Dallas Mack

At the conclusion of the Crown's case in a first-degree murder trial, the accused applied for a directed verdict, seeking to remove the elevation of murder to first degree based on unlawful confinement and criminal harassment from jury consideration.

The court orally dismissed the application regarding criminal harassment.

In these written reasons, the court granted the application concerning unlawful confinement, finding no evidence of a distinct act of confinement separate from the murder itself, thus precluding first-degree murder liability on that ground.

Ralph King was sentenced after being found guilty of sexual assault against three women during private healing ceremonies where he acted as a spiritual healer.

The offences involved inappropriate physical contact under the guise of healing.

The court considered aggravating factors, including abuse of a position of trust, significant impact on victims (two of whom were Indigenous and had prior trauma), multiple victims, and fraud.

Mitigating factors included his compliance with release conditions, prosocial lifestyle, and health issues.

The court emphasized the interplay between s. 718.04 (vulnerable victims, particularly Indigenous women, mandating primary consideration of denunciation and deterrence) and s. 718.2(e) (Gladue principles for Indigenous offenders).

The court found that the harm done to the victims and the Indigenous community, coupled with the lack of remorse, necessitated a significant custodial sentence.

The accused brought applications for first-party disclosure and third-party production arising from charges connected to the Freedom Convoy protest.

The court applied the Stinchcombe disclosure regime and the O’Connor likely relevance framework, while first addressing asserted claims of solicitor-client privilege and work product privilege.

Communications between the Crown Attorney’s office and police, and emails involving PPS counsel, were held privileged and were not producible.

The court ordered limited disclosure to itself of specified police and PPS materials, including certain duty book notes, reports, and potentially relevant communications and footage, but dismissed the balance of the broader disclosure requests for lack of likely relevance.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on two counts of mischief arising from the Ottawa Freedom Convoy protests.

The trial judge had excluded the respondent's statements to police as involuntary and obtained in violation of his Charter rights, and found insufficient evidence to prove he was a party to the mischief.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in her voluntariness analysis by requiring verbatim notes, misapplied the law on psychological detention, and failed to consider the evidence as a whole regarding the respondent's participation in the protest blockade.

A new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on two counts of mischief arising from his participation in the Freedom Convoy protest in Ottawa.

The respondent cross-appealed his conviction for obstructing a peace officer and sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding the invocation of the Emergencies Act.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the Crown's appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider the respondent's actions—including his refusal to leave the area and his encouragement of others—as aiding and abetting the ongoing mischief.

The court dismissed the respondent's appeal, holding that the police were acting in the lawful execution of their duties and that the fresh evidence would not have affected the result.

Convictions for mischief were entered and the matter was remitted for sentencing.

The applicant, a former provincial legislator charged with offences related to the Freedom Convoy protest, applied for a change of venue from Ottawa, arguing pervasive bias prevented a fair trial.

The Crown argued the court was bound by a prior coordinate decision denying a change of venue for another convoy participant.

The court found it was not bound by the prior decision due to significant differences in evidence, notably a targeted social media campaign against the applicant.

However, the court dismissed the application, concluding that existing procedural safeguards, including robust jury screening, were sufficient to ensure a fair trial.

This endorsement addresses the summary dismissal of an applicant's change of venue application.

The initial dismissal was based on the application having no reasonable prospect of success, similar to a prior decision.

However, a subsequent Supreme Court of Canada decision, R. v. Haevischer, established a new, higher threshold for summary dismissal of criminal applications, requiring them to be "manifestly frivolous." The court found that the applicant's case, which involved factual assertions rather than a pure question of law, could not be deemed "manifestly frivolous" under the new standard.

Consequently, the original summary dismissal was set aside, and the applicant was granted the opportunity to renew his application before another justice.

This endorsement addresses a prior decision summarily dismissing the applicant's change of venue application.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada's release of R. v. Haevischer, 2023 SCC 11, which established that criminal applications should only be summarily dismissed if "manifestly frivolous" the presiding judge invites submissions from the parties.

The purpose of these submissions is to determine whether the earlier dismissal should be set aside in light of the new jurisprudential standard, potentially allowing the applicant to re-present the application before another justice.

The applicant, charged with offences related to his involvement in the Freedom Convoy protest in Ottawa, brought a motion for a change of venue for his trial.

He argued that extensive negative media coverage and the high concentration of federal government employees in Ottawa would prevent him from receiving a fair trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the media coverage was not specifically directed at the applicant and that his concerns about government employees were baseless.

The court concluded that traditional safeguards, such as screening questions and challenges for cause, would be adequate to ensure an impartial jury and address any potential bias from residents directly affected by the protest.

The offender was convicted of manslaughter for his role in facilitating a home invasion that resulted in the shooting death of the victim.

The Crown sought an eight-year sentence, arguing the four-year mandatory minimum for manslaughter with a firearm applied.

The court found the mandatory minimum did not apply because the offender did not know firearms would be used.

After weighing the aggravating factors of the violent home invasion against significant mitigating factors, including the offender's youth, lack of record, and extensive rehabilitation over ten years on bail, the court imposed a total sentence of five years.

With credit for pre-sentence custody and time spent on strict bail conditions, the remaining sentence to serve was two years and five months.

The Crown applied to revoke Sam Tsega's bail pending sentencing after he was found guilty of manslaughter.

