Julien Lalande

This ruling addresses the Crown's application to admit evidence of discreditable conduct against the respondent, who is charged with second-degree murder.

The court admitted evidence of specific threats involving a knife made by the respondent to the deceased shortly before the killing, and a prior incident where the respondent brandished a knife and stabbed a motel room wall in the deceased's presence.

However, the court declined to admit evidence of the respondent's prior convictions for weapon possession, robbery (involving knife brandishing), and assault with a weapon, finding their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value, particularly on the central issue of who possessed the murder weapon.

This ruling addresses an application by the Crown to remove defence counsel due to an apparent conflict of interest.

Defence counsel represented the accused in a murder trial while also representing the mother of the Crown's key witness in an unrelated criminal matter.

The court found a significant appearance of divided loyalties, particularly concerning the cross-examination of the key witness whose credibility was central to the defence theory.

Despite the accused's desire to retain counsel and counsel's assertion of no actual conflict, the court prioritized public confidence in the administration of justice and ordered the removal of counsel.

The accused, charged with sexual offences against two young complainants, sought a pre-trial ruling to cross-examine one of the complainants about her prior viewing of pornography.

The accused argued that viewing pornography alone is not a 'sexual activity' under s. 276 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that s. 276 must be interpreted broadly to protect the dignity and privacy of complainants, concluding that the provision applies to the private viewing of pornography.

Consequently, such evidence is inadmissible unless the conditions of s. 276(2) are met.

The accused was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while impaired by drugs (fentanyl and xanax) causing the deaths of two people, and criminal negligence causing death.

The accused crossed the center line at high speed and struck the victims' vehicle head-on.

The court weighed the gravity of the offence and the need for general deterrence against the accused's significant mitigating factors, including his youth, lack of criminal record, severe childhood trauma that led to his opioid addiction, and his extensive rehabilitation efforts.

The court sentenced the accused to 5 years' imprisonment and imposed a 7-year driving prohibition.

The applicant, charged jointly with two co-accused for human trafficking offences, brought a pre-trial application for severance.

The applicant argued that being tried alongside one of the co-accused, who was also her alleged victimizer in related charges, would cause her further victimization and prevent her from testifying in her own defence.

The court dismissed the application without prejudice, finding the evidentiary record insufficient to establish that a joint trial would work an injustice, while noting that testimonial aids could potentially be utilized to facilitate her evidence.

The three offenders were convicted of firearms trafficking and related offences.

Prior to sentencing, they applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unconstitutional post-verdict delay.

The court dismissed the applications, finding the delay fell below the 5-month presumptive ceiling established in Charley after deducting defence delay and the discrete event of a constitutional challenge.

On sentencing, the court found the mandatory minimum under s. 99(2) of the Criminal Code had been struck down and was inapplicable.

Saberi and Montgiraud, both youthful first offenders with lower moral blameworthiness, received conditional sentences of 20 months.

Bruce, who facilitated three separate transactions and possessed drugs for trafficking, received a custodial sentence of 22 months.

During a sentencing hearing for three offenders convicted of firearms offences, the Crown argued the court should conduct a fresh constitutional analysis of the mandatory minimum sentence under s. 99(2) of the Criminal Code, despite previous Superior Court decisions declaring it unconstitutional.

The court held that, following the Supreme Court's decision in Ferguson, a declaration of invalidity under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act effectively removes the provision from the statute books.

Therefore, the previous declarations of invalidity are binding on courts of coordinate jurisdiction, and the mandatory minimum sentence is of no force and effect.

The accused was involved in a fatal motor vehicle collision while driving a rental car.

Police seized the vehicle and conducted a warrantless search, locating drug paraphernalia in a knapsack and downloading the vehicle's Crash Data Recovery (CDR) data.

Police subsequently obtained a search warrant for the accused's blood and medical records.

The accused brought a motion to quash the warrant and exclude evidence under s. 8 of the Charter.

The Superior Court of Justice held that while the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained misleading information regarding the knapsack search, the warrant could still have issued on the remaining evidence.

The court further held that the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the CDR data of the rental vehicle.

However, the court found that the warrantless search of the accused's knapsack for the vehicle's keys violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

Arguments regarding the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) were deferred.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm, aggravated assault, and sexual assault against his intimate partner.

The charges arose from events where the accused struck the complainant in the face, pushed her out of a moving van and directed the driver to drive away while she was partially underneath it, and later forced her to have sex while she was recovering from her injuries.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and reliable, rejecting the defence's theory of self-defence and accidental injury.

