COURT FILE NO.: 14-2310
DATE: 2021/11/02
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Her Majesty the Queen
– and –
Bhupinder Gill
– and –
Gurpreet Ronald, Accused
Counsel:
Jason Neubauer and Brian Holowka for the Crown
James Harbic and Robert Harbic for Bhupinder Gill
Michael Spratt for Gurpreet Ronald
HEARD: November 23, 24, 2020, January 18, 19, 2021
VOLUNTARINESS RULING: STATEMENT OF GURPREET RONALD
Anne London-Weinstein J.
[1] I ruled that certain statements alleged to have been made by Gurpreet Ronald were voluntary with reasons to follow. These are my reasons:
[2] On January 29, 2014, Jagtar Gill was murdered in her home at 174 Brambling Way in Barrhaven. It is the theory of the Crown that Ms. Ronald and Mr. Gill were having an affair and murdered Jagtar Gill in order that they could be together without Mr. Gill having to divorce his wife. The Crown seeks to establish the voluntariness of certain statements alleged to have been made by Ms. Ronald. The burden is upon the crown to establish the voluntariness of the statements beyond a reasonable doubt. The first statement in question is one which Ms. Ronald is alleged to have made to Sgt. Cookson and Sgt. Bond on January 29, 2014. Police were canvassing the neighborhood to determine if anyone had observed anything unusual happening in the neighborhood during the relevant time period, and to gather knowledge about the Gill family. The second statement was provided on January 30 at the Ottawa Police Station. There were additional conversations between Ms. Ronald and the police at various points in the case. I have dealt with these additional conversations at the end of my analysis.
[3] The only statements which were addressed in oral argument by counsel were the January 29 and January 30 statements.
January 29 neighbourhood canvass:
[4] In the evening of January 29, 2014, police conducted a general neighborhood canvass of homes in the area. They attended the home of Gurpreet Ronald at 303 Towhee Place. Another neighbour on Towhee Place informed police that members of the Ronald family were friendly with the Gill family at 174 Brambling Way.
[5] Police attended the home of Ms. Ronald. She permitted them to enter the house despite her initial expressed concern that they not wake the children. Police asked Ms. Ronald a number of questions which she answered. I considered all of the relevant circumstances surrounding the giving of the statement. I found there was nothing in the circumstances of the giving of the statement which would render it involuntary. Ms. Ronald was not a suspect at this point in the investigation. She was not under detention. There were no threats or promises made. There were no oppressive circumstances at play. She had an operating mind. The respondent contests the completeness of the record relating to the January 29, 2014 canvassing statement to Sgt. Cookson and Det. Bond. However, Det. Cookson was able to relate the general content of the statement to the court. This statement was not like the one in R. v. Ferris, 1994 31 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 756, at p. 756, where the probative value of the statement was so tenuous that it should have been excluded on the grounds that prejudicial effect outweighed probative value. The police were able to relate what Ms. Ronald said to them. Any deficiencies in the recording of the statement go to the weight of the evidence and not the admissibility of the statement: see R. v. Menezes (2001), 2001 28426 (ON SC), 48 C.R. (5th) 163 (Ont. S.C.) at paras. 27-30; R. v. Learning, 2010 ONSC 3816, 258 C.C.C. (3d) 68, at para. 62. While Ms. Ronald said she was not close to the Gill family, contradicting the information police had from her neighbour, this contradiction would not elevate her to be considered as a suspect by police. The answers she provided to police were also at times inconsistent to information she provided at an earlier point in the statement. However, these factors alone would not elevate her to be considered as a suspect such that a caution would be warranted. There was no information available to police on January 29 at this early stage which would cause police to suspect that Ms. Ronald killed Jagtar Gill.
January 30 statement at the Ottawa Police Station:
[6] In regard to the January 30 statement, the respondent takes the position that the accused was a suspect at the time of the statement and should have been cautioned. The Crown takes the position that Ms. Ronald was not a suspect at the time of the January 30 statement, and a caution was not necessary. Counsel does not allege that there were threats or promises, or oppression, or that Ms. Ronald did not have an operating mind. She was not under detention.
[7] The lack of a caution is not determinative of the issue of voluntariness. All of the relevant circumstances surrounding the giving of the statement must be considered in order to determine whether the Crown has proven voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. The lack of a caution is an important factor which is relevant to an assessment of whether the statement was voluntarily made.
