Jason Michael Neubauer

This criminal trial involved charges against Zekeim Ogilvie (13 offences) and Akol Akol (15 offences, including enabling escape) stemming from a shooting incident.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including video surveillance, cell phone data, and GPS data from a rented vehicle.

The court meticulously analyzed the identification evidence for Ogilvie and the elements of aiding and abetting for Akol.

The judge found that the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for either accused on any count, emphasizing the need to avoid speculation and conjecture when drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence.

Both defendants were acquitted.

The Crown sought to admit recognition evidence from Det. Walrond, identifying the accused, Zekeim Ogilvie, on a video recording related to a shooting.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine threshold admissibility based on the Berhe and Hudson tests.

The court found that Det. Walrond's prior acquaintance with Mr. Ogilvie, primarily a 53-minute police interview, did not afford him a sufficient level of familiarity to provide valuable and otherwise unavailable identifying information regarding Ogilvie's gait, movement, facial features, complexion, hairline, and hairstyle.

The court also noted that the trial judge had sufficient opportunity and other evidence (like a photograph) to make their own assessment.

Consequently, the Crown's application for the admission of Det. Walrond's recognition evidence was dismissed.

Zekeim Ogilvie, charged with multiple offences related to a shooting, brought a pre-trial Charter application to exclude evidence (an iPhone and its data) obtained from a vehicle search.

He argued the warrantless search, conducted under the Liquor Licence Act, violated his section 8 and 9 Charter rights due to a lack of reasonable and probable grounds.

The court examined whether Ogilvie, as a passenger, had standing to challenge the search by establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle.

Despite owning the iPhone found in the vehicle, the court found that he did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle as a whole, given the significantly reduced privacy interest in vehicles, especially for non-owner passengers.

Consequently, the court ruled that Ogilvie lacked standing to challenge the validity of the search, and his application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The Crown sought to establish the voluntariness of statements made by the accused to police during a neighbourhood canvass and a subsequent interview at the police station.

The accused argued she was a suspect at the time of the interview and should have been cautioned.

The court found that, viewed objectively, the police did not have sufficient information to regard the accused as a suspect at that early stage of the investigation.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the lack of threats, promises, or oppression, the court ruled the statements were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.

In a murder trial where the Crown alleged the two accused killed the victim (the wife of one of the accused) to continue their affair, the Crown sought to introduce discreditable conduct evidence and hearsay statements of the deceased.

The court admitted statements made by the accused to a psychic regarding their hatred for the victim, finding the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect in a judge-alone trial.

The court also admitted the deceased's hearsay statements to a friend that she would not divorce, under the present state of mind exception, but excluded other statements regarding financial control and taking the children due to threshold reliability concerns.

During a joint trial for first-degree murder, the accused sought to introduce evidence of his co-accused's prior discreditable conduct involving knife attacks against her former spouse.

The accused argued this evidence supported his defence that the co-accused acted alone.

The co-accused opposed the admission, arguing it was highly prejudicial.

The court admitted the evidence, finding it sufficiently probative to the accused's right to make full answer and defence, and held that any prejudice to the co-accused could be mitigated by a limiting instruction in a judge-alone trial.

The accused, Bhupinderpal Gill and Gurpreet Ronald, were jointly charged with the first degree murder of Jagtar Gill, the wife of Bhupinderpal Gill.

The Crown alleged that the accused, who were engaged in an extramarital affair, planned and executed the murder so they could be together.

Jagtar Gill was found bludgeoned and stabbed to death in her home while recovering from hernia surgery.

The court found that Gurpreet Ronald entered the home and carried out the physical killing, while Bhupinderpal Gill aided in the murder by planning it, preparing the murder weapon, ensuring the victim was alone, and subsequently disposing of incriminating evidence.

Both accused were found guilty of first degree murder.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit twelve statements made by the accused, who was charged with first-degree murder.

The statements were categorized as 'background statements', 'interrogation statements', and 'implied confession' statements.

The court excluded the 'implied confession' and 'background' statements, finding their probative value was far outweighed by the extreme prejudice of introducing vague allegations of other homicides.

The court allowed edited segments of two 'interrogation statements' to be admitted, finding they retained their proper meaning and provided highly probative evidence regarding blood found in the accused's truck.

The accused, Tyler Floyd and Amanda Mailloux, were charged with multiple offences including distribution of child pornography, advertising sexual services, receiving material benefit from sexual services, recruiting for exploitation, forcible confinement, and assault causing bodily harm.

The complainant was a 15-year-old drug-addicted girl.

The court conducted a detailed credibility and reliability assessment of the complainant's evidence, noting significant memory issues, inconsistencies, and drug use impacting her testimony.

The court also considered the co-accused Ms. Mailloux's testimony and Mr. Floyd's police statement.

Ultimately, the court found reasonable doubt on most charges against both accused due to the complainant's unreliable evidence and inconsistencies.

Mr. Floyd was found not guilty of assault causing bodily harm but guilty of the lesser included offence of simple assault.

All other charges against both accused were dismissed.

The Crown applied under s. 652 of the Criminal Code for an order directing the jury to view the scene where the victim's remains were found and two other nearby locations.

