Joseph Villeneuve

The plaintiff, a former radio host, brought a defamation action against the defendants over a magazine article detailing his criminal harassment of a former partner.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action.

The court found that the article related to a matter of public interest (gender-based harassment).

While the plaintiff showed the action had substantial merit and the defence of justification might not succeed, he failed to prove that the harm he suffered from the article outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The court noted the plaintiff's career damage occurred prior to the article's publication due to the criminal charges themselves.

The motion was granted and the action dismissed.

The plaintiffs, successful in their negligence claims at trial, sought costs.

However, they deliberately withheld the terms of their contingency fee agreement with their insurer and individual clients.

The defendants argued for disclosure, citing the principle of indemnity in costs assessment.

The court found the non-disclosure intentional and crucial for properly fixing costs.

The court ordered plaintiffs' counsel to file the fee agreement under seal for judicial review to determine its compliance with O. Reg. 195/04 and to identify the terms requiring disclosure to the defendants for costs calculation.

This ruling addresses the final terms of judgment following a trial where liability was apportioned 60% to Ultramar and 40% to the plaintiffs.

The court resolved disputes between the parties regarding the precise wording of the judgment, specifically concerning the subrogated claim, Ultramar's crossclaim for indemnity, and the inclusion of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.

The court largely adopted the plaintiffs' proposed judgment wording, emphasizing that a judgment must reflect the enforceable result rather than the underlying calculations or reasons for decision.

Pre-judgment interest and costs were noted as subjects for a subsequent order.

The appellant appealed a decision by Tarion Warranty Corporation denying her claim for warranty coverage under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act for water penetration into her home.

The tribunal found that the water penetration was primarily caused by ice damming.

While ice damming itself is a naturally occurring phenomenon and not explicitly warranted, the tribunal held that the appellant was entitled to a home built in compliance with the Ontario Building Code and the warranty of workmanship.

The tribunal accepted expert evidence that the home's attic insulation, eaves protection, and starter strips violated the Ontario Building Code.

Tarion was ordered to repair these specific defects, though the appellant was denied a broader order requiring Tarion to identify and correct the entire water penetration problem due to her failure to comply with a prior order to conduct an engineering inspection.

The applicant political party brought an application and motion for an interlocutory injunction against the respondent member and his campaigns, alleging unauthorized use of the party's confidential membership list to send emails criticizing the party leader.

The respondents brought a cross-motion to dismiss the application under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court granted the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that the proceeding arose from expression on a matter of public interest (political debate), the applicant failed to show its claims had substantial merit and no valid defence existed, and the public interest in protecting the expression outweighed the public interest in allowing the proceeding to continue.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiffs suffered a residential fuel oil spill when their outdoor tank, which was labelled for indoor use, corroded and leaked.

They sued their fuel oil supplier, Ultramar, and its sub-contractor, Kilpatrick Fuels, in negligence and breach of contract.

The court found that the defendants breached the standard of care under the Technical Standards and Safety Act regime by failing to properly inspect, tag, and mandate the replacement of the non-compliant tank.

However, the court also found the plaintiffs contributorily negligent for failing to maintain their heating system.

Liability was apportioned 60% to Ultramar and 40% to the plaintiffs, with Ultramar entitled to 50% contribution from Kilpatrick.

The plaintiffs were awarded agreed subrogated damages of $750,000 and general damages of $30,000.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff's personal injury claim was statute-barred due to the two-year limitation period.

The core issue was discoverability, specifically whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in discovering the permanent and serious nature of her injuries, particularly regarding an MRI report.

The court found it reasonable for the plaintiff to defer to her doctors regarding MRI results and that her claim was not statute-barred, dismissing the motion.

The plaintiff sought damages for injuries from a motor vehicle accident.

The defendants admitted liability but brought a threshold motion to declare the plaintiff's non-pecuniary loss claim barred under s. 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act, arguing the plaintiff did not sustain a permanent, serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function.

The court applied the three-part Meyer v. Bright test, finding the plaintiff suffered permanent chronic pain, anxiety, driving phobia, and depression, which constituted a permanent and serious impairment of important functions.

The defendants' motion was dismissed.

Following reasons for decision on a motion concerning undertakings and security for costs in a simplified procedure action, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The moving parties had succeeded on the motion but obtained a reduced form of the relief originally sought, including a lower amount of security for costs.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found that the moving parties achieved partial success and that the motion was not complex.

The court fixed partial indemnity costs payable by the responding party and also directed the form in which security for costs must be posted.

Following a successful appeal, the appellants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis of $54,456.00, arguing that the trial tactics of defence counsel warranted such an award.

The Court of Appeal found no basis in the conduct of the appeal for substantial indemnity costs.

The court fixed the costs of the appeal at $33,000 all-inclusive, payable to the appellants.

The moving party, a third-party subcontractor, sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing its motion for summary judgment.

