Michael A. Crystal

During a jury trial for sexual offences, the 16-year-old complainant was unable to continue her testimony after a recess on the second day of cross-examination.

The Crown applied to continue the trial, while the defendant applied for a directed verdict of acquittal or a mistrial.

Applying the framework from R. v. Hart, the court found that the incomplete cross-examination had little impact on the jury's ability to assess the evidence, as the cross-examination was near completion and the defendant had already explored most areas of impeachment.

The court held that any prejudice could be remedied by allowing defence counsel to present the planned confrontation using prior statements and by providing a specific jury instruction.

The Crown's application was granted and the defendant's application was dismissed.

On an application for a stay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, the court held that although total delay reached 1,316 days, 455.5 days were properly attributed to defence delay (including multiple adjournments, failures to appear, delayed election steps, and partial apportionment after late notice of delay concerns).

After deduction, net delay was 860.5 days (28.3 months), below the 30-month Jordan ceiling for Superior Court matters.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown sought a ruling on the voluntariness of a statement given by the accused, who was charged with second-degree murder.

The accused was arrested on December 23, 2022, and gave a statement to police approximately 10 hours later.

The defence challenged the voluntariness of the statement, arguing that oppressive circumstances, including fentanyl withdrawal symptoms, lack of proper caution, and police trickery, rendered the statement involuntary.

The court found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary and admissible in evidence.

This decision addresses an application for a stay of proceedings under sections 11(b) and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, brought by Nicholas Aaron Martin and Mackenzie Doyle.

The applicants, charged with serious offences including robbery and pointing a firearm, argued that the delay in bringing their case to trial—over 52 months—exceeded the presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court analyzed the sources of delay, including the presence of multiple accused and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and found that the net delay still exceeded the ceiling.

The court ordered a stay of proceedings.

J.H., accused of three sexual offences, applied for a stay of proceedings under ss. 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to unreasonable delay.

The court calculated the total delay, deducted defence delay and exceptional circumstances (COVID-19 pandemic), and found the remaining delay of 34.5 months exceeded the presumptive ceiling of 30 months established in R. v. Jordan.

The application was allowed, and the charges were stayed.

The offender pleaded guilty to manslaughter after encouraging her co-accused to attack the victim, who subsequently died from a stab wound.

The court found the offender's active role in instigating the confrontation and her failure to render assistance to be significant aggravating factors.

After weighing the mitigating factors, including her guilty plea and lack of a significant criminal record, the court imposed a sentence of 7.5 years imprisonment, less enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody, leaving approximately 38 months to serve.

The accused, Cody Lenard, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under ss. 11(b) and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in bringing his aggravated assault charge to trial.

The total delay was 38.5 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court attributed 5.5 months of delay to the defence's unnecessary adjournments.

However, the court rejected the Crown's argument that a 6.7-month period, during which the accused was out of province, constituted defence delay or an exceptional circumstance, finding the Crown failed to prove the accused's knowledge of the charge or police diligence in obtaining a Canada-wide warrant.

With only the 5.5 months of defence delay deducted, the net delay remained 33 months, still exceeding the presumptive ceiling.

The application for a stay was granted.

The accused, Travis Larose, brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter, alleging an infringement of his section 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The application was assessed under the R. v. Jordan framework, which sets a presumptive ceiling of 30 months for Superior Court cases.

The applicant argued the total delay exceeded this ceiling, while the Crown contended that significant portions of the delay were attributable to defence conduct, including lack of diligence in disclosure, failure to elect, and lack of urgency in setting trial dates.

The court agreed with the Crown's calculation, finding the net delay to be 26.4 months, which is below the Jordan ceiling.

Consequently, the onus remained on the defence to demonstrate the delay was unreasonable, which they failed to do.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal and stay of proceedings against the respondent, Michael Lemieux, who was charged with assaulting a police officer.

The trial judge had acquitted Lemieux, finding doubt regarding his intent (reflexive action) and, alternatively, applying the doctrine of *de minimis non curat lex*.

The Crown also appealed the trial judge's findings on Charter violations.

The appellate court found that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the police vehicle's location and erred in applying *de minimis non curat lex*.

However, these legal errors were deemed not to have impacted the trial judge's fundamental doubt about the respondent's intent for assault.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, upholding the acquittal.

The appellate court declined to review the Charter findings due to the trial judge's unclear factual findings.

This ruling addresses the voluntariness of three statements made by the accused, Nadine Melvaer and Tyler Campbell, to police in relation to the death of Oliver McCarthy.

The Crown sought to admit Nadine Melvaer's statements from January 15-16, 2020, and March 31, 2021, and Tyler Campbell's statement from January 23, 2020.

The court applied the common law confessions rule, considering factors such as inducements, oppressive circumstances, operating mind, police trickery, and the presence or absence of a police caution.

