Timothy Searle Carrington Radcliffe

Tamara Lich and Christopher Barber were convicted of mischief arising from their leadership roles in the Freedom Convoy, which gridlocked Ottawa from January 29 to February 18, 2022.

Barber was additionally convicted of counselling others to disobey a Court Order.

The Crown sought unprecedented custodial sentences of seven years for Lich and eight years for Barber.

The defence sought absolute discharges or non-custodial dispositions.

The court imposed conditional sentences of 18 months for Barber (concurrent with 3 months for the counselling conviction) and 15.5 months for Lich (after crediting 74 days pre-sentence custody), with strict conditions including house arrest, curfews, and community service.

The court rejected both the Crown's punitive approach and the defence's request for discharges, finding that conditional sentences with onerous conditions could achieve denunciation and deterrence while respecting principles of proportionality and restraint.

This decision concerns the manslaughter charge against Ian Rooney for the unlawful death of Yu Kun Xie.

The Crown alleged that Rooney's disproportionate response to Ms. Xie's aggressive behavior, including a blow to her face, caused a fatal brain injury, and that his failure to seek timely medical help constituted criminal negligence.

The trial judge found Rooney's evidence unreliable but accepted that Ms. Xie assaulted him and that his response was in self-defence and reasonable under the circumstances.

The judge further found that although Rooney's cancellation of 911 calls was reckless and a marked departure from reasonable conduct, the Crown failed to prove causation between this conduct and Ms. Xie's death.

Consequently, the manslaughter charge was dismissed.

This judgment addresses pre-trial motions concerning the voluntariness of a statement made by the accused to police and alleged breaches of the accused's Charter rights under sections 10(a) and 10(b).

The accused was initially arrested for aggravated assault, and later cautioned and 'arrested' for murder as the victim's condition worsened.

The defence argued police trickery regarding the victim's health status and failure to re-advise of the right to counsel upon change in jeopardy.

The court found the statement voluntary, concluding that the accused was aware of the extent of their jeopardy and that police conduct did not constitute trickery that would shock the community.

The court also found no breach of Charter rights, as the accused was informed of the change in jeopardy and had opportunities to consult counsel.

The accused, David Arron Romlewski, was charged with two counts of mischief and one count of obstructing a peace officer, arising from the "Freedom Convoy" protests in Ottawa.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused, self-represented, presented pseudolegal arguments regarding jurisdiction, which the court summarily rejected.

The court found the accused guilty of obstructing a peace officer, as his act of sitting down in front of advancing tactical officers constituted a willful physical obstruction of their lawful duty to clear the streets.

However, the court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was a party to the broader mischief committed by the Freedom Convoy protesters, as there was no evidence linking his actions to the overall protest organization or that he aided or abetted the mischief of others.

Jean Roy pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and breach of probation after an unprovoked, drunken stabbing of a neighbor, Stephen Penney, who sustained permanent physical and psychological injuries.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the premeditated nature of the attack, the severe impact on the victim, and Roy's history of violence and failed attempts at alcohol rehabilitation.

Mitigating factors included his guilty plea, mental health issues (mild intellectual disability, depressive disorder, PTSD, anti-social personality disorder), and candour with the psychiatrist.

The court sentenced Roy to an equivalent of four years' incarceration, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence while applying the principle of restraint for a first penitentiary sentence.

M.S., a young person, pleaded guilty to multiple terrorism-related offenses, including facilitating terrorist activity, counselling to detonate an explosive device, and making/possessing explosive substances.

The Crown initially sought an adult sentence of life imprisonment but, after extensive evidence regarding M.S.'s rehabilitation efforts, including participation in Project Reset and NORMM programs, and his diagnosis of Multiple Sclerosis, jointly submitted for a maximum youth sentence.

The court accepted the joint submission, imposing a three-year custody and supervision order (two years in custody, one year under community supervision), in addition to the three years already served in detention, emphasizing accountability, rehabilitation, and public protection under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge imposed under section 737 of the Criminal Code, arguing it violates sections 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appellants were impoverished offenders with mental and physical disabilities, unemployment, and substance abuse issues.

The trial judges had refused to impose the surcharge, finding it unconstitutional.

The Crown appealed and the Superior Court judges overturned these decisions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge, finding that while it engages the appellants' liberty interests, it does not violate section 7 because impoverished offenders cannot be imprisoned for non-payment (inability to pay is a reasonable excuse), extensions of time to pay are available, and the deprivation is not grossly disproportionate to the important objectives of the surcharge regime.

The court also found the surcharge does not violate section 12 of the Charter as it is not cruel and unusual treatment, being disproportionate but not grossly disproportionate.

The applicant challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge (SAC) imposed under section 737 of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated his rights under sections 7, 12, and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the SAC constitutes a punishment rather than an ancillary order.

Applying the test for cruel and unusual punishment under section 12, the court determined that imposing a $700 surcharge on an impoverished, mentally ill, and substance-dependent offender with a monthly income of approximately $136 would be grossly disproportionate and incompatible with human dignity.

The court declared section 737(1) of the Criminal Code to be of no force or effect under section 52 of the Charter.