Shira Brass

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention at a mental health centre with conditions, arguing he should have been conditionally discharged.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable given the appellant's lack of insight, medication non-compliance, and intimidation of his treatment team.

The court also rejected the argument that a recent appellate decision setting aside a prior conviction undermined the Board's disposition, as the Board relied on the appellant's own testimony regarding the underlying incident.

The applicant, Michael Kilbride, sought a bail review after being detained on secondary and tertiary grounds for charges including breaking into a private residence and assault.

The court found that the new bail plan, which included house arrest with his mother and cash pledges, did not constitute a material change in circumstances sufficient to warrant a de novo hearing or to address the original concerns.

The applicant's extensive criminal record, history of failing to comply with court orders, and the surety's past inability to supervise him led the court to conclude that the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention remained strong.

The application for bail review was dismissed, and the applicant remained detained.

Michael Kilbride, charged with drug trafficking, sought a review of his detention order under s. 525 of the Criminal Code after being initially detained on primary and secondary grounds.

The court considered a new bail plan involving residential drug addiction treatment at the Salvation Army's Anchorage program.

The judge found that the comprehensive program, coupled with support from a CMHA worker and diligent counsel, mitigated the primary and secondary ground concerns, including the risk of reoffence and failure to appear.

The court also considered the applicant's asthma and the COVID-19 pandemic as factors favoring release, concluding that continued detention was not necessary.

The Attorney General of Ontario initiated a forfeiture proceeding under the Civil Remedies Act against property associated with the late Michael Norwood, controlled by 947014 Ontario Inc. The corporation moved for the release of $210,000 from preserved funds for legal expenses and for the conversion of the application to an action.

The court dismissed the request for legal expenses, holding that the Act only permits payment for expenses already incurred, not future retainers, and that disbursements and HST fall under the 15% cap.

The motion to convert the application to an action was deemed premature.

The court also authorized the payment of a judgment to a third-party creditor from the preserved funds.

No costs were awarded.

The applicant, M.K., sought a review of his detention order, which was initially based on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The bail review was conducted via audio conference due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

M.K. faced serious drug trafficking and firearm charges, had a criminal record including prior trafficking convictions and failures to comply with court orders, and was on probation and a firearms prohibition at the time of his arrest.

A new bail plan was proposed, including M.K.'s mother as an additional surety and a GPS monitoring bracelet.

The court found a material change in circumstances, allowing for a de novo hearing.

While the primary and secondary grounds were mitigated by the strengthened bail plan and strong family ties, the tertiary grounds initially favored detention due to the seriousness of the charges and M.K.'s criminal history.

However, M.K.'s specific health vulnerability (prior spontaneous pneumothorax) combined with the heightened risk of COVID-19 transmission in custodial facilities, and the robust bail plan, ultimately led the court to grant release.

The court emphasized that absent M.K.'s particular health vulnerability, the tertiary grounds would have mandated detention.

The accused, Tyler Floyd and Amanda Mailloux, were charged with multiple offences including distribution of child pornography, advertising sexual services, receiving material benefit from sexual services, recruiting for exploitation, forcible confinement, and assault causing bodily harm.

The complainant was a 15-year-old drug-addicted girl.

The court conducted a detailed credibility and reliability assessment of the complainant's evidence, noting significant memory issues, inconsistencies, and drug use impacting her testimony.

The court also considered the co-accused Ms. Mailloux's testimony and Mr. Floyd's police statement.

Ultimately, the court found reasonable doubt on most charges against both accused due to the complainant's unreliable evidence and inconsistencies.

Mr. Floyd was found not guilty of assault causing bodily harm but guilty of the lesser included offence of simple assault.

All other charges against both accused were dismissed.

In a blended voir dire on voluntariness, the court considered whether post-arrest utterances and recorded police interviews were inadmissible because of trickery, oppression, implied promises, or denigration of defence counsel.

Applying the confession rule and the contextual framework from Oickle and Singh, the court held the Crown proved voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.

The interviewing techniques did not amount to community-shocking trickery, no oppressive atmosphere overbore either accused's will, and any alleged inducement arose from one accused's own attempts to negotiate.

All three statements were admitted.

During a trial for human trafficking and related offences, the accused brought an application under section 276 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant about her prior involvement in prostitution in the two weeks preceding the alleged offences.

The accused argued this evidence was relevant to whether the complainant was 'recruited' by them, which is an essential element of the offences charged.

The court granted the application, finding that the proposed evidence had significant probative value regarding the issue of recruitment and the complainant's credibility, and that this probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice.

The accused sought to cross-examine the complainant on prior sexual activity during their trial for various sexual exploitation and child pornography offences.

The court addressed whether the s. 276 regime of the Criminal Code applied, given that the charged offences were not explicitly listed in s. 276(1).

Relying on the Supreme Court's broad interpretation in R. v. Barton, the court found that the s. 276 regime applied due to a sufficient connection between the charged offences and the listed offences, requiring the accused to bring a formal application to admit such evidence.

The accused, facing drug charges following a vehicle search, brought an application for the disclosure of police GPS tracking data to challenge the arresting officers' version of events and support a Charter claim of unreasonable search.

The court held that police GPS data, while not gathered primarily as an investigative tool, relates to the investigation and falls under the Crown's first-party disclosure obligations under Stinchcombe rather than the third-party O'Connor regime.

Finding the data relevant to the accused's defence, the court ordered its production but narrowed the temporal scope of the request.

The applicant, K.H., brought an application under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to exclude all evidence seized at his residence and three statements made to the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP).

K.H. argued that the OPP breached his rights under sections 7, 8, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter, and that his statements were not voluntary.

The court found that K.H. was psychologically detained when he entered the police vehicle, and his Charter rights under sections 7, 10(a), and 10(b) were breached because he was not immediately informed of his rights.

The first and second statements were excluded due to these breaches.

The third statement was excluded because the Crown failed to prove its voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt due to inadequate police record-keeping during the search and subsequent interactions.

The warrantless search of K.H.'s residence was found to be unreasonable and in breach of section 8 of the Charter, as exigent circumstances were not established, and the police had sufficient grounds to obtain a warrant.

Applying the Grant factors under section 24(2), the court concluded that admitting the evidence (statements, handgun, ammunition, and long guns) would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and therefore excluded all evidence.