[8] I looked at all of the relevant circumstances surrounding the making of the statement and I determined that the statement was made voluntarily, despite the lack of a caution, for the following reasons.
Was it reasonable for police to not regard Ms. Ronald as a suspect?
[9] A review of the evidence of Det. Monette and Staff Sgt. Cookson is required to establish whether it was objectively reasonable for the police to regard Ms. Ronald as a witness, a person of interest, or a suspect.
[10] On January 29, 2014, Det. John Monette was working the afternoon shift which had started at 3:00 p.m. Staff Sgt. Bruce Pirt had informed him of a suspicious death and assigned Det. Monette as the lead investigator. Det. Sean Gordon was assigned as the file co-ordinator. Det. Monette was advised that Dr. Milroy had arrived with the coroner and that the death was criminally suspicious.
[11] Det. Monette asked Staff Sgt. Pirt for members of the Major Incident Response Team (MIRT) to canvass the neighbourhood. Det. Monette did not know the death was a homicide at the time and there were no suspects. There was some initial information provided that the death may have been a suicide.
[12] A questionnaire was created to query neighbours. The questions were whether the persons were at home, whether they observed anything suspicious at 174 Brambling Way on January 29 and whether they knew the family.
[13] Sgt. Cookson was one of the canvassers. A number of persons were asked to attend an interview at the police station at 474 Elgin Street. The individuals included Mr. Gill, Dilpreet Gill, Scott Fewer, Chantal Allain and Ishwar Toor.
[14] Police did not have a search warrant for 174 Brambling Way at this point and were in the home under the authority of the Coroner’s Act, RSO 1990, c C. 37. Mr. Gill consented to police searching in the home. He advised Sgt. Kinnear that he wanted police to do whatever was required to discover who killed his wife.
[15] At the end of the day on January 29, all of the above-mentioned persons were interviewed. The investigation was advanced to the point that Mr. Gill was not a suspect. He had provided a detailed chronology of the events of the day, supported by his daughter. Mr. Fewer’s information provided police with a timeline as to when Mr. Fewer attended the house and spoke to the deceased prior to her death. Police had no direction regarding a suspect at this point.
[16] On January 29, Det. Gordon received information from Sgt. Cookson that Ms. Ronald had been identified by neighbours as someone who was friends with the family of the deceased.
[17] Det. Monette asked Sgt. Cookson to have the Ronalds come in for an interview as friends of the Gill family. Det. Monette testified that he was looking for information from persons who may be friends with the family to provide context as to the dynamics of the family. I accepted his evidence regarding the reason for having the Ronalds in for an interview.
[18] Police were aware from the initial canvass that a neighbour on Towhee Place said that Ms. Ronald was a friend of the Gill family. Ms. Ronald said she was not that close to the Gill family when she spoke to Det. Cookson. However, that discrepancy in information would not have caused Ms. Ronald to be regarded as a suspect, especially since Mr. Gill was not a suspect at this time.
[19] Police also interviewed Mr. Gill’s friend Mr. Scott Fewer. He provided a statement to police on January 29 and again on January 30. As a result of the information provided by Mr. Fewer, police were aware of the following prior to the interview with Ms. Ronald.
What were police aware of before the Gurpreet Ronald interview?
Scott Fewer:
[20] Police were aware that Mr. Fewer had been at 174 Brambling Way on January 29. He was interviewed by Sgt. Kinnear on the same date at around 11:00 p.m. The questions which Sgt. Kinnear asked of Mr. Fewer were focused in part on Mr. Fewer himself and his relationship to the Gill family. Sgt. Kinnear asked him if he had been teaching during the week, what days he worked, how long he had worked at Algonquin College, whether his wife worked, whether he had children, how often he dropped by for coffee and whether he spent a lot of time with the Gill family. At one point he asked Mr. Fewer, “Are you just spending the day at home?” He asked whether Mr. Gill texted him and whether Mr. Gill ever attended the Fewer home. Det. Monette testified that he was initially sceptical of Mr. Fewer. He regarded Mr. Fewer as someone who had inserted himself into the investigation. His reservations regarding Mr. Fewer governed the weight he afforded the uncorroborated information Mr. Fewer provided. In my view, it is reasonable for police to be entitled to consider the source of information in making determinations as to whether an individual can properly be regarded as a suspect. Sgt. Kinnear’s questioning also reflected a degree of skepticism regarding Mr. Fewer’s degree of involvement at the earliest points in the investigation. As it turned out, Mr. Fewer had absolutely nothing to do with the murder of Jagtar Gill, although he had been at her house that morning.