The court found all three statements to be voluntary and admissible, concluding that the police conduct did not unfairly deprive the accused of their free choice to speak.

The Crown applied under section 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code for an order permitting the complainant, Makenna Desbiens, to testify via CCTV in a trial involving 11 charges of intimate partner violence against Anthony Grantham.

The complainant, diagnosed with borderline personality disorder and PTSD, testified that she would be fearful and intimidated if required to testify in the same courtroom as the accused, which would negatively impact her ability to give a full and candid account.

The court considered factors under section 486.2(3), including the complainant's mental health, the nature of the offences, and the relationship with the accused.

The court found that CCTV testimony would facilitate a more fulsome and honest account and would not compromise the defence's ability to assess demeanor.

The Crown's application was granted.

The accused, charged with historical sexual offences against his daughter and granddaughter, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the swearing of the information to the end of the trial was 57 months and 10 days.

The court found that the accused engaged in deliberate and calculated tactics to delay the proceedings, including refusing to view disclosure, resisting the appointment of s. 486.3 counsel, and disputing the court's jurisdiction.

After deducting defence delay and exceptional circumstances, the net delay was 25 months, which fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown sought to appeal the respondent's acquittal on assault charges but failed to personally serve the Notice of Appeal within the 30-day limit, citing concerns about using local police due to the trial judge's finding of excessive force.

The Crown brought an application for substituted service or to dispense with service, which the court dismissed because the Crown had not attempted personal service via a process server.

However, the court granted the Crown's alternative request for a 30-day extension of time to effect personal service, finding the Crown had demonstrated a bona fide intention to appeal, explained the delay, and raised grounds with some merit.

The young person appeared before the Superior Court of Justice for a detention review under section 525 of the Criminal Code.

The court raised the issue of its jurisdiction to conduct the review under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court held that because the young person had not elected to be tried in the Superior Court, the court was not deemed a youth justice court and therefore lacked jurisdiction.

The matter was transferred to the Ontario Court of Justice.

The accused, a 79-year-old man, sought release on a detention review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

He was charged with attempted murder and other offences against his former common-law spouse, and subsequently breached a non-communication order while in custody.

Despite a proposed release plan involving GPS monitoring, CCTV, and sureties, and evidence that the accused may be suffering from dementia requiring assessment, the court found the plan insufficient to mitigate the risks.

The court concluded that continued detention was necessary on both the secondary and tertiary grounds.

In a judge-alone sexual assault trial arising from a sexual encounter that began consensually, the central issue was whether the accused struck the complainant mid-encounter, thereby vitiating consent to subsequent sexual activity under s. 265(3) of the Criminal Code.

The court treated the matter as a credibility case, applied the W. (D.) framework, and found significant implausibilities and inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, while also identifying limitations in the accused's evidence.

The medical evidence and post-incident text message were held not to materially corroborate the complainant's account.

Considering the evidence as a whole, the accused's evidence raised a reasonable doubt, and the Crown failed to prove absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.

The applicant, convicted of first degree murder in 2007 and sentenced to life with 25 years of parole ineligibility, applied for a reduction in his parole ineligibility period under the 'faint hope' clause (s. 745.6(1) of the Criminal Code).

The screening judge, who was also the trial judge, found that despite the brutality of the crime, the applicant demonstrated significant rehabilitative progress, maturity, and community support.

Applying the 'reasonable prospect of success' standard, the court directed that a jury be empanelled to consider the application.

The offender, an Indigenous man, was convicted of sexual assault, forcible confinement, assault, and threatening his former intimate partner, an Indigenous woman.

The Crown sought a global sentence of five years, while the defence sought two years.

The court weighed the aggravating factors, including the victim's vulnerability and the impact of the offences, against significant mitigating factors, particularly the offender's Indigenous background (Gladue factors), onerous bail conditions, and strong potential for rehabilitation.

The court sentenced the offender to a global term of two years' imprisonment, along with ancillary orders.

The defendant, Chad Valiquette, applied under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to stay charges of assault and sexual assault due to unreasonable delay.

The court analyzed the total delay of 1331 days against the 30-month Jordan ceiling, deducting periods attributed to defence actions (awaiting an appeal decision, Legal Aid issues) and exceptional circumstances (threat to counsel, COVID-19 court suspensions).

The court found that after deductions, the remaining delay was 27.99 months, which is below the Jordan ceiling.

Consequently, the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The moving party pleaded guilty to second-degree murder for the killing of his pregnant wife and was sentenced to life imprisonment.

Over two and a half years later, he brought a motion for an extension of time to appeal his conviction, arguing he was previously unaware he could appeal a guilty plea and that his plea was uninformed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no bona fide intention to appeal within the required period, no reasonable explanation for the delay, and no merit to the proposed appeal, as the record demonstrated the guilty plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and fully informed.