Laurie Galway

The Crown sought a ruling on the voluntariness of a statement given by the accused, who was charged with second-degree murder.

The accused was arrested on December 23, 2022, and gave a statement to police approximately 10 hours later.

The defence challenged the voluntariness of the statement, arguing that oppressive circumstances, including fentanyl withdrawal symptoms, lack of proper caution, and police trickery, rendered the statement involuntary.

The court found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary and admissible in evidence.

The accused applied for a detention review after being arrested on new charges while on a release order.

The Crown opposed release on secondary and tertiary grounds, citing the accused's criminal record, substance abuse issues, and the serious nature of the allegations.

The defence proposed a comprehensive release plan involving residence with sureties in a remote Alberta camp with strict conditions.

The court, applying the principles from R. v. Myers, R. v. Antic, and R. v. St-Cloud, found that the proposed plan met the accused's onus on both secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court emphasized the principle of restraint and the proportionality of continued detention to a realistic sentence, especially given the accused's mental health issues and time already served.

The accused was released on the proposed terms.

The defendants Gabriel Chartrand and Boss Man Limited brought a motion for an order requiring the self-represented plaintiff, Oslyn Lewis, to post security for costs under Rule 56.01(1)(a), (b), and (e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendants argued the plaintiff resided outside Ontario, had a duplicative proceeding, and that the action was frivolous/vexatious with insufficient assets to pay costs.

The court found no evidence the plaintiff resided outside Ontario, and the earlier duplicative action had been discontinued.

While the plaintiff had insufficient assets, the court, referencing a prior motion to strike the claim (Lewis v. Chartrand, 2022 ONSC 3055), determined the claim was not frivolous or vexatious.

Consequently, the motion for security for costs was dismissed.

The court delivered reasons for sentence for three co-accused, David Kawal, Tyrel Nicholson, and Devonte Rowe, involved in a botched robbery and kidnapping scheme.

Kawal was convicted of attempted murder of a police officer, robbery with a firearm, and kidnapping with a firearm.

Nicholson pleaded guilty to robbery with a firearm, kidnapping with a firearm, and breach of recognizance.

Rowe was convicted of robbery and kidnapping simpliciter.

The judge emphasized the gravity of handgun violence and offences against police officers, applying principles of general deterrence and denunciation.

Kawal received a life sentence with normal parole eligibility.

Nicholson was sentenced to 10 years (63 months actual after pre-trial credit).

Rowe received a 4-year sentence (time served) based on a joint submission.

The court declined to delay parole for Kawal, citing the parole board's superior position to assess rehabilitation.

This decision contains pre-charge rulings in a criminal trial involving charges of robbery, kidnapping, and attempted murder against David Kawal and co-accused.

The court addressed three issues: the admissibility of consciousness of guilt evidence, a directed verdict application for one of the attempted murder charges against Kawal, and an alternative suspect application.

The court ruled that the consciousness of guilt evidence (cell phone sim card change) was inadmissible due to its low probative value and high prejudicial effect.

It granted a directed verdict of acquittal for Kawal on the attempted murder of Mohammed Ibrahim, finding that the act was not a probable consequence of the common criminal purpose.

Finally, the court allowed the defence to pursue an alternative suspect (Q.H.) for the shooting of Officer Alwyn, finding sufficient admissible evidence to lend an "air of reality" to this defence.

On a Crown evidentiary motion in a joint criminal trial, the court considered whether parole-source evidence linking one accused to a cell phone and related biographical information was admissible.

The court held the evidence had high probative value because the cell tower data was a major pillar of the Crown case and the accused's likely possession of the phone was a key circumstantial link.

Although the evidence carried some moral prejudice by revealing the accused was on parole, the jury would not learn the underlying offences and a limiting instruction could reduce prejudice.

The court rejected the Crown's submission that anticipated character attacks on a complainant supported admission, but still ruled the evidence admissible and encouraged counsel to prepare an agreed statement of facts to minimize prejudice.

The accused pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated assault after attacking his mother by pouring boiling water on her face and chest while she slept.

The offender had been in custody since October 17, 2013.

The court imposed a sentence of 3½ years (42 months) with enhanced credit of 1.5:1 for 20 months of pretrial custody, resulting in an additional 12 months to be served.

The sentence was followed by two years of probation with conditions including no contact with the victim, no weapons, and a 10-year weapons prohibition order.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence while considering the offender's youth, mental health challenges, and rehabilitative potential.

Sentencing decision for multiple firearm, drug trafficking, and breach of prohibition order offences.

The accused was arrested while carrying a fully loaded restricted handgun and possessing crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking while subject to firearms prohibition orders and probation.

The court applied the Kienapple rule to stay certain duplicative convictions and considered aggravating factors including the loaded firearm, connection to drug trafficking, flight from police, and breach of prior court orders.

After granting enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody under s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, the court imposed a global sentence of five years’ imprisonment.

The remaining custodial term was structured as a reformatory sentence followed by a three-year probation order with multiple ancillary orders.