[21] Mr. Fewer shared his suspicions that Mr. Gill and Ms. Ronald spent a lot of time together and Jagtar Gill’s body language expressed displeasure at those visits. He advised him that Mr. Gill denied that his relationship with Ms. Ronald was sexual. Mr. Fewer told Sgt. Kinnear that Mr. Gill did not think it was a good idea for Ms. Ronald to move so close by. Mr. Fewer than gave a second statement on January 30, 2014 where he shared more information with Sergeant Kinnear. He had gathered the information as a result of attending at the home of the extended Gill family at 2477 Regatta.
Second interview information from Scott Fewer to police:
[22] Mr. Fewer disclosed that he had attended 2477 Regatta Avenue with his friend Mr. Victor Murphy. He indicated that Mr. Gill had admitted to him that he had moved his wife’s body. Mr. Gill told Mr. Fewer that he had picked up the knives he found at the scene and had washed them. Mr. Gill said he had just frozen in a moment of panic.
[23] Mr. Fewer indicated he thought Gurpreet Ronald was the only person with motive to kill Jagtar Gill. Mr. Fewer’s opinion regarding exclusive motive, in the absence of any evidence at this point in the investigation, was not sufficient to elevate Ms. Ronald to being regarded as a suspect.
Jason Ronald:
[24] Jason Ronald was interviewed before Gurpreet Ronald. Det. Monette monitored this interview in part. Mr. Ronald contradicted Gurpreet Ronald’s statement at the canvass that she was not close to the Gill family. He told police that Gurpreet Ronald and Mr. Gill were close friends. Gurpreet Ronald also made this same admission to Sgt. Cookson on January 30. Mr. Ronald advised police that his marriage was in trouble and that he spent the night of January 29 at the home of a woman with whom he was romantically involved.
Contradictions in what Ms. Ronald said at the canvass, and what she said later and other contradictory evidence:
[25] The defence points out that there were contradictions between what Ms. Ronald said at the initial canvass, and what she said in the interview on January 30 with Det. Cookson. However, discrepancies in what she said at the canvass, versus what she said in the statement would not necessarily elevate her to be regarded by police as a suspect. It is important to remember that Mr. Gill himself was not a suspect on January 30. Police were aware that Ms. Ronald may have been having a sexual relationship with Mr. Gill. Looked at objectively, these discrepancies in the information which Ms. Ronald provided at various times may have been linked to her desire to keep the alleged affair a secret. Much of the information regarding a possible affair came from Mr. Fewer. Police regarded him as someone who inserted himself into the case. There was a sound basis for police to hold this view. It was reasonable of police to consider the frailty of Mr. Fewer as an uncorroborated source of information. Ms. Ronald’s story did evolve in that she admitted that she was friends with Mr. Gill and that Mr. Gill had called her when he drove by her house. She advised Det. Cookson that she had gone to the Sobeys and seen him there. However, I agree with the original ruling of Parfett J. in this matter, which was not the subject of appeal, that her changing story as to what she did that day is insufficient to convert her to a suspect.
[26] Police did not reference Ms. Ronald’s bandaged left hand until the interview was over and she was on her way out. Ms. Ronald became faint as she was leaving the interview. At that point, Sgt. Cookson noted that Ms. Ronald had a large Elastoplast bandage on her hand. The discovery of the bandage unfolded off camera. Sgt. Cookson’s notice of the bandage unfolded in an organic manner which suggested that the discovery was spontaneous. Ms. Ronald kept her hand out of sight for much of the interview, but there were times when she could be observed gesturing on the video with her injured hand. At no time during the on-camera portion of the interview did Sgt. Cookson ask about the bandage. Sgt. Cookson is an experienced officer. In my view, if she had regarded Ms. Ronald as a suspect in the murder, it is more likely that she would have been looking for signs of injury to Ms. Ronald’s hand during the interview. Police knew that sharp force injuries had been inflicted on the victim. It is not uncommon for wounds to the hand to be incurred to the perpetrator in stabbings. I found the discovery of the wound to the hand at the end of the interview, off camera, to be some confirmation of the fact that Ms. Ronald was not regarded as a suspect during the interview.
