Catherine D. Aitken

The Crown sought to have Matthew Villeneuve declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate period of detention following his guilty plea to attempted murder, break and enter, and obstruction of justice.

The court reviewed Villeneuve's extensive history of violent and aggressive behavior, including numerous assaults, dangerous driving, thefts, and breaches of court orders, dating back to his youth.

Psychiatric and psychological assessments, including high scores on the VRAG-R and PCL-R, indicated a very high risk of future violent reoffending and intractability of his behavior.

Despite past interventions and treatment attempts, Villeneuve consistently failed to benefit from programs or adhere to supervision conditions.

The court found that a pattern of persistent aggressive behavior with indifference to consequences was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and there was no reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public.

Consequently, the court designated Villeneuve a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

Kivi Bar Wari pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of his cellmate.

Crown and Defence jointly recommended an eight-year sentence, which the court accepted.

The primary outstanding issue was the calculation of pre-sentence custody credit.

The Crown argued for standard 1.5:1 Summers credit, while the Defence sought additional enhanced Duncan credit due to unduly harsh detention conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court, following R. v. Marshall, held that Duncan credit is a mitigating factor to be considered when determining the appropriate sentence, not an additional deduction after the sentence is set.

Since the joint sentencing submission had already factored in the harsh conditions, granting further enhanced credit would constitute "double accounting." The court applied the 1.5:1 Summers credit to the remaining pre-sentence custody.

The accused, J.W., pleaded guilty to sexual assault, threatening death, and unlawful confinement of K.G. The court was tasked with sentencing, considering the Crown's request for 8-10 years and the Defence's request for 7.5 years.

The decision weighed aggravating factors, including the violent nature of the offences, the victim's vulnerability as an Aboriginal female, and the significant impact on her life and career.

Mitigating factors included the offender's Aboriginal status, mental health issues, and cognitive deficits, stemming from intergenerational trauma.

The court sentenced the offender to nine years imprisonment, granting 1.5:1 credit for time in detention centres and 1:1 credit for time spent in a more comfortable hospital environment, resulting in a balance of four years to be served in a federal institution.

Ancillary orders were also imposed.

The accused sought a review of a prior bail denial under section 520 of the Criminal Code, arguing a material change in circumstances.

The court considered a "beefed-up" release plan including GPS monitoring and culturally appropriate counselling.

Despite reservations about the accused's credibility and lack of full disclosure to the proposed counsellor, the court found that the new plan, combined with the surety's commitment and the accused's time in custody, barely satisfied the secondary grounds for release.

The application for bail review was granted.

Scott Bullen, a surety, brought a preliminary motion challenging the court's jurisdiction to hold a forfeiture hearing under s. 771(2) of the Criminal Code.

He argued that the certificate of default (Form 33) was endorsed prematurely and lacked sufficient information, and that the forfeiture proceedings should be stayed due to the principal's (David Bullen's) death and the Crown's staying of charges against him.

The court rejected all arguments, finding the certificate validly endorsed and that neither the stay of charges nor the principal's death precluded forfeiture proceedings against the sureties.

This ruling addresses the voluntariness of a videotaped statement made by Matthew Villeneuve to police, which the Crown sought to admit as evidence in his trial for attempted murder and other charges.

The defence challenged the statement's admissibility, arguing that Villeneuve lacked an operating mind due to his mental health issues and drug use.

The court, applying the common law confessions rule, found that Villeneuve had an operating mind, understood his rights, and made the statement voluntarily, despite his aggressive behaviour prior to the interview and his stated psychological problems.

The court emphasized that Villeneuve initiated and controlled the interview, and his statements were coherent and rational, demonstrating free will.

The accused, Gaston Nicholas, was found guilty of two counts of arson.

At sentencing, the Crown sought a 12-month reformatory sentence, while the defence sought a suspended sentence with probation, citing the accused's advanced age, poor physical and mental health (including vascular dementia and depression), and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found a causal link between the accused's mental health and the offences, and concluded that incarceration would have a severe negative effect on him due to his vulnerabilities and the pandemic conditions in correctional institutions.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with three years probation and a 10-year weapons prohibition, declining a DNA order.