The accused is charged with first-degree murder.

The court applied the test from R. v. Johnson, requiring the applicant to establish a real and demonstrable advantage to the jury's understanding of the evidence.

The court found that the extensive photographic, video, and 3D model evidence available would sufficiently convey the topography, remoteness, and size of the culvert.

The application for a jury view was dismissed.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct towards a third party, arguing it demonstrated animosity towards mentally ill persons or those who upset him, which was relevant to motive in a circumstantial murder case.

The court dismissed the application, finding the proposed evidence lacked context, was not sufficiently cogent to establish a bona fide theory of motive, and its prejudicial impact far outweighed its probative value.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit hearsay statements made by deceased persons in a first-degree murder trial.

The central issue was the threshold reliability of the statements under the principled exception and the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.

The court considered the deceased victim's mental health history, specifically evidence of schizophrenia and paranoia, as a relevant factor in assessing whether statements were made under 'circumstances of suspicion'.

The court admitted one statement made by the victim to a friend, finding it materially corroborated, but excluded the remaining disputed statements due to insufficient threshold reliability.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion to exclude statements made to police under s 24(2) of the Charter, arguing they were tainted by a prior s 8 breach involving an invalid search of his residence.

The court found that statements made during police visits where search-related property was returned or discussed were causally and contextually linked to the prior breach.

The court rejected the Crown's request to merely edit the statements, ruling that the tainted statements must be excluded in their entirety to prevent the administration of justice from being brought into disrepute.

Statements made during visits unrelated to the seized property were not excluded.

In a blended voir dire on voluntariness, the court considered whether post-arrest utterances and recorded police interviews were inadmissible because of trickery, oppression, implied promises, or denigration of defence counsel.

Applying the confession rule and the contextual framework from Oickle and Singh, the court held the Crown proved voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.

The interviewing techniques did not amount to community-shocking trickery, no oppressive atmosphere overbore either accused's will, and any alleged inducement arose from one accused's own attempts to negotiate.

All three statements were admitted.

During a trial for human trafficking and related offences, the accused brought an application under section 276 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant about her prior involvement in prostitution in the two weeks preceding the alleged offences.

The accused argued this evidence was relevant to whether the complainant was 'recruited' by them, which is an essential element of the offences charged.

The court granted the application, finding that the proposed evidence had significant probative value regarding the issue of recruitment and the complainant's credibility, and that this probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice.

The accused sought to cross-examine the complainant on prior sexual activity during their trial for various sexual exploitation and child pornography offences.

The court addressed whether the s. 276 regime of the Criminal Code applied, given that the charged offences were not explicitly listed in s. 276(1).

Relying on the Supreme Court's broad interpretation in R. v. Barton, the court found that the s. 276 regime applied due to a sufficient connection between the charged offences and the listed offences, requiring the accused to bring a formal application to admit such evidence.

During a sentencing hearing for three offenders convicted of firearms offences, the Crown argued the court should conduct a fresh constitutional analysis of the mandatory minimum sentence under s. 99(2) of the Criminal Code, despite previous Superior Court decisions declaring it unconstitutional.

The court held that, following the Supreme Court's decision in Ferguson, a declaration of invalidity under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act effectively removes the provision from the statute books.

Therefore, the previous declarations of invalidity are binding on courts of coordinate jurisdiction, and the mandatory minimum sentence is of no force and effect.

Miles Kempffer-Hossack pleaded guilty to multiple counts of firearms transfer, possession of firearms without a licence, and possession of Schedule I drugs for the purpose of trafficking, arising from an Ottawa Police investigation (Project Sabotage) into gun violence.

The court considered aggravating factors including the quantity and prohibited nature of the weapons, the presence of a booby-trapped window and explosive devices, and the dangerous combination of drugs and guns.

Mitigating factors included the offender's youth, lack of prior criminal record, guilty plea, and demonstrated efforts towards rehabilitation.

The Crown sought a 10-year custodial sentence, while the defence sought 6 years.

The court imposed a total custodial sentence of 9 years, less pre-sentence custody, along with ancillary orders for DNA, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and forfeiture.

The accused was charged with 19 offences including sexual assault with a weapon, assault, uttering death threats, criminal harassment, unlawful confinement, and related offences.

During trial, the defence sought to introduce excerpts from the complainant's psychologist records under section 278.94 of the Criminal Code.

The court ruled on the admissibility of two excerpts: the first, a prior inconsistent statement regarding the timing of assaults, was admitted as it had significant probative value for impeaching credibility; the second, regarding the absence of mention of a specific assault, was excluded as the defence failed to establish a rational basis for the inference that the omission was relevant to whether the assault occurred.

The accused brought an application under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code seeking to adduce evidence of other sexual activity of the complainant.

The complainant sought to cross-examine the accused on his affidavit in support of the application.

The court determined whether the complainant's statutory right to "appear and make submissions" under s. 278.94(2) and (3) includes the right to cross-examine the accused.

The court held that the right to appear and make submissions must be meaningful and includes the right to cross-examine the accused on issues relevant to the application.