[27] Sgt. Cookson asked Ms. Ronald questions about going to her trailer, and why she would wade through the snow to check out the trailer. Counsel suggests that the tenor of the questioning suggests police regarded Ms. Ronald as a suspect. I did not find that the nature of the questioning itself confirmed that police regarded Ms. Ronald as a suspect. I agree with the original ruling of Parfett J. that much of the information which police had regarding Ms. Ronald was food for thought and follow up, but that she was not regarded as a suspect. I note that Scott Fewer was not regarded as a suspect, but police also asked him numerous questions, as referenced above. Some of those questions might suggest he was regarded as a potential suspect. He was not a suspect.
[28] Det. Monette indicated that once he had spoken to Susanne Shields, he felt he had corroborated the fact that Ms. Ronald and Mr. Gill were having an affair, that Ms. Ronald hated Jagtar Gill, and that divorce was not an option for Mr. Gill. This interview with Ms. Shields was held on February 1, and at that point, Det. Monette was satisfied that Ms. Ronald could properly be regarded as a suspect. I accepted Det. Monette’ s evidence on this issue.
The stage of the investigation:
[29] In determining whether Ms. Ronald should have been properly considered as a suspect on January 30, it is relevant to consider that the investigation was at an early stage. Based on information available to them on January 29, Mr. Gill was not considered a suspect by the police. Ms. Ronald was the only person with any significant knowledge of or involvement with the Gills discovered during the canvass of the neighbourhood. On January 30, when Ms. Ronald provided her interview, it was at a nascent stage in the investigation. A number of other persons were also interviewed, including family members and a former co-worker of both Mr. and Mrs. Gill.
Ms. Ronald’s statement does not run afoul of the confession rule:
[30] For a confession, such as Ms. Ronald’s, to be admissible, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was made voluntarily: see R. v. Oickle, 2000 SCC 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 15.
[31] In R. v. Singh, 2007 SCC 48, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 405, at para. 35, the Court outlined the correct approach to the common law confessions rule.
[T]he more common circumstances that vitiate the voluntariness of a confession [include] the well-known headings: (a) threats or promises, (b) oppression, and (c) operating mind. In keeping with the broader modern approach to the confessions rule…a final consideration in determining whether a confession is voluntary or not [is whether] the police use of trickery to obtain a confession that would “shock the community”.
[32] There were no threats or promises or “fear of prejudice or hope of advantage” arising from the circumstances surrounding Ms. Ronald providing her statement to police. There were no circumstances of oppression. Ms. Ronald took the interviewing officer’s card and called the next day with additional information. Ms. Ronald possessed an operating mind. Police did not employ any trickery in this case. She was not under detention during the interview on January 30.
[33] The analysis is contextual. All the relevant circumstances surrounding the giving of the statement must be considered to determine whether the Crown has proven voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.
[34] In the original trial of this matter, the respondent advanced the caution issue on the voluntariness application: see R. v. Ronald, 2016 ONSC 2597. Parfett J. found that the statement had been proven voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. The court wrote the following at para. 70:
There is no question that at the outset of the interview there was no evidence to suggest that Mrs. Ronald was implicated in the homicide. Information that the Ronald marriage was over, an unsubstantiated allegation of an affair between Ms. Ronald and Mr. Gill and the knowledge they had spoken on the telephone that day would not lead a reasonable person to conclude that Ms. Ronald might be involved in the homicide in any way.
[35] Parfett J. noted that Ms. Ronald provided information which might lead an observer to conclude she and Mr. Gill were closer than she originally had indicated. The court noted that Ms. Ronald told Sgt. Cookson that Mr. Gill assisted with renovations for her home. Ms. Ronald said she had known him for seven years, that they were both bus drivers and that they were good friends. She told Det. Cookson that she and Mr. Gill communicated many times a day. She stated that she was closer to Mr. Gill than Mrs. Gill. Ms. Ronald told the story of the aborted trip to buy cauliflower, that Mr. Gill had driven by her house and that Mr. Gill’s daughter waved to her. This combined information would indicate a close relationship between the two accused. However, Ms. Ronald also stated that she and Mr. Gill would not see one another much outside of work: see Ronald, at para. 71.
