Douglas Baum

The accused was convicted of three terrorism-related offences: participating in the activities of the Atom Waffen Division (AWD) terrorist group by producing propaganda and recruitment videos; knowingly facilitating a terrorist activity through the production and publication of such materials; and communicating statements that wilfully promoted hatred against Jewish people and other identifiable groups.

The court imposed a total sentence of ten years imprisonment (reduced to nine years and nine months after pre-sentence custody credit), with the accused eligible for parole under the usual criteria rather than being required to serve half the sentence.

The court found that the Kienapple principle did not apply to the multiple convictions and considered the offender's youth, remorse, renunciation of extremist beliefs, participation in rehabilitation programming, and strict bail compliance as mitigating factors.

The Crown sought to qualify Matthew Kriner as an expert witness to provide opinion evidence regarding the impact of the accused's postings in the ideologically motivated violent extremism milieu and the significance of images created for far-right terrorist groups.

A voir dire was held during the sentencing hearing.

The court found that the proposed expert evidence met all four Mohan threshold requirements and that the probative value of the evidence exceeded any prejudicial effect.

The expert was qualified to testify.

The accused, Patrick Gordon MacDonald, was charged with terrorism offences for participating in or contributing to the production of three recruitment videos for the Atomwaffen Division (AWD), a white supremacist terrorist group.

The court found that MacDonald participated in the production and online posting of these videos and other images promoting AWD’s violent neo-Nazi ideology, with the intent to recruit others and facilitate terrorist activity.

The court accepted expert evidence that AWD was a terrorist group in 2018-2019, and found that MacDonald’s actions met the requirements for participation, facilitation, and wilful promotion of hatred under the Criminal Code.

MacDonald was found guilty on all counts.

The accused, Michele Arnold and Jean Lafontaine, brought a Charter application alleging violations of their section 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) and section 9 (arbitrary detention) rights.

They sought to exclude evidence obtained from a search warrant executed at their residence.

The court reviewed the Information to Obtain (ITO) supporting the warrant, applying the Debot test for compelling, credible, and corroborated information from confidential informants and anonymous sources, and the Garofoli standard for reviewing search warrants.

The court found that the ITO provided reasonable grounds for the search, concluding there was no Charter violation.

Consequently, the application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

This ruling addresses an application by the Crown to remove defence counsel due to an apparent conflict of interest.

Defence counsel represented the accused in a murder trial while also representing the mother of the Crown's key witness in an unrelated criminal matter.

The court found a significant appearance of divided loyalties, particularly concerning the cross-examination of the key witness whose credibility was central to the defence theory.

Despite the accused's desire to retain counsel and counsel's assertion of no actual conflict, the court prioritized public confidence in the administration of justice and ordered the removal of counsel.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by using s. 633 of the Criminal Code to stand aside two male jurors for gender diversity, which was done in the presence of the jury.

The Court of Appeal found this was a legal error, as the judicial stand-aside power cannot be used to actively promote diversity on the petit jury, citing R. v. Chouhan.

The court further held that this error was not curable by the proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Code because it prejudiced the appellant's right to a fair trial and undermined public confidence in the administration of justice, particularly given the jury witnessed the defence's objection.

A new trial was ordered.

This decision concerns a new trial to determine if the accused, René Goudreau, was not criminally responsible (NCR) by reason of mental disorder for the first-degree murder of his mother.

The accused had previously been convicted by a jury, but the Ontario Court of Appeal ordered a new trial solely on the NCR issue.

The court considered expert psychiatric evidence, the accused's behaviour before and after the offence, and evidence of extensive planning related to life insurance policies on the victim.

Despite evidence of mental disorder, the court found that the accused failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that he was incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of his acts or knowing they were wrong.

The court concluded that the accused engaged in detailed planning for financial gain and acted rationally in many aspects, tipping the scales against an NCR finding.

The applicant, an Indigenous man charged with sexual assault and sexual interference involving a seven-year-old child, applied for a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code.

He sought to overturn a detention order made at his show cause hearing.

The court found that the show cause judge did not err in law or make a clearly inappropriate decision in detaining the applicant on the primary and secondary grounds, given his outstanding charges, history of non-compliance, and concerns regarding the proposed surety.

