Dominic James Lamb

The defendant was charged with sexual assault following an incident on February 4, 2018, where the complainant alleged that after initially consenting to sexual intercourse, she asked the defendant to stop, but he continued to engage in sexual activity for a few more thrusts.

The defendant denied continuing after the complainant asked him to stop.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant continued to engage in sexual intercourse after the complainant said she wanted to stop.

The court found significant credibility and reliability concerns with the complainant's evidence, including inconsistencies with her police statement, limited memory of key events, and the selective provision of text messages to police.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework and concluded that the Crown had not proven the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The charge was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault, alleging that while engaged in consensual sexual intercourse on February 4, 2018, the complainant told him to stop, but he continued to penetrate her briefly before stopping.

The defendant acknowledged the complainant told him to stop but testified he immediately complied.

The court held a hearing under section 278.94 of the Criminal Code to determine the admissibility of evidence of other sexual activity and private records relating to the complainant.

The central issue at trial would be whether the defendant stopped when the complainant communicated her withdrawal of consent.

The court admitted certain text messages and Snapchat messages between the parties and the complainant and her friend that directly related to the sexual activity in issue, as they were relevant to the complainant's credibility regarding her account of the events.

However, the court excluded evidence of other sexual activity between the parties occurring on other dates, as such evidence had minimal probative value and would substantially prejudice the complainant's privacy and dignity rights.

The court also excluded a sentence from the complainant's post-incident message to the defendant that the Crown sought to introduce.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault on February 4, 2018.

This decision addresses applications under s. 278.93 of the Criminal Code to determine whether certain evidence is capable of being admissible.

The defendant sought to introduce: (a) Snapchat messages between the complainant and a friend dated February 4-8, 2018; (b) text messages between the defendant and complainant dated February 3-4, 2018 of a sexual nature; (c) text messages of other sexual activity from various dates between January and August 2018; and (d) evidence of other sexual activity as outlined in the notice of application.

The Crown also sought to introduce a sentence from a message sent by the complainant to a friend.

The court determined that all evidence should proceed to a s. 278.94 hearing to determine final admissibility, with the exception of certain portions that the defendant agreed to redact.

Trial management order addressing pre-trial motions in a sexual assault prosecution.

The defendant sought to admit Snapchat messages, text messages, and evidence of other sexual activity of the complainant.

The Crown sought to admit evidence of other sexual activity.

The court established a comprehensive procedural framework and timetable for determining admissibility issues in stages, including determinations of standing, document characterization, and application of statutory tests for admission of sensitive evidence.

Three defendants were charged with twelve offences arising from a shooting incident at a strip mall parking lot in Ottawa on September 1, 2018.

The Crown alleged that Haji Ragab was the shooter, Paraparan was the driver of the getaway vehicle, and Hope was a passenger.

All three were charged with various firearm-related offences.

The trial judge found that while the Crown proved the three defendants were in the vehicle at the scene, it failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Haji Ragab was the shooter or that Paraparan was the driver.

Critically, the Crown also failed to prove that any defendant possessed the firearm, as the weapon was never recovered and the Crown could not establish that the item used was a firearm as defined by the Criminal Code.

All charges were dismissed against all defendants.

Following conviction on multiple counts arising from a home invasion of a vulnerable victim in September 2014, and guilty pleas to additional offences committed while in custody, the court imposed a global sentence of 120 months (10 years).

The sentencing considered the principle of parity with a co-accused who received 6.5 years, the absence of a criminal record, the defendant's youth at the time of the offences, and the serious nature of the crimes including robbery, forcible confinement, kidnapping, extortion, and assault causing bodily harm.

Additional consecutive sentences were imposed for attempt to obstruct justice (6 months) and aggravated assault at a detention centre (12 months), with a concurrent sentence for obstructing a peace officer (1 month).

The defendant sought to qualify Mark Paquette as an expert witness in forensic collision reconstruction in a criminal negligence and dangerous driving causing death case.

The court declined to qualify him as an expert in forensic collision reconstruction but accepted that he should be qualified as an expert in the narrower field of preparing computer-generated graphic representations of accident reconstructions.

The court found that while the blind spot analysis methodology did not require expert assistance to understand, the computer-aided generation of graphic representations overlaid on scale diagrams required specialized knowledge beyond the trier of fact's ken.

The Crown sought to qualify Detective Alain Boucher as an expert witness in collision reconstruction in a trial for criminal negligence causing death and dangerous driving causing death.

The accused was charged in connection with a fatal collision involving a truck and a cyclist in downtown Ottawa.

The court declined to qualify the detective as an expert, finding that while the detective was impartial, independent, and unbiased, the evidence was primarily narrative and factual in nature and did not meet the necessity threshold for expert evidence.

The court determined that the trier of fact did not require expert assistance to understand the collision analysis report, surveillance video, re-enactment video, and other materials, as these could be understood by examining the totality of the evidence without specialized knowledge.

The Crown sought to admit an audio-recorded statement made by the accused to a detective investigating a fatal motor vehicle collision.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the statement on the basis that the Crown had not proven the "operating mind" component of the common law voluntariness test, specifically arguing that the accused was not aware of the specific criminal charges he might face at the time he made the statement.

