Luc Boucher

The applicant, a young person charged with terrorism-related offences, sought certiorari to quash a youth justice court judge's decision.

The judge had ruled that the Crown was entitled to apply for a de novo bail hearing under s. 33(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA), notwithstanding that the young person had previously been released into the care of responsible persons under s. 31(1) of the YCJA by a justice of the peace.

The applicant argued that s. 31 constituted a distinct release scheme, and challenges should proceed under s. 31(4), not s. 33(1).

The Superior Court dismissed the application, affirming that s. 33(1) provides a mechanism for a youth justice court judge to conduct a de novo bail hearing, integrating with the Criminal Code provisions and the YCJA's purpose of providing enhanced procedural protections and avoiding youth incarceration.

The applicant, Hamza Badran, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter due to an alleged violation of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Jordan and R. v. Cody, calculating the total delay, deducting defence delay and exceptional circumstances.

Despite a total delay exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for superior courts, the court found that significant portions were attributable to defence delay (including waivers) and discrete exceptional circumstances.

The resulting net delay fell just under the presumptive ceiling, and the applicant failed to demonstrate that the remaining delay was unreasonable given his lack of sustained effort to expedite proceedings.

The application was dismissed.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge imposed under section 737 of the Criminal Code, arguing it violates sections 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appellants were impoverished offenders with mental and physical disabilities, unemployment, and substance abuse issues.

The trial judges had refused to impose the surcharge, finding it unconstitutional.

The Crown appealed and the Superior Court judges overturned these decisions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge, finding that while it engages the appellants' liberty interests, it does not violate section 7 because impoverished offenders cannot be imprisoned for non-payment (inability to pay is a reasonable excuse), extensions of time to pay are available, and the deprivation is not grossly disproportionate to the important objectives of the surcharge regime.

The court also found the surcharge does not violate section 12 of the Charter as it is not cruel and unusual treatment, being disproportionate but not grossly disproportionate.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice that declared the mandatory victim surcharge under s. 737(1) of the Criminal Code unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the Charter.

The accused, who pleaded guilty to multiple offences and was indigent with mental health and addiction issues, argued that the mandatory surcharge imposed a crushing financial burden.

The Superior Court agreed that the surcharge constitutes punishment for Charter purposes but held that the evidentiary record was insufficient to establish that the surcharge was grossly disproportionate.

The court emphasized the high threshold for s. 12 violations and the availability of statutory mechanisms such as extensions of time to pay.

The appeal was allowed and the surcharge was ordered imposed.

The applicant challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge (SAC) imposed under section 737 of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated his rights under sections 7, 12, and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the SAC constitutes a punishment rather than an ancillary order.

Applying the test for cruel and unusual punishment under section 12, the court determined that imposing a $700 surcharge on an impoverished, mentally ill, and substance-dependent offender with a monthly income of approximately $136 would be grossly disproportionate and incompatible with human dignity.

The court declared section 737(1) of the Criminal Code to be of no force or effect under section 52 of the Charter.

The accused was charged under the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act with genocide and crimes against humanity for allegedly participating in the 1994 Rwandan genocide by intentionally killing Tutsis during attacks in the Kibuye region.

Numerous witnesses described massacres at Mugonero hospital and subsequent attacks in Gitwe, Murambi, and Bisesero.

The Crown relied on both direct eyewitness testimony and circumstantial evidence that the accused joined groups of attackers.

The court found serious credibility issues in several key Crown witnesses, including evidence that some allegations had been fabricated or exaggerated after investigators revealed the accused as the target of an investigation.

Given inconsistencies, unreliable identifications, and lack of corroboration, the court held the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused participated in the killings or materially assisted the attacks.

The accused brought a pre‑trial motion seeking an order compelling the Crown to produce a structured “livre de procès” setting out all material facts supporting each alleged criminal act and identifying the witnesses tied to those facts.

The accused argued that the exceptional measure was necessary due to the alleged complexity of the prosecution and relied on the court’s case‑management powers under the Fair and Efficient Criminal Trials Act.

The court rejected the request, finding that the case itself was not unusually complex and that the Act applies to mega‑trials involving numerous accused and counts.

The court further held it could not restrict the Crown’s discretion to call admissible evidence where full disclosure had already been provided.

The motion was dismissed, although the Crown was ordered to provide a final witness list prior to trial.

The accused brought a motion seeking a declaration that evidence placing him within a broad geographic region during the alleged offence period should not be treated as an alibi defence requiring advance notice to the Crown.

The accused argued the indictment was too vague as to time and location to permit a specific alibi disclosure obligation.

The court held that the disclosure provided by the Crown gave sufficient detail for the accused to understand the allegations and determine whether an alibi existed for particular incidents.

The court also held that there is no freestanding right to an alibi defence and that issues regarding late disclosure must be assessed contextually when the evidence is presented.

The motion was dismissed.