The application was dismissed and the detention order was upheld.

This is a Crown appeal from a stay of proceedings imposed under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in a youth matter.

The respondent was 12-13 years old at the time of the alleged offences.

The application judge erred by not applying the R. v. Jordan framework, which was subsequently clarified for youth matters by R. v. K.J.M. The Court of Appeal found that the 18-month ceiling from Jordan was not exceeded and there was no basis to maintain the stay.

The appeal was allowed, the stay set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The applicants were charged with drug offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and Criminal Code arising from the alleged sale of fentanyl.

They sought leave to cross-examine the affiant who swore the Information to Obtain in support of a search warrant at a preliminary inquiry.

The court addressed standing issues for one applicant and applied the Dawson/Garofoli framework to determine which proposed cross-examination questions would be permitted.

The court balanced the narrow scope of cross-examination at a preliminary inquiry against the need to protect confidential informer privilege and the requirement for full and frank disclosure by the affiant.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa sought Crown wardship for the child ZS via summary judgment.

The mother opposed, arguing for another chance to parent.

The court found the child in need of protection due to the parents' history of missed visits, domestic conflict, and inability to meet the child's significant medical needs, especially after an unsuccessful reintegration attempt.

Given the child had been in care for 18 months, exceeding statutory timelines, the court determined it was in the child's best interest to be made a Crown ward for adoption, dismissing the mother's arguments as unsubstantiated denials.

The accused, Melissa Lee, was charged with aggravated assault, choking with intent, and unlawful confinement against the complainant, Yale Pan.

The court heard conflicting accounts from the complainant, the accused, and her brother.

After assessing witness credibility and physical evidence, the judge rejected the accused's version of events, finding the complainant's testimony credible and corroborated by injuries.

Lee was found guilty of aggravated assault but acquitted of choking with intent and unlawful confinement due to the Crown failing to prove intent for the former and insufficient evidence for the latter.

After a jury returned a verdict of guilty of first degree murder, the accused applied under ss. 672.11(b) and 672.12(1) of the Criminal Code for a psychiatric assessment to determine whether he was not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder at the time of the offence.

The defence relied on the accused’s extensive psychiatric history, prior NCR finding, prior unfitness to stand trial, and evidence during trial suggesting untreated mental illness.

The Crown argued the application failed to establish reasonable grounds because there was no supporting expert medical opinion linking the illness to criminal responsibility at the time of the offence.

The court held that the threshold for ordering an assessment is low and requires only reasonable grounds based on a credibly based probability that the assessment is necessary.

Given the accused’s documented mental health history and the evidentiary record, the court found the threshold met and ordered the assessment.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for a temporary court order placing the two-year-old child with the paternal grandmother.

The child had previously been residing with the maternal grandparents under a temporary supervision order, which included a condition that the mother not reside in their home.

The maternal grandparents breached this condition when the mother arrived in distress, leading to the child's apprehension.

The court found that the maternal grandparents had provided good care for two years and now understood the necessity of complying with the order.

The court ordered the child returned to the maternal grandparents under a temporary supervision order with conditions.

In a first degree murder prosecution, the Crown brought an application seeking to admit hearsay statements made by the deceased and evidence of the accused’s prior discreditable conduct.

The proposed evidence included statements made by the deceased to friends, family members, a building superintendent, and a police officer describing her fear of the accused and his alleged treatment of her.

The court held that many of the statements were admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and, where necessary, under the principled approach, finding sufficient necessity and threshold reliability.

The court further determined that evidence of prior discreditable conduct was admissible because it was relevant to animus, motive, and the nature of the relationship between the accused and the deceased, and its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

Certain specific statements and unrelated misconduct evidence were excluded.

The court ruled on a pre-trial motion regarding the qualification of an expert witness, Ms. Donna Lee, who testified regarding intellectual disabilities and communication issues.

The Crown sought to have the witness qualified as an expert, while the defence challenged her qualifications.

The court applied the four-part test from R. v. Mohan to determine admissibility of expert evidence: relevance, necessity, absence of exclusionary rules, and proper qualification of the expert.

The court found that the witness met all four criteria and allowed her to be qualified as an expert.