The underlying action involved a claim for damages resulting from severed power cables during demolition work.

The moving party argued that a full and final release barred the third-party claim for contribution and indemnity.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding no conflicting decision and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's conclusion that a trial was required to determine the parties' intentions regarding the release.

The appellants were involved in a rear-end motor vehicle collision and sued for personal injuries.

At trial, the judge failed to instruct the jury that the evidentiary burden shifts to the defendant in a rear-end collision.

Furthermore, the trial judge permitted the respondents to introduce extensive surveillance evidence that had not been disclosed in an affidavit of documents, leading to a trial by ambush.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, substituted a finding of liability against the respondents, and ordered a new trial on the issue of damages due to the severe prejudice caused by the undisclosed surveillance evidence.

The moving party (Third Party) brought a motion to set aside an order of a single judge of the Divisional Court, which had quashed its appeal from a Master's interlocutory orders regarding the procedure for a trade secrets protection motion.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the Master's orders were interlocutory and properly appealable only to a judge of the Superior Court.

The court also dismissed the moving party's requests to vary the order to permit examination of opposing counsel and to delete portions of the judge's endorsement, characterizing the moving party's conduct as an abuse of process.

The responding party's cross-motion was granted in part, requiring the moving party to obtain leave before bringing further procedural motions.

Full indemnity costs were awarded against the moving party.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding they breached a custom home construction contract and dismissing their counterclaim.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's dismissal of its claim for future lost profits.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions that the appellants caused the delay, that the Consumer Protection Act did not apply because the real substance of the transaction was the purchase of real property, and that the respondent did not commit trespass.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in failing to award the 20% markup as pure profit on the uncompleted portion of the cost-plus contract, and awarded the respondent $162,008.71 in damages.

The appellant, B.C.R. Construction Incorporated, appealed a trial judgment that awarded the respondent damages for breach of a real estate contract and dismissed the appellant's counterclaim regarding restrictive covenants.

The trial judge had found a binding agreement of purchase and sale, awarded damages for the cost differential and relocation of a house, and granted $100,000 in costs to the respondent due to the complexity of the dismissed counterclaim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings, legal conclusions, or costs award.

Following a jury trial for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident, the defendant brought a threshold motion arguing the plaintiff's claims for non-pecuniary damages and future care costs were barred under s. 267.5 of the Insurance Act.

The court reviewed extensive expert medical evidence regarding the plaintiff's chronic pain.

Despite the lack of objective findings and the jury's low damage award, the trial judge found the plaintiff credible and concluded she suffered from chronic pain caused by the accident, meeting the threshold of a serious permanent impairment.

The defendant's motion was dismissed, and judgment was entered in accordance with the jury's verdict.

The defendant brought a motion during a jury trial for a ruling that the plaintiff's claims for future care costs and non-pecuniary damages were barred by the statutory threshold under the Insurance Act.

The plaintiff suffered a whiplash injury in a rear-end motor vehicle accident and subsequently developed chronic pain.

The defendant argued the plaintiff was malingering and exaggerating her symptoms for financial gain.

The trial judge dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiff credible and concluding she suffered a serious permanent impairment due to chronic pain caused by the accident, despite the jury ultimately awarding only $10,000 for general damages and $14,521.21 for past loss of income.

A home builder sued purchasers for breach of a cost-plus construction contract after the defendants terminated the project before completion.

The defendants alleged breaches including cost overruns, delay, improper billing, and reliance on the Consumer Protection Act, 2002.

The court held the construction contract and the agreement of purchase and sale formed one integrated real estate transaction, rendering the Consumer Protection Act inapplicable.

The court found the defendants terminated the contract without cause and breached restrictive covenants requiring completion of construction within one year.

Damages were limited to unpaid invoiced work already performed, as the builder failed to prove lost profits from the abandoned project.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' personal injury claims at a jury trial, the court assessed costs payable to the successful defendants.

The plaintiff argued impecuniosity, but the court found he failed to meet the evidentiary threshold to prove an inability to pay.

The court awarded the defendants partial indemnity costs up to the date of their reasonable settlement offer, and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, fixing total fees at $180,000 plus HST and disbursements at $51,554.18.

During a jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the defendants brought a threshold motion under s. 267.5 of the Insurance Act to determine whether the plaintiff had sustained a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function.

The court assessed extensive medical evidence concerning shoulder injuries, surgeries, and alleged chronic pain.

While the court accepted that the accident aggravated a pre-existing shoulder condition requiring surgical treatment, it found the plaintiff’s evidence of ongoing limitations unreliable and inconsistent with medical opinions and surveillance evidence.

The court concluded that the plaintiff had not established, on a balance of probabilities, that any impairment was permanent, serious, or sufficiently impactful on important functions.

The statutory threshold was therefore not met and the claim for non‑pecuniary damages was barred.