Jason Michael Neubauer

This criminal trial involved charges against Zekeim Ogilvie (13 offences) and Akol Akol (15 offences, including enabling escape) stemming from a shooting incident.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including video surveillance, cell phone data, and GPS data from a rented vehicle.

The court meticulously analyzed the identification evidence for Ogilvie and the elements of aiding and abetting for Akol.

The judge found that the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for either accused on any count, emphasizing the need to avoid speculation and conjecture when drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence.

Both defendants were acquitted.

The Crown sought to admit recognition evidence from Det. Walrond, identifying the accused, Zekeim Ogilvie, on a video recording related to a shooting.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine threshold admissibility based on the Berhe and Hudson tests.

The court found that Det. Walrond's prior acquaintance with Mr. Ogilvie, primarily a 53-minute police interview, did not afford him a sufficient level of familiarity to provide valuable and otherwise unavailable identifying information regarding Ogilvie's gait, movement, facial features, complexion, hairline, and hairstyle.

The court also noted that the trial judge had sufficient opportunity and other evidence (like a photograph) to make their own assessment.

Consequently, the Crown's application for the admission of Det. Walrond's recognition evidence was dismissed.

Zekeim Ogilvie, charged with multiple offences related to a shooting, brought a pre-trial Charter application to exclude evidence (an iPhone and its data) obtained from a vehicle search.

He argued the warrantless search, conducted under the Liquor Licence Act, violated his section 8 and 9 Charter rights due to a lack of reasonable and probable grounds.

The court examined whether Ogilvie, as a passenger, had standing to challenge the search by establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle.

Despite owning the iPhone found in the vehicle, the court found that he did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle as a whole, given the significantly reduced privacy interest in vehicles, especially for non-owner passengers.

Consequently, the court ruled that Ogilvie lacked standing to challenge the validity of the search, and his application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The accused, Tyler Floyd and Amanda Mailloux, were charged with multiple offences including distribution of child pornography, advertising sexual services, receiving material benefit from sexual services, recruiting for exploitation, forcible confinement, and assault causing bodily harm.

The complainant was a 15-year-old drug-addicted girl.

The court conducted a detailed credibility and reliability assessment of the complainant's evidence, noting significant memory issues, inconsistencies, and drug use impacting her testimony.

The court also considered the co-accused Ms. Mailloux's testimony and Mr. Floyd's police statement.

Ultimately, the court found reasonable doubt on most charges against both accused due to the complainant's unreliable evidence and inconsistencies.

Mr. Floyd was found not guilty of assault causing bodily harm but guilty of the lesser included offence of simple assault.

All other charges against both accused were dismissed.

The accused sought to cross-examine the complainant on prior sexual activity during their trial for various sexual exploitation and child pornography offences.

The court addressed whether the s. 276 regime of the Criminal Code applied, given that the charged offences were not explicitly listed in s. 276(1).

Relying on the Supreme Court's broad interpretation in R. v. Barton, the court found that the s. 276 regime applied due to a sufficient connection between the charged offences and the listed offences, requiring the accused to bring a formal application to admit such evidence.

Miles Kempffer-Hossack pleaded guilty to multiple counts of firearms transfer, possession of firearms without a licence, and possession of Schedule I drugs for the purpose of trafficking, arising from an Ottawa Police investigation (Project Sabotage) into gun violence.

The court considered aggravating factors including the quantity and prohibited nature of the weapons, the presence of a booby-trapped window and explosive devices, and the dangerous combination of drugs and guns.

Mitigating factors included the offender's youth, lack of prior criminal record, guilty plea, and demonstrated efforts towards rehabilitation.

The Crown sought a 10-year custodial sentence, while the defence sought 6 years.

The court imposed a total custodial sentence of 9 years, less pre-sentence custody, along with ancillary orders for DNA, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and forfeiture.

The accused brought an application under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code seeking to adduce evidence of other sexual activity of the complainant.

The complainant sought to cross-examine the accused on his affidavit in support of the application.

The court determined whether the complainant's statutory right to "appear and make submissions" under s. 278.94(2) and (3) includes the right to cross-examine the accused.

The court held that the right to appear and make submissions must be meaningful and includes the right to cross-examine the accused on issues relevant to the application.

The accused was charged with 19 offences including sexual assault with a weapon, assault, uttering death threats, criminal harassment, unlawful confinement, and related offences.

During trial, the defence sought to introduce excerpts from the complainant's psychologist records under section 278.94 of the Criminal Code.

The court ruled on the admissibility of two excerpts: the first, a prior inconsistent statement regarding the timing of assaults, was admitted as it had significant probative value for impeaching credibility; the second, regarding the absence of mention of a specific assault, was excluded as the defence failed to establish a rational basis for the inference that the omission was relevant to whether the assault occurred.

The court considered whether section 278.92 of the Criminal Code prohibits defence counsel from putting the contents of a private record to a complainant during cross-examination without first obtaining a court order.

The accused was charged with 19 offences including sexual assault with a weapon, assault, uttering threats, criminal harassment, unlawful confinement, and public mischief.

Defence counsel sought to cross-examine the complainant regarding statements she allegedly made to a health care provider that appeared inconsistent with her trial testimony regarding the timing of alleged incidents.

The Crown objected, arguing that section 278.92 required a court order before any contents of the private record could be put to the complainant.

The court held that an order under section 278.92 is required before defence counsel may put to a witness the contents of a record in the possession of the defendant in which the complainant had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The accused brought an application under s. 278.93 (formerly s. 276.1) for a hearing under s. 278.94 (formerly s. 276.2) to determine whether evidence of the complainant's sexual activity other than that forming the subject matter of the sexual assault charges would be admissible under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code.

The central issue was whether the accused's application record must be provided to the complainant before the s. 278.94 hearing.

