnecessary for the defendants to add the Ministry to ascertain the identity of the correct contractor, and that the Ministry could have avoided the costs claimed by providing the requested information.

The court ordered the dismissal without costs to any party.

This urgent motion concerned a parenting dispute over parenting time and decision-making for two children.

The respondent father sought increased parenting time, alleging the applicant mother was unjustifiably denying it.

The mother filed an affidavit that the court found to be non-compliant with evidentiary rules, mixing facts, opinions, and submissions.

The court granted the father interim parenting time and struck the mother's affidavit, emphasizing the importance of proper affidavit evidence in family law proceedings.

The father was also granted costs.

The plaintiffs sought damages arising from a catastrophic ATV crash involving an inexperienced adult rider on an unlit rural road with a sharp curve.

The court held that all defendants owed a prima facie duty of care, but only the boyfriend who had instructed and accompanied the rider breached the standard of care by allowing her to ride alone without adequate training, without a helmet, and toward a dangerous curve he knew she could not safely negotiate.

Applying the but for causation test, the court inferred from circumstantial and expert evidence that the accident was caused by the rider's inability to properly turn the ATV.

The claims against the owner and his spouse were dismissed, statutory owner liability was rejected, and contributory negligence was fixed at 10%.

The defendants sought an order to cross-examine the plaintiff's counsel's assistant, Laurel Saunders, on an affidavit filed in an upcoming motion to enforce a settlement.

The plaintiff's counsel argued the affidavit only attached uncontentious correspondence and that Ms. Saunders had nothing relevant to add, citing privilege.

The court granted the defendants' motion, affirming the prima facie right to cross-examine under Rule 39.02(1) and finding no sufficient reason to prevent it, especially given potential future evidentiary developments from non-party lawyer examinations.

Costs were awarded to the successful defendants.

The defendants' solicitor of record brought a motion to be removed due to a complete breakdown in the solicitor-client relationship.

The defendant, acting in person, agreed with the removal and orally requested an adjournment of the upcoming trial to retain new counsel.

The 90-year-old plaintiff opposed the adjournment due to prejudice from delay.

The court granted the motion to remove the solicitor and adjourned the trial, but ordered an interim distribution of $90,000 from the estate to the plaintiff to mitigate prejudice.

The defendants in a motor vehicle accident claim brought a motion to add an independent winter maintenance contractor as a third party.

The Crown and the proposed third party opposed the motion, arguing the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act.

The court granted the motion, finding that the claim was not discoverable until the Crown finally produced patrol records and a representative for discovery, having previously failed to plead the contractor's existence or provide timely disclosure.

The court held that the defendants exercised reasonable diligence and rebutted the presumption of knowledge.

Following a successful motion for contempt against the applicant mother for unilaterally withholding the children, the respondent father sought substantial indemnity costs of $18,429.17.

The court considered the factors under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, noting the mother's unreasonable behaviour and failure to accept reasonable offers to settle.

The court awarded the father costs fixed at $11,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The applicant mother sought costs arising from three case conferences, arguing they were unproductive due to the respondent father's delayed and incomplete financial disclosure.

The court found that the father's failure to comply with disclosure orders and lack of preparedness impeded progress and warranted a costs award under Rule 17(18) of the Family Law Rules.

The court awarded the mother costs on a substantial indemnity basis, fixed at $6,441.00 inclusive of HST.

The respondent father brought a motion for contempt against the applicant mother for failing to return their two children to Ontario from British Columbia following her March Break access.

The mother claimed she withheld the children due to COVID-19 travel risks and the child's asthma.

The court found the mother intentionally breached a clear court order, noting she had unilaterally decided to keep the children despite no evidence of travel restrictions preventing their return.

The mother was found in contempt, and the court ordered temporary adjustments to the parenting schedule to facilitate the children's return and make-up time.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for a fuel oil spill at the respondents' home.

The trial judge found that the appellants negligently failed to identify that the respondents' fuel oil tank, which was labelled for indoor use, was installed outdoors, and failed to tag it as non-compliant.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred by applying the 'material contribution' test for causation instead of the 'but for' test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the trial judge articulated the wrong test, she effectively applied the 'but for' test by finding the spill would not have occurred if the appellants had fulfilled their regulatory obligations.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's apportionment of liability, finding of contributory negligence, and damages assessment.

Braebury Development Corporation appealed a Small Claims Court decision regarding two issues: the proration of an insurance premium and the validity of a steel audit report used to justify a price reduction in a purchase agreement.