The accused was found guilty on all three charges.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant was stopped on Highway 417 in Ottawa after driving at high speed without headlights.

He failed an approved screening device test and was arrested.

The defendant challenged whether the Intoxilyzer breath samples were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The defence argued that delays at the roadside scene and during a stop on Metcalfe Street to provide rights to counsel and formal breath demand violated the statutory requirement.

The court found that the officer acted reasonably promptly throughout and that the Intoxilyzer tests were administered within a reasonably prompt time in the overall circumstances.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with aggravated sexual assault contrary to section 273(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that the accused had non-consensual intercourse with the complainant without informing her of his HIV-positive status.

The central issues were whether the complainant slept in the couple's bed and whether sexual intercourse occurred.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and reliable, rejected the accused's denials, and found him guilty of the charge.

The court applied the W.(D.) test to assess credibility and found that the complainant and the accused's wife provided consistent corroborating evidence regarding key details, while the accused's account was evasive and contradicted by both witnesses.

The offender, suffering from schizo-affective disorder and psychotic delusions, fatally stabbed a fellow resident in a rooming house.

Following an unsuccessful NCR defence, a jury found him guilty of manslaughter.

The court sentenced the offender to 8 years imprisonment, less 4 years credit for pre-trial custody, emphasizing the need for general deterrence and public protection through psychiatric treatment within the federal penitentiary system.

The offender, who suffers from severe schizo-affective disorder, was found guilty of manslaughter by a jury after stabbing a fellow rooming house tenant.

The court weighed the principles of general deterrence and public protection against the offender's mental illness and need for rehabilitation.

The offender was sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment, less 4 years' credit for pre-trial custody, with a strong recommendation for treatment at a Regional Treatment Centre.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing Charter challenges related to arbitrary detention, failure to promptly inform of the reasons for detention, and admission of breath test evidence.

The appellant contended that the police officer lacked reasonable grounds for the initial traffic stop and that questioning about alcohol consumption occurred without proper notice of a change in the purpose of detention.

The court held that the trial judge’s factual findings were supported by the evidence and entitled to deference, including the finding that the officer had grounds to conduct a Highway Traffic Act stop and that the appellant had been informed of the reason for the stop.

The court also found no legal requirement that the officer explicitly advise that the investigation had shifted to a criminal matter before asking about alcohol consumption.

The trial judge’s analysis under s. 24(2) of the Charter was upheld and the breathalyzer evidence was properly admitted.

The applicant challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge (SAC) imposed under section 737 of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated his rights under sections 7, 12, and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the SAC constitutes a punishment rather than an ancillary order.

Applying the test for cruel and unusual punishment under section 12, the court determined that imposing a $700 surcharge on an impoverished, mentally ill, and substance-dependent offender with a monthly income of approximately $136 would be grossly disproportionate and incompatible with human dignity.

The court declared section 737(1) of the Criminal Code to be of no force or effect under section 52 of the Charter.

The applicant was charged with thirteen firearms-related offences, including possession of a loaded prohibited firearm.

He brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking exclusion of evidence of the firearm.

Police responded to a noise complaint and encountered the applicant in a stairwell with another individual.

Officers detected a strong smell of marijuana, observed suspicious hand movements by the applicant, and conducted a pat-down search for officer safety, discovering a loaded 9mm handgun.

The court found the detention was lawful for investigative purposes and the pat-down search was justified on safety grounds.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for criminal harassment under s. 264(2)(c) of the Criminal Code, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing to reopen the defence case to permit testimony from the complainant’s daughter.

The proposed witness lived with the complainant and the accused during the relevant period and was said to possess relevant evidence regarding whether the complainant actually feared the accused.

The appeal court held the trial judge misapprehended the relevance of the proposed evidence and improperly imposed a due diligence requirement when applying the test for reopening evidence established in R. v. Hayward.

The daughter’s evidence was potentially significant to the key element of whether the accused’s conduct caused the complainant to fear for her safety.

The refusal to reopen the evidence created the potential for a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing that the trial judge erred by proceeding with the trial using only transcripts and exhibits from a prior uncompleted trial, without hearing viva voce evidence.

The appellant had demonstrated significant difficulty understanding English during the first trial, which was conducted without an interpreter until late in his cross-examination.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred in relying on the transcripts given the central issue of credibility and the appellant's lack of comprehension, which denied him a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.