The court found that while the accused was not aware of the specific charges, he was aware of the general consequences of speaking to police, including the possibility of jail or fines under either the Criminal Code or the Highway Traffic Act.

The court admitted the statement as voluntary.

The Crown brought a motion for summary dismissal of the defendant's Charter s. 11(b) application alleging unreasonable delay, based on the defence's failure to comply with the Criminal Rules of the Ontario Court of Justice regarding timelines for filing and serving pre-trial applications.

The defence had failed to file materials by the required deadline of March 28, 2018, instead filing on June 18, 2018, just days before trial.

The court dismissed the Crown's motion, finding that although the defence was in clear violation of the Rules, the application met the viability threshold, no prejudice had been caused to the Crown, and constitutional rights should not be easily displaced by procedural non-compliance.

The accused pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography between February 1, 2017 and June 1, 2017, contrary to Section 163.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded by indictment, triggering mandatory minimum penalties.

Police discovered 863 unique images and 5 unique videos of child pornography depicting extremely young children in explicit sexual acts.

The accused had organized and catalogued the materials.

The court imposed a sentence of 19 months imprisonment, followed by 3 years probation, with ancillary orders including DNA registration, a 20-year Sexual Offence Identification Registration Act order, and a 10-year Section 161 order prohibiting attendance at public swimming areas where children are present and restricting computer and internet use.

The accused was charged with impaired driving contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and over 80 contrary to s. 253(1)(b).

The trial proceeded as a blended voir dire to address a Charter application alleging denial of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) due to failure to facilitate interpretation.

The court found no breach of s. 10(b) rights, determining that special circumstances did not exist on an objective basis despite the accused's limited English proficiency.

The court convicted on both counts, finding the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt based on driving conduct, odour of alcohol, and unsteadiness, and proved the over 80 offence based on breath sample analysis.

The applicant sought to invalidate a search warrant and exclude evidence obtained through police surveillance, arguing that observations made in a condominium parking garage and common areas constituted warrantless and unreasonable searches under section 8 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas and that the police conduct fell within the implied license doctrine, thus upholding the search warrant's validity.

The Crown sought to amend count six of the indictment, which initially charged possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, to reflect an unloaded firearm with readily accessible ammunition, and to reopen its case to adduce expert evidence on ammunition capability.

The accused opposed, arguing prejudice.

The court granted the Crown's requests, finding no irreparable prejudice to the accused, noting that the defense of "knowledge and control" would remain unchanged and that the error in the indictment was inadvertent.

The Crown appealed a decision by Justice Maranger dismissing an application for certiorari and mandamus relating to a preliminary inquiry judge's ruling discharging the respondent on count five of an information.

The Crown had subsequently preferred a six-count indictment with count six being identical to the discharged count five.

The respondent's counsel conceded in oral argument that the indictment was properly preferred under s. 574.1(b) and indicated no intention to challenge it at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot but commented on the merits, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge had committed jurisdictional error by failing to consider all evidence relevant to the amended count five, which alleged a continuing sexual assault over a three-year period in Ontario and Quebec.

L.C. was found guilty by a jury of one count of sexual assault and one count of sexual interference against his stepdaughter, S.B.M., who was between six and eight years old at the time of the offences.

The charge of sexual interference was conditionally stayed based on the Kineapple principle.

The court considered aggravating factors including the victim's age, abuse of trust, repeated acts of intercourse over 2.5 years, prior similar convictions, and the long-standing psychological impact on the child.

Mitigating factors included a positive pre-sentence report, steady employment, and family support.

The court sentenced L.C. to 6.5 years' incarceration for sexual assault, along with a DNA order, lifetime sex offender registration, and a communication prohibition with the victim during the custodial period.

The Crown applied for a writ of certiorari and mandamus to review a preliminary inquiry judge's decision to discharge the accused on a sexual assault count.

The preliminary inquiry judge had found insufficient evidence to establish that the offence, which involved anal intercourse, was initiated in Ontario and completed in Quebec, thereby denying Ontario jurisdiction.

The Superior Court, applying the standard of review for non-committal orders, determined that the preliminary inquiry judge's decision was based on an insufficiency of evidence, not a jurisdictional error.

As such, the decision was not susceptible to judicial review, and the Crown's application was dismissed.

The Crown sought to admit certain text messages for the truth of their contents in a criminal trial.

The Defence objected, citing concerns about necessity and reliability under the principled approach to hearsay.

The court ruled that two of the four contested text messages were admissible for the truth of their contents under the present intentions and co-conspirators’ exceptions to the hearsay rule, finding that they met the necessity and reliability requirements despite the declarant's availability.

The other two messages were deemed to lack probative value for their truth.

Sam Tsega was charged with second-degree murder.

The Crown sought to admit evidence of Tsega's marijuana use and dealing to establish opportunity, motive, context, and witness credibility.

The defense argued inadmissibility due to lack of support for inferences and prejudicial effect outweighing probative value.

The court applied the Handy/L.B. framework, finding the evidence relevant and material to central issues, and while discreditable, its probative value significantly outweighed any minimal prejudice, especially in a judge-alone trial.

The evidence was deemed admissible.