The court held that the complainant is entitled to receive the application record sufficiently in advance of the hearing to allow her to prepare and make meaningful submissions.

Marc Auguste pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing bodily harm after failing to stop at a stop sign, resulting in severe injuries to the victim.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the extent of injuries, speeding, and the nature of the vehicle, alongside mitigating factors including a guilty plea, lack of criminal record, remorse, and pro-social lifestyle.

The Crown sought a four-month jail sentence, while the defence requested a suspended sentence with probation and a one-year driving prohibition.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with three years' probation, 240 hours of community service, and a six-month curfew, declining a driving prohibition to allow the offender to maintain employment.

The Crown applied under s. 714.2 of the Criminal Code to adduce evidence from a witness, Omar Ahmed, via video link, as he had been deported to Somalia after the first trial.

The Defence opposed, arguing that the witness should testify in person and that cross-examination via video link would be hampered.

The court ruled that s. 714.2 is mandatory and does not require all efforts to secure in-person testimony.

The Defence failed to satisfy the court that video link testimony would be contrary to fundamental justice principles, as video technology is regularly used and does not deprive an accused of a fair trial or the opportunity to confront a witness.

The application was granted, with conditions for video quality and process.

The Crown sought to admit hearsay statements of a deported witness, Omar Ahmed, and his prior transcript testimony in a re-trial for first-degree murder.

The Respondent objected on grounds of necessity and reliability.

The court found that while necessity was met due to Ahmed's deportation, threshold reliability was not established due to his criminal background, inconsistencies in prior testimony, and the Respondent's lack of full opportunity to cross-examine him in a fair trial setting.

The court also exercised its residual discretion to exclude the evidence to protect the Respondent's constitutional right to a fair trial, given the prior conviction was overturned due to a miscarriage of justice.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, sought to exclude 104 private communications intercepted under six wiretap authorizations, arguing violations of section 8 and 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicant alleged that the affiant failed to make full, frank, and fair disclosure in the Information to Obtain (ITO) for the first authorization, leading to invalidity of all subsequent authorizations.

The court reviewed the ITO for probable cause and investigative necessity, finding that despite some errors and omissions by the affiant, they were not intentional or grossly negligent and did not seriously distort the assessment of witness credibility.

The court concluded that the issuing justice had a sufficient basis to grant the authorizations, as probable cause and investigative necessity were established.

The motion to exclude the wiretap evidence was dismissed.

The Applicant, charged with first-degree murder, sought to exclude call detail records obtained via search warrants, arguing violations of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Applicant contended that the Informations to Obtain (ITOs) contained inaccuracies, lacked reasonable grounds to believe the records would afford evidence, and that police failed to file Reports to Justice as required by s. 489.1 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while there were minor inaccuracies in the ITOs, they were made in good faith and, once excised, sufficient grounds remained for the warrants.

The court also found that the police's failure to file Reports to Justice constituted a s. 8 Charter breach but, following established jurisprudence, determined that this technical breach did not warrant the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, especially given the serious nature of the charge.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The defence counsel for Gurpreet Ronald sought to prohibit her former counsel, Mr. Bruce Engel, from testifying for the Crown, asserting solicitor-client privilege.

The court examined the validity of two waivers of privilege: a verbal waiver given on August 6, 2014, and a written waiver given on August 21, 2014, after consultation with independent counsel.

The court found the verbal waiver invalid due to the lack of independent legal advice but upheld the written waiver as valid and irrevocable, as the information had already been disclosed.

The court also clarified the scope of solicitor-client privilege, ruling that it covered communications between Ms. Ronald and Mr. Engel but not the content of Mr. Engel's subsequent conversation with co-accused Mr. Gill.

The application to prohibit testimony was dismissed.

The court issued two rulings during a murder trial.

First, it rejected the defence's argument that if one co-accused was acquitted, the other must also be acquitted based on conspiracy law, clarifying that the old common law rule for conspirators is no longer valid and, in any event, the accused were charged with murder, not conspiracy.

Second, the court denied the request to leave second-degree murder as an included offence to the jury, finding no air of reality in the evidence to support a conclusion of intentional but spontaneous killing, given the pre-meditated actions of the assailant.

This decision addresses a voir dire application in a murder trial to determine the voluntariness and admissibility of three statements made by the accused to police.

The court found the August 22, 2006 telephone statement and the November 8, 2006 video statement to be voluntary and admissible.

Portions of the November 8, 2006 surreptitiously audio-recorded statement were deemed admissible, specifically those relating to the murder investigation, while police opinions and commentary on unrelated criminal investigations were excluded due to prejudicial effect outweighing probative value.

The court rejected arguments that the accused was induced, misled about his status or the use of the interview, or that the statements' prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value.

The accused sought an order permitting challenges for cause of prospective jurors based on race, religion, pre-trial publicity, marital infidelity, and employment bias.

The court permitted challenges for cause on the grounds of race, religion (by agreement), and pre-trial publicity, finding a realistic potential for bias that might prevent jurors from being impartial despite judicial instructions.

However, the court denied challenges for cause based on marital infidelity and employment bias, as the applicants failed to demonstrate widespread community bias or that potential jurors would be incapable of setting aside such biases.

The accused, Gurpreet Ronald and Bhupinderpal Gill, charged with first-degree murder, sought to edit their voluntary exculpatory statements given to police.

The Crown alleged the accused acted in concert to kill the victim.

The court reviewed legal principles for editing voluntary statements, emphasizing the balance between relevance, prejudicial effect, and the right to a fair trial in a joint proceeding.

The judge ruled that segments where the officer commented on the accused's credibility, advised them to tell the truth, or expressed opinions on co-accused's guilt should be excised as they are not probative and are prejudicial.