[36] Parfett J. concluded that the information that Mr. Gill and Ms. Ronald were good friends did not add much to the earlier information without any indication that Mr. Gill was involved in the homicide. The court described this information as food for thought but nothing more. Parfett J. noted that counsel pointed to some questions Sgt. Cookson asked as evidence she viewed Ms. Ronald as a suspect. Sgt. Cookson asked Ms. Ronald what she thought had happened. She later asked her why she thought the homicide had occurred. Parfett J. noted that the suggestion these questions indicated Sgt. Cookson viewed Ms. Ronald as a suspect suffered from the same problem the court noted earlier, which was that these questions are being viewed through the lens of information that came later: see Ronald, at para. 73. Parfett J. noted that the discovery after the interview had ended, that Ms. Ronald had a bandage on her hand and she seemed to be concealing it from Sgt. Cookson, certainly had the effect of changing Ms. Ronald from a mere witness to a person who warranted further investigation. However, once again, it was not sufficient to cause Sgt. Cookson to view Ms. Ronald as a suspect: see Ronald, at paras. 70-74. I agreed with the reasoning of Parfett J. on this issue.
[37] The common law recognizes that police could not investigate crime without speaking to individuals who may have relevant information to provide. “Properly conducted police questioning is a legitimate and effective aid to criminal investigation.”: Oickle, at para. 33.
[38] The confessions rule balances the twin goals of protecting the rights of the accused while not unduly limiting society’s need to investigate and solve crimes. Voluntariness is a broad doctrine which mandates a contextual analysis. Attempts to impose bright line rules risks over or under inclusion: see Oickle, at para. 47.
[39] The formal police caution involves advising the person being questioned that he or she does not have to say anything, but that anything which they do say may be given in evidence against them, and has its origins in the English Judges’ Rules of 1912.
[40] The absence of a police caution is a factor which is relevant to the analysis of whether voluntariness has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The extent to which the failure to caution impacts the assessment of voluntariness involves a consideration of all of the relevant circumstances, including the failure to caution.
[41] The presence or absence of a caution is relevant to, but not determinative of voluntariness. The fundamental question is whether the confession of an accused is voluntary. A warning is not decisive of the issue, but neither is the failure to caution determinative. The presence or absence of a warning will be a factor and, in many cases, an important one: see Boudreaux v. The King, 1949 26 (SCC), [1949] S.C.R. 262, at p. 267.
When is a person a suspect?
[42] A person is a suspect when, objectively viewed, the information collected during an investigation tends to implicate him or her in the crime. It is an objective test which is to be applied to the totality of the information available to police: see R. v. Morrison, [2000] O.J. No. 5733 (S.C.), at para. 50.
[43] In Morrison, Trafford J. discussed the concept of a suspect versus a person of interest. An objective test safeguards the public interest in imposing duties on interrogating officers when the coercive power of the state is brought to bear on an individual in the context of a custodial interrogation. The frailty of the information collected during the investigation, if any, is to be considered in assessing its tendency to implicate a person: see Morrison, at para. 50 The test is based on information as opposed to evidence. The threshold is not probable cause and prima facie proof is not required. A suspicion is to be distinguished from a belief that a person committed a crime. Suspicion in its ordinary meaning is a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking. Suspicion can take into account matters that would not be put into evidence at all”: Morrison, at para. 50, citing Shaaban Bin Hussein v. Chong Fook Kan, [1969] All E.R. 1626, at p. 1630-1631 (P.C.).
[44] Suspicion is not a state of mind founded on speculation or “mere idle wondering…but is concerned with a state of mind arrived upon by consideration of known facts out of which an apprehension that a person might possibly have committed an offence is created.”: R. v. Heaney, [1992] 2 V.R. 531 (S.C.A.D.), at p. 548, cited in Morrison, at para. 51.
[45] Police are not required to make hasty judgments, or to proceed with less than due diligence during an investigation. These principles do not detract from the duties of an officer to be honest, competent and diligent in the conduct of the investigation. An officer has the duty to consider the information obtained during the course of an investigation on a continuing basis and to determine its legal significance: see Morrison, at para. 51, citing The Commission on Proceedings Involving Guy Paul Morin, Volume 2, 1998, at p. 798.