The accused, Jorden Larocque-Laplante, was found guilty of second-degree murder.

The court was tasked with determining the period of parole ineligibility, which could range from 10 to 25 years.

The judge considered the accused's character, the brutal nature and circumstances of the offence (including a hate-motivated element), the jury's recommendations, and the devastating impact on the victim's family.

Despite mitigating factors such as youth and remorse, the significant aggravating factors led the court to impose a parole ineligibility period of 13 years.

Crown counsel, on behalf of Complainant C.G., applied for an order lifting a mandatory publication ban under s. 486.4 of the Criminal Code, which had been imposed in incest proceedings.

C.G. wished to publicize her story to encourage other victims and aid her healing.

The other complainant, H.B., did not consent to lifting the ban, and the Accused, T.S.H., opposed it due to concerns about youth criminal justice information.

The court acknowledged its jurisdiction to revoke the ban given C.G.'s consent, but ultimately refused the application, prioritizing H.B.'s privacy interests and the criminal justice system's assurance of victim identity protection.

The court suggested alternative ways for C.G. to tell her story without revealing her identity.

The Applicant sought substantial indemnity costs of $9,638.47 for an interim motion, while the Respondent sought no costs.

The court found the Applicant was largely successful on the interim motion.

The Respondent's conduct was deemed unreasonable, including non-compliance with disclosure orders, changing positions on property sale, and late filing of materials and an unreasonable settlement offer.

Despite this, the court did not award substantial indemnity costs.

Considering factors under Family Law Rules, r. 24(12), the court fixed costs at $6,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements, to be paid by the Respondent to the Applicant.

The Respondent's impecuniosity was not a reason to deny costs given her unreasonable litigation conduct.

The Applicant sought the sale of a jointly-titled property under the Partition Act and opposed interim spousal support for the Respondent.

The Respondent opposed the sale, citing her mother's health and a potential gift, and sought interim spousal support.

The court ordered the immediate sale of the property, finding the Respondent's reasons unpersuasive and her financial capacity insufficient to purchase the Applicant's interest.

The court also declined to order interim spousal support, noting the Applicant was already covering significant property expenses benefiting the Respondent and her mother, which effectively provided a non-taxable benefit equivalent to potential support.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the plaintiff's Statement of Claim, alleging no reasonable cause of action, reliance on false documents, and abuse of process.

The defendant also sought various ancillary orders, including declarations regarding financial obligations and property charges, credit rating restoration, and sealing of court files.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff's Statement of Claim adequately pled material facts for its claims based on a mortgage and unpaid credit card bills.

The court determined that the defendant's arguments related to the merits of the plaintiff's claim rather than the adequacy of the pleading itself, which is the focus of a Rule 25.11 motion.

The court noted several substantive issues raised by the defendant that might warrant a trial on the merits.

Costs were reserved.

The Third Party sought costs after partially succeeding on a motion to strike claims in an Amended Third Party Claim.

The Defendant opposed, arguing the motion was unnecessary and the Third Party introduced a new issue late.

The court found divided success on the motion to strike and unreasonable behaviour from both parties, including the Defendant's poorly drafted Third Party Claim and the Third Party's improper Demand for Particulars and late introduction of an objection.

Consequently, no costs were awarded to either party.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, sought to have the partial defence of provocation left to the jury.

The Crown argued there was no air of reality to the defence.

The court applied the five-component air of reality test for provocation under s. 232 of the Criminal Code, considering both objective and subjective elements.

The court found that there was sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to have a reasonable doubt regarding the Crown disproving the elements of provocation, particularly concerning whether the victim's conduct constituted an indictable offence and whether it would deprive an ordinary person of self-control, despite the accused initiating the confrontation.

The court ruled that the defence of provocation would be left with the jury.