Tsega was initially charged with murder but tried for manslaughter, meaning his bail was not automatically revoked post-conviction under s. 523(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought revocation based on the tertiary ground (maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice) under s. 515(10) of the Code.

The court reviewed five principles for post-conviction bail revocation, emphasizing that the Crown must generally present new facts.

The court found that the circumstances relied upon by the Crown were known when Tsega was initially granted bail by the Court of Appeal in 2017, and no new facts or breaches of conditions were alleged.

Considering the relatively short delay until sentencing and potential difficulties for Tsega to prepare while incarcerated due to the pandemic, the court concluded that the Crown had not shown that immediate incarceration was required to maintain public confidence.

The application to revoke bail was denied.

In a judge-alone retrial arising from a fatal home invasion drug robbery, the Crown alleged the accused was liable for manslaughter as a party under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

The court found the accused intentionally assisted the robbers by showing them the victim's house, knew or was willfully blind to the robbery plan, and that a reasonable person in his circumstances would have foreseen a serious risk of non-transient harm from a home invasion drug robbery.

The court rejected the defence theory that the accused merely thought the visitors intended a drug purchase or non-confrontational theft, and also rejected duress as a fabricated excuse lacking an air of reality.

A finding of guilt for manslaughter was entered.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion to exclude evidence obtained from a covert search of his residence authorized by a general warrant.

The police sought to find items linking the accused to the murder, including a composition book containing a map of alleged crime scenes.

The court found that the Information to Obtain (ITO) the general warrant lacked sufficient objective and subjective grounds, relying on stale-dated information and a conditional psychiatric opinion.

Consequently, the search violated the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that the serious nature of the Charter-infringing state conduct and the significant impact on the accused's privacy interests outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The evidence was excluded.

The Crown applied to remove defence counsel from the record in a manslaughter retrial due to a potential conflict of interest.

Defence counsel had previously represented two key Crown witnesses, one of whom was convicted as the shooter in the underlying incident.

Despite the respondent's fundamental right to counsel of choice and proposed waivers, the court found that the potential need to cross-examine former clients created an appearance of unfairness.

The application was granted to protect public confidence in the administration of justice.

This decision addresses two applications for certiorari brought by the Crown, RCMP, and Ottawa Police Services to quash lower court rulings that ordered the disclosure of Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) rolling logs in drug-impaired driving cases.

The Superior Court considered the impact of recent amendments to the Criminal Code (Bill C-46) on the relevance and disclosability of these logs, particularly in light of the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Stipo.

The court found that the Code amendments constituted a significant change in circumstances, but ultimately concluded that the amendments do not alter the requirement for disclosure of rolling logs where the DRE's opinion is not corroborated by toxicological results.

However, where toxicological analysis does corroborate the DRE's call, the rolling log is no longer relevant to challenge the DRE's opinion.

The court indicated it would quash the disclosure orders in the specific cases at hand because the DRE calls were corroborated by toxicology, but declined to issue a mandamus order.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and criminal harassment, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the laying of charges to the anticipated end of trial was approximately 23 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial courts.

The court found only 28 days of defence delay and rejected the Crown's arguments that the defence implicitly waived delay or engaged in illegitimate conduct regarding disclosure and scheduling.

The court also rejected the Crown's argument that the case was complex.

Finding no exceptional circumstances to justify the net delay of nearly 22 months, the court ordered a stay of proceedings.

The accused, charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug, brought a motion for disclosure of the Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) rolling log.

The Crown argued that recent amendments to the Criminal Code (Bill C-46) repealed the provision relied upon in previous case law to permit disclosure, creating an absolute prohibition under the new section 320.36.

The court conducted a statutory interpretation analysis and concluded that section 320.36 does not create an absolute prohibition, as it contains an exception for the enforcement of the Act.

The court held that the appellate precedent mandating disclosure of DRE rolling logs remains applicable under the new legislative regime.

The disclosure application was granted.

The Crown and Ottawa Police Service brought certiorari applications to quash disclosure orders made by three application judges.

These orders required the disclosure of Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) rolling logs and face sheets to the respondents, who were charged with drug-impaired driving.

The Crown argued that disclosure was prohibited by s. 258.1 of the Criminal Code or, alternatively, that the records were third-party records and not relevant.

The court dismissed the certiorari applications, finding that the application judges did not exceed their jurisdiction, s. 258.1 of the Code did not bar disclosure, and the rolling logs and face sheets were relevant third-party records.

The court also declined to order a new hearing for one respondent despite an error in denying standing to the Ottawa Police Service, citing judicial efficiency and the respondents' s. 11(b) rights.

The applicant, charged with first degree murder, brought a fresh application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter after the Court of Appeal previously overturned a stay and ordered a new trial.

The court conducted a preliminary assessment under Rule 34.02 of the Criminal Proceedings Rules.

Finding that the delay since the appellate decision was entirely attributable to the applicant's own requests for time to prepare and seek leave to appeal, the court concluded the application had no reasonable prospect of success and summarily dismissed it.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay charges of assault causing bodily harm against the respondent due to unconstitutional delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge had attributed a six-month delay to the Crown for failing to disclose the child's neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) medical records.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the NICU records were third-party documents held by the hospital, not first-party Crown disclosure, and the delay in requesting them was attributable to the defence.

Alternatively, the court found that the trial judge erred in applying the transitional exception by failing to properly weigh the seriousness of the offence and the moderate complexity of the case.

The stay was lifted and the matter remitted for trial.