[46] As Trafford J. noted in Morrison, these principles require an officer who is about to interview a person to be diligent in determining the status of the interviewee so as to better care for the public interest in the recognition of the rights, if any, of such a person in the circumstances of the interview. It is also of fundamental importance to look at the totality of the circumstances of the information known to police, including the sources of that information, in assessing whether it was reasonable for police to consider the person as a suspect. In this case, police were skeptical of relying on the information provided by Scott Fewer for reasons which are objectively reasonable. Mr. Fewer had a tendency to exaggerate, he appeared to insert himself into the investigation and he sometimes appeared to make assumptions not based on fact. His information was that he thought Ms. Ronald and Mr. Gill were having an affair
[47] Voluntariness is a complex of values which relate to the underlying reliability of the statement, the right to silence, the conduct of the police and the fairness of the criminal justice system: R. v. Hebert, 1990 118 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151, at p. 179-181.
[48] The decision to speak to police as a witness is fundamentally different from choosing to speak as a suspect. A review of cases where no caution was given demonstrates the contextual nature of the analysis.
No caution and held not proven voluntary:
[49] In Morrison, police responded to a call of an unconscious female. When police arrived, they found a woman in a small basement apartment with an obvious gunshot wound to the face. Police advised all of the persons in the building that they were witnesses and transported them to the police station to be questioned by police. The accused told police that he did not live in the basement apartment. A neighbour said that Mr. Morrison did live there. Police learned that he had come upstairs shortly after the gunshot was heard. Despite knowing this fact, police advised him he was not a suspect and conducted a lengthy video-recorded interview without cautioning him as to his right to silence. In addition, Det. McGuire was advised that Mr. Morrison had confessed to the shooting and called the interviewing officers to advise him of this information he had received. Trafford J. concluded that viewed objectively, the information gathered by police prior to the interview implicated the accused in an offence and he ought to have been cautioned. The lack of a caution, in combination with other circumstances, raised a reasonable doubt as to the voluntariness of the statement.
[50] In R. v. Worrall, [2002] O.J. No. 2711 (S.C.) police were investigating an apparent death by overdose. They attended an apartment where they were aware the deceased had lived with his brother. Police spoke with the brother and asked him to come with them to the police station to speak further. Once they had arrived at the police station, the accused mentioned to one officer that he had given his brother heroin and he may have given him too much. Police later conducted an interview without cautioning the accused. Watt J., as he then was, held that once the accused admitted giving the deceased heroin “any reasonably competent investigator” would have been alive to the potential that the death may have been as a result of the accused’s unlawful act. The subsequent statement was held to be involuntary as a result, but earlier statements were admitted.
[51] In R. v. Randall, [2003] O.J. No. 718 (S.C.), the accused reported his wife missing to police. Police spoke to him on three occasions and he was never provided a caution or right to counsel. O’Connor J. found the first interview was conducted to discover the movements of his wife and to gather general information. He was only a person of interest and police were not even aware that a crime had been committed. At the time of the second and third interview however, police had information that he may have murdered his spouse. He ought to have been warned prior to those interviews and the failure to caution him raised a doubt as to voluntariness. O’Connor J. held that trial fairness required a suspect be apprised of the implications of lying to police investigating an offence. The first statement was voluntary and admitted.
No caution and proven voluntary:
[52] In R. v. Bottineau, 2011 ONCA 194, 269 C.C.C. (3d) 227, leave to appeal refused, [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 455, R. v. Pearson, 2017 ONCA 389, 348 C.C.C. (3d) 277, and R. v. Joseph, 2020 ONCA 73, 385 C.C.C. (3d) 514, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld findings of voluntariness despite the failure to caution.
[53] In determining whether or not the failure to caution effectively deprived Ms. Ronald of the ability to choose whether or not to answer the questions of police, I recognize the analysis is necessarily contextual: see Oickle, para 47.
[54] Ms. Ronald was not cautioned, but she did attend the police station voluntarily after the neighbourhood canvass. I found that Ms. Ronald wanted to speak to the police. She had attended 174 Brambling Way when police were present, in the aftermath of the homicide, ostensibly to inquire as to what had happened. I found that Ms. Ronald’s decision to provide an interview on January 30 was partly based on an attempt to manage police perception, in a similar fashion to her attendance at 174 Brambling Way on January 29. The inference regarding impression management supports the conclusion that Ms. Ronald voluntarily provided a statement to police the day after she visited the crime scene to ask police what happened.