The Third Party, RE/MAX Ontario-Atlantic Canada Inc. o/a RE/MAX Integra, brought a motion to strike portions of the Amended Third Party Claim filed by the Defendant, RE/MAX Core Realty Inc. The claims sought to be struck included allegations of unfair business practices, breaches of common law duties of fair dealing and good faith, breaches of the Arthur Wishart Act, and intentional interference with economic relations.

The court struck the claims for unfair business practices (by consent) and intentional interference with economic relations (without leave to amend).

The claims for breaches of common law and statutory duties of good faith were struck but with leave for the Defendant to amend its pleading to include necessary material facts linking the allegations to the Franchise Agreement.

The court also clarified that allegations regarding a disciplinary matter could be included as particulars for the good faith claims, provided they were properly tied to the Franchise Agreement.

The appellant, Abdulahi Quadri, appealed a suspended sentence imposed for knowingly using a forged document, arguing he should have received a conditional discharge due to potential immigration consequences.

The sentencing judge had disbelieved the appellant's explanation and considered the offence serious, especially given a prior conditional discharge.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, affirming that a sentencing judge is not compelled to adjust a sentence to avoid collateral immigration consequences if it would render the sentence inappropriate, and that the judge's weighing of sentencing factors is entitled to deference.

The Appellant, Bernard Momprevil, sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal and appealed his conviction and sentence for breach of probation.

The court considered the factors for granting an extension, including bona fide intention, explanation for delay, and the merit of the proposed appeal.

The Appellant failed to provide evidence of a bona fide intention or explain the significant delay in filing the appeal, and the court found no appreciable promise of success on the merits.

Furthermore, the Appellant had already benefited from the original judgment, which involved the withdrawal of more serious charges and his release from custody.

The court also affirmed the validity of the guilty plea, finding it to be voluntary, unequivocal, and informed, as the Appellant actively participated in discussions, understood the consequences, and was not subjected to pressure.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, Deinsberg St. Hilaire, was charged with dangerous driving causing death, failure to stop at the scene of an accident causing death, and obstruction of a peace officer.

He pleaded guilty to obstruction but not guilty to the other two.

The charges arose from a collision where his pickup truck struck and killed a cyclist on the paved shoulder of Leitrim Road.

The court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the *actus reus* and *mens rea* for dangerous driving, specifically that the driving constituted a 'marked departure' from the standard of care or that the accused knew or ought to have known he was too tired to drive.

For the failure to stop charge, the court found reasonable doubt as to whether the accused knew or was wilfully blind to having struck a person.

Consequently, St. Hilaire was found not guilty of dangerous driving causing death and failure to stop, but guilty of obstruction of a peace officer.

The Plaintiffs sought partial indemnity costs of $117,629.60 after recovering modest damages (under $50,000 each) in an action against the Ottawa Police Services Board and several officers for negligent investigation, false arrest, unreasonable search and seizure, negligence in training, and Charter rights breaches.

The Defendants argued no costs should be awarded due to the low recovery, suggesting the case should have proceeded under Simplified Procedure.

The court found it reasonable for the Plaintiffs to have used the ordinary procedure given the importance of Charter rights, the need for discovery, oral evidence, and the complexity of legal issues.

However, the court found the Plaintiffs' counsel's docketing heavy, hourly rates inappropriate for the entire eight-year litigation, and the use of two senior lawyers unjustified given the modest recovery.

Considering proportionality and the importance of the issues, the court awarded the Plaintiffs $65,000 in costs, less $3,750 owed to the Defendants for an unsuccessful motion, resulting in a net recovery of $61,250.

The accused, Jose Herrera, was charged with possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, assault with a weapon, and aggravated assault following a stabbing incident.

The court found Herrera not guilty of possession of a knife for a dangerous purpose due to insufficient evidence that a knife specifically was used.

However, he was found guilty of assault with a weapon (a sharp-edged object) and aggravated assault.

The defense of self-defense was rejected as lacking an "air of reality," given that Herrera initiated both altercations and there was no evidence of force or threat from the complainant prior to the stabbing.