The appeal court dismissed both grounds of appeal.

It found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's decision to prorate the insurance premium.

On the steel audit issue, the court affirmed that the "Christmas Steel Report" did not constitute a "thorough audit" as required by the purchase agreement, and therefore, Braebury was not entitled to the claimed price reduction.

This ruling addresses the final terms of judgment following a trial where liability was apportioned 60% to Ultramar and 40% to the plaintiffs.

The court resolved disputes between the parties regarding the precise wording of the judgment, specifically concerning the subrogated claim, Ultramar's crossclaim for indemnity, and the inclusion of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.

The court largely adopted the plaintiffs' proposed judgment wording, emphasizing that a judgment must reflect the enforceable result rather than the underlying calculations or reasons for decision.

Pre-judgment interest and costs were noted as subjects for a subsequent order.

The plaintiffs suffered a residential fuel oil spill when their outdoor tank, which was labelled for indoor use, corroded and leaked.

They sued their fuel oil supplier, Ultramar, and its sub-contractor, Kilpatrick Fuels, in negligence and breach of contract.

The court found that the defendants breached the standard of care under the Technical Standards and Safety Act regime by failing to properly inspect, tag, and mandate the replacement of the non-compliant tank.

However, the court also found the plaintiffs contributorily negligent for failing to maintain their heating system.

Liability was apportioned 60% to Ultramar and 40% to the plaintiffs, with Ultramar entitled to 50% contribution from Kilpatrick.

The plaintiffs were awarded agreed subrogated damages of $750,000 and general damages of $30,000.

The plaintiff estates brought a motion for a timetable and to extend the time to set the matter down for trial, which the court treated as a status hearing.

The action, a subrogated claim arising from an oil spill, was delayed following the deaths of both original plaintiffs and procedural missteps in obtaining an order to continue.

The court found the plaintiffs' explanation for the delay passable and concluded the defendants would not suffer non-compensable prejudice, as the insurer had promptly investigated the spill.

The action was stayed pending a proper order to continue, with costs awarded to the defendants.

The parties sought clarification of a previous order regarding the conditions of the plaintiff's independent medical examinations.

The court issued supplementary reasons clarifying that the prohibition on using a questionnaire in advance of the assessment does not preclude the use of psychometric testing forms.

Furthermore, the condition that the plaintiff's health records not be disclosed to anyone other than defence counsel does not prevent the expert from utilizing administrative staff or a psychometrist.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a contested motion where the defendants successfully obtained independent medical examinations, but on terms largely advocated by the plaintiff.

The court found success was divided, with the plaintiff being "more successful" on the central issue of the conditions for the medical assessments, particularly regarding "ghostwriting" concerns.

Applying Rule 57, the court awarded the plaintiff partial fixed costs, acknowledging the legitimate differences of opinion on novel issues.

The defendant Jamie Macari moved for an order compelling the plaintiff to undergo two independent medical examinations (IMEs) and to pay a late cancellation fee for a missed appointment.

The plaintiff sought additional conditions for the IMEs, specifically regarding "ghost writing" of expert reports, and opposed paying the cancellation fee.

The court allowed the defendant's motion in part, imposing modified conditions for the IMEs to ensure expert reports are solely authored by the examining doctor and are compliant with Rules 33.06 and 53.03(2.1), and ordered the plaintiff to pay a reduced portion of the cancellation fee.

The defendant sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion for summary judgment in a dental malpractice action.

The primary issues were the admissibility of a treating cardiologist's opinion on causation without strict compliance with Rule 53.03 and whether conflicting expert opinions could be resolved at the summary judgment stage.

The court, applying the principles from Westerhof v. Gee Estate, determined that the treating cardiologist was a "participant expert" whose opinion was admissible.

Given the presence of conflicting medical expert opinions on causation and questions surrounding the defendant's missing dental records, the court found that a genuine issue requiring a trial existed.

Consequently, the motion for leave to appeal was dismissed, and the matter was directed to proceed to trial.

During a family law trial, the respondent sought to qualify his long-time accountant as an expert to provide opinion evidence on his income for spousal support purposes.

The applicant opposed the request on the basis that the evidence was not necessary and the accountant lacked independence.

The court applied the Mohan and White Burgess frameworks and concluded that the proposed expert evidence was not necessary.

Furthermore, the court found the accountant lacked specific expertise in support income determination and lacked the requisite independence and impartiality, having served as the respondent's accountant for nearly four decades.

The request to admit the expert opinion evidence was denied.