[55] Ms. Ronald was also given a KGB warning, which was considered to be a relevant factor in Bottineau as it would have at least made her aware of the importance of not committing perjury and that she may be a witness in a criminal trial. It is not the equivalent of warning her that what she said could be used in evidence against her, but it would have at least alerted her to the possibility of peril if she lied. She was not under detention. The only issue was the impact that a failure to caution had on the voluntariness of the statement.
The lack of caution does not render the statement involuntary:
[56] “Even where a person is a suspect, the absence of the standard caution is only one factor to be considered in the voluntariness analysis—just as the presence of such a caution does not automatically lead to the conclusion that a statement is voluntary”: Bottineau, at para. 88. I approach my analysis with this principle in mind. In that same paragraph, the court went on to cite the comments of the trial judge in that case, who said that “[h]ard and fast rules are incapable of accounting for the myriad circumstances that may vitiate voluntariness”. All the circumstances must be scrutinized carefully: see Oickle, at paras. 47, 71.
[57] In R. v. Pearson, 2017 ONCA 389, 348 C.C.C. (3d) 277, leave to appeal refused, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 465, the Court relied on existing appellate authority when it indicated at para. 19 that, “although the absence of a caution is a factor to be considered on the voluntariness inquiry, it is not determinative. . . This proposition applies regardless of whether the police do or ought to regard the person being questioned as a suspect” (citations omitted).
[58] Looking at the circumstances surrounding the giving of the statement, I note that Ms. Ronald attended voluntarily and arranged for Mr. Ronald to be home to attend for an interview. She agreed to be interviewed again after being briefly interviewed the day before in a street canvassing exercise by police. Ms. Ronald appeared to speak freely during the videotaped interview.
[59] Ms. Ronald was not detained during the interview. As she was leaving, she accepted Sgt. Cookson’s business card, and in fact called again the next day to provide additional information.
[60] In Singh, at para. 32, Charron J., speaking for the majority, adopted as a “useful yardstick for the police on when they should caution a suspect” the following passage from Rene Marin, Admissibility of Statements 9th ed.,(loose leaf) at pp. 2-24.2 and 2-24.3:
The warning should be given when there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the person being interviewed has committed an offence. An easy yardstick to determine whether the warning should be given is for a police officer to consider the question of what he or she would do if the person attempted to leave the questioning room, or leave the presence of the officer where a communication or exchange is taking place. If the answer is arrest (or detain) the person, then the warning should be given.
[61] The need to caution a person must be based on “more than speculation. . . or even reliable information that may warrant further inquiry”: R. v. D.(A.), [2003] O.J. No. 4901 (S.C.) at para. 75. Further, in deciding whether, in a given instance the police ought to consider an accused to be a suspect, and, thus, ought to caution them, the court should not be overly expansive because “to cast the net wider than this is to overemphasize an individual’s right to silence at the cost of stifling legitimate police investigation.”: R. v. Carroll (2009), 71 C.R. (6th) 169 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 72.
[62] Parfett J. found in her original ruling on this matter there was no question that at the outset of the interview there was no evidence to suggest that Ms. Ronald was implicated in the homicide. Information that Ms. Ronald’s marriage was over, an unsubstantiated allegation of an affair between Ms. Ronald and Mr. Gill and the knowledge they had spoken on the telephone that day would not lead a reasonable person to conclude that Ms. Ronald might be involved in the homicide. At that time, there was still no reason to believe Mr. Gill was involved in the homicide in any way: see Ronald, at para. 70.
[63] Some of Sgt. Cookson’s questions were probing and might tend to suggest that she regarded Ms. Ronald as someone who may warrant further investigation. However, I am not satisfied that police viewed her as a suspect. She was free to leave at the end of the interview, even after the cut on her hand was discovered after the formal part of the interview had ended.
[64] Mr. Spratt argues that as the interview progressed and Ms. Ronald’s evidence began to shift and evolve, she should have been regarded as a suspect and she should have been cautioned.
