Joseph Villeneuve

The plaintiff, a former radio host, brought a defamation action against the defendants over a magazine article detailing his criminal harassment of a former partner.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action.

The court found that the article related to a matter of public interest (gender-based harassment).

While the plaintiff showed the action had substantial merit and the defence of justification might not succeed, he failed to prove that the harm he suffered from the article outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The court noted the plaintiff's career damage occurred prior to the article's publication due to the criminal charges themselves.

The motion was granted and the action dismissed.

The plaintiffs, successful in their negligence claims at trial, sought costs.

However, they deliberately withheld the terms of their contingency fee agreement with their insurer and individual clients.

The defendants argued for disclosure, citing the principle of indemnity in costs assessment.

The court found the non-disclosure intentional and crucial for properly fixing costs.

The court ordered plaintiffs' counsel to file the fee agreement under seal for judicial review to determine its compliance with O. Reg. 195/04 and to identify the terms requiring disclosure to the defendants for costs calculation.

This ruling addresses the final terms of judgment following a trial where liability was apportioned 60% to Ultramar and 40% to the plaintiffs.

The court resolved disputes between the parties regarding the precise wording of the judgment, specifically concerning the subrogated claim, Ultramar's crossclaim for indemnity, and the inclusion of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.

The court largely adopted the plaintiffs' proposed judgment wording, emphasizing that a judgment must reflect the enforceable result rather than the underlying calculations or reasons for decision.

Pre-judgment interest and costs were noted as subjects for a subsequent order.

The applicant political party brought an application and motion for an interlocutory injunction against the respondent member and his campaigns, alleging unauthorized use of the party's confidential membership list to send emails criticizing the party leader.

The respondents brought a cross-motion to dismiss the application under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court granted the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that the proceeding arose from expression on a matter of public interest (political debate), the applicant failed to show its claims had substantial merit and no valid defence existed, and the public interest in protecting the expression outweighed the public interest in allowing the proceeding to continue.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiffs suffered a residential fuel oil spill when their outdoor tank, which was labelled for indoor use, corroded and leaked.

They sued their fuel oil supplier, Ultramar, and its sub-contractor, Kilpatrick Fuels, in negligence and breach of contract.

The court found that the defendants breached the standard of care under the Technical Standards and Safety Act regime by failing to properly inspect, tag, and mandate the replacement of the non-compliant tank.

However, the court also found the plaintiffs contributorily negligent for failing to maintain their heating system.

Liability was apportioned 60% to Ultramar and 40% to the plaintiffs, with Ultramar entitled to 50% contribution from Kilpatrick.

The plaintiffs were awarded agreed subrogated damages of $750,000 and general damages of $30,000.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff's personal injury claim was statute-barred due to the two-year limitation period.

The core issue was discoverability, specifically whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in discovering the permanent and serious nature of her injuries, particularly regarding an MRI report.

The court found it reasonable for the plaintiff to defer to her doctors regarding MRI results and that her claim was not statute-barred, dismissing the motion.

The plaintiff sought damages for injuries from a motor vehicle accident.

The defendants admitted liability but brought a threshold motion to declare the plaintiff's non-pecuniary loss claim barred under s. 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act, arguing the plaintiff did not sustain a permanent, serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function.

The court applied the three-part Meyer v. Bright test, finding the plaintiff suffered permanent chronic pain, anxiety, driving phobia, and depression, which constituted a permanent and serious impairment of important functions.

The defendants' motion was dismissed.

Following reasons for decision on a motion concerning undertakings and security for costs in a simplified procedure action, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The moving parties had succeeded on the motion but obtained a reduced form of the relief originally sought, including a lower amount of security for costs.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found that the moving parties achieved partial success and that the motion was not complex.

The court fixed partial indemnity costs payable by the responding party and also directed the form in which security for costs must be posted.

Following a jury trial for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident, the defendant brought a threshold motion arguing the plaintiff's claims for non-pecuniary damages and future care costs were barred under s. 267.5 of the Insurance Act.

The court reviewed extensive expert medical evidence regarding the plaintiff's chronic pain.

Despite the lack of objective findings and the jury's low damage award, the trial judge found the plaintiff credible and concluded she suffered from chronic pain caused by the accident, meeting the threshold of a serious permanent impairment.

The defendant's motion was dismissed, and judgment was entered in accordance with the jury's verdict.

The defendant brought a motion during a jury trial for a ruling that the plaintiff's claims for future care costs and non-pecuniary damages were barred by the statutory threshold under the Insurance Act.

The plaintiff suffered a whiplash injury in a rear-end motor vehicle accident and subsequently developed chronic pain.

The defendant argued the plaintiff was malingering and exaggerating her symptoms for financial gain.

The trial judge dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiff credible and concluding she suffered a serious permanent impairment due to chronic pain caused by the accident, despite the jury ultimately awarding only $10,000 for general damages and $14,521.21 for past loss of income.

A home builder sued purchasers for breach of a cost-plus construction contract after the defendants terminated the project before completion.

The defendants alleged breaches including cost overruns, delay, improper billing, and reliance on the Consumer Protection Act, 2002.

The court held the construction contract and the agreement of purchase and sale formed one integrated real estate transaction, rendering the Consumer Protection Act inapplicable.

The court found the defendants terminated the contract without cause and breached restrictive covenants requiring completion of construction within one year.

Damages were limited to unpaid invoiced work already performed, as the builder failed to prove lost profits from the abandoned project.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' personal injury claims at a jury trial, the court assessed costs payable to the successful defendants.

The plaintiff argued impecuniosity, but the court found he failed to meet the evidentiary threshold to prove an inability to pay.

The court awarded the defendants partial indemnity costs up to the date of their reasonable settlement offer, and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, fixing total fees at $180,000 plus HST and disbursements at $51,554.18.

During a jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the defendants brought a threshold motion under s. 267.5 of the Insurance Act to determine whether the plaintiff had sustained a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function.

The court assessed extensive medical evidence concerning shoulder injuries, surgeries, and alleged chronic pain.

While the court accepted that the accident aggravated a pre-existing shoulder condition requiring surgical treatment, it found the plaintiff’s evidence of ongoing limitations unreliable and inconsistent with medical opinions and surveillance evidence.

The court concluded that the plaintiff had not established, on a balance of probabilities, that any impairment was permanent, serious, or sufficiently impactful on important functions.

The statutory threshold was therefore not met and the claim for non‑pecuniary damages was barred.