[65] Police may have considered further investigation of Ms. Ronald was warranted, but there was an insufficient basis to regard her as a suspect at the very early stage in the proceedings. Police were correct to be cautious of relying on the speculative and, at that time, unsubstantiated suggestions of Mr. Fewer. I accept the evidence of Det. Monette that it was not until speaking to Susanne Shields that Ms. Ronald was regarded as a suspect. I find that Ms. Ronald was not a suspect and did not require a caution as a result. When I look at the totality of the circumstances, I find the January 30 statement to be proven voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. I agree with the ruling of Parfett J., which is not binding on me. I find that Ms. Ronald made a voluntary decision to speak to the police on January 30 and her will was not overborne. I found that the neighbourhood canvass statement on January 29 was also proven voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.
Other utterances:
[66] There was no argument presented by either defence counsel or the crown regarding the voluntariness of any communication on April 4 between Ms. Ronald and police regarding her reporting the Killer note. Ms. Ronald’s phone conversations were the subject of a Part VI authorization. Whatever Ms. Ronald said to police regarding the note was not relied upon by me in any part of my judgment. The statements were not relevant to the case. The point of the killer note ruse was to prompt Ms. Ronald to see if she would contact Mr. Gill.
[67] Similarly, regarding the April 8 conversation captured by intercept between Ms. Ronald and Det. Benson, in which he requested her DNA as part of a ruse, neither the Crown, nor the defence made submissions as to the voluntariness of Ms. Ronald’s response to Det. Benson’s request that she attend and provide her DNA. Ms. Ronald acceded to that request. Ms. Ronald did not make any incriminating utterances. The point of this call was to prompt Ms. Ronald to call Mr. Gill, which she did. However, counsel did not address the voluntariness of the brief intercepted conversation between Det. Benson and Ms. Ronald. The benign, non-incriminatory nature of the communication may have been the reason why the voluntariness of these utterances was not formally addressed. I did not rely on the April 4 and April 8 conversations between Ms. Ronald and Det. Benson in my reasons for judgment. The content of these conversations was not material to an issue in trial. I note that the conversation on April 8 was innocuous. Ms. Ronald agreed to attend the police station on Greenbank Road to provide a DNA sample. She also expressed some confusion as she initially thought the call related to the killer note. The judicial authorizations of the intercepts which captured these conversations were not challenged.
[68] Ms. Ronald approached 174 Brambling Way in the aftermath of the murder and spoke to Officer Gallichon on January 29, 2014. Ms. Ronald approached the Gill home completely of her own volition and made inquiries of police as to what had happened. She was not a suspect, or even a person of interest at that point. There were no threats or inducements. She clearly had an operating mind. There were no oppressive circumstances. She was not detained. Police asked her whether she and Jagtar were close. Her utterances at 174 Brambling Way to Officer Gallichon are proven voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. She made a similar inquiry of EMS personnel, demonstrating that she was intent on seeking information regarding what had happened of her own volition. While the issue of whether the EMS personnel could be representatives of the state, or persons in authority, was not raised by counsel, if they were to be regarded as persons of authority, Ms. Ronald’s conversation with these EMS personnel was completely voluntary.
[69] Ms. Ronald also had a conversation with Det. Hill when police sought her DNA through a ruse. Det. Hill pretended to be a representative from a construction/builder association. Those utterances were not incriminating, relevant only to the narrative and formed no part of my judgment in this matter.
[70] Further, there was an exculpatory utterance which Ms. Ronald is alleged to have made to Det. Hill regarding wanting to take her daughters to the Chateau Laurier. Police were hoping she would attend with Mr. Gill and discuss the homicide. I admitted this statement as I found that it was voluntarily made by Ms. Ronald who initiated the conversation regarding wanting to take her daughters to the hotel. The statement was exculpatory, not incriminating. It was clear that Ms. Ronald was not going to attend the Chateau Laurier with Mr. Gill, but that she did want to take her children.
[71] Ms. Ronald called Sgt. Cookson the day after her interview to provide additional information. The information provided was not lead in evidence. I did not rely on that conversation in my reasons for judgment in this matter.
Anne London-Weinstein J.
Released: November 2, 2021
COURT FILE NO.: 14-2310
DATE: 2021/11/02
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Her Majesty The Queen
– and –
Bhupinder Gill
– and –
Gurpreet Ronald, Accused
VOLUNTARINESS RULING: STATEMENT OF GURPREET RONALD
Anne London-Weinstein J.
Released: November 2, 2021