Steven M. Hinkson

The accused was charged with failing to comply with a house arrest term of a release order contrary to s. 145(5)(a) of the Criminal Code.

He was found alone at 4:30 a.m. near Yonge and Dundas in Toronto, holding an open alcoholic beverage.

The defence brought a directed verdict application, arguing the Crown failed to negate exceptions in the release order permitting travel to and from work.

The court dismissed the application, relying on R. v. Blaker to hold the exceptions were not essential elements of the offence.

On the merits, the court found the Crown proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, as no evidence supported any applicable exception to the house arrest condition.

The offender was convicted of multiple firearms offences, including possession of two loaded handguns in a hotel room, and pleaded guilty to possessing firearms while subject to three separate prohibition orders.

The offender had an extensive criminal record with 53 prior convictions, including previous firearms offences.

The Crown sought a 12-year consecutive sentence, while the defence sought 6 years.

Emphasizing denunciation, deterrence, and the protection of the public, the court imposed a global sentence of 10.5 years consecutive to the sentence the offender was currently serving, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The offender, a 35-year-old first-time offender and primary caregiver to her son, was found guilty by a jury of possession of cocaine and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of cannabis for the purpose of selling.

The police found over 1 kg of cocaine in her backpack and additional cocaine and fentanyl concealed in her body.

The Crown sought an 8-year sentence, while the defence proposed 3 to 5 years.

The court weighed the significant aggravating factors of the quantity and nature of the drugs against mitigating factors including her lack of a criminal record, remorse, and family circumstances.

The offender was sentenced to a total of 5 years' imprisonment.

The applicant brought a Garofoli application seeking to quash a search warrant issued under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and to exclude evidence pursuant to sections 8 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicant was charged with possession of a loaded and prohibited firearm, possession of a prohibited firearm, and possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown conceded that the redacted Information to Obtain could not support the authorization and sought to have the court review the unredacted material.

The court found that the Information to Obtain contained sufficient information upon which the issuing justice could have authorized the search, and therefore no section 8 Charter breach occurred.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown applied to introduce prior discreditable conduct of the accused, Felicity Altiman, in a second-degree murder trial.

The conduct involved threatening to stab a third party and brandishing a knife.

The court applied the four-part test for admitting such evidence, focusing on the probative value versus prejudicial effect.

The court allowed evidence of the accused possessing and brandishing a knife but excluded evidence of the specific threats made due to moral prejudice.

Additionally, evidence of the accused admitting to regularly robbing the deceased was conceded as admissible.

The applicants, Nimo Ali and Carlington Graham, jointly charged with human trafficking and child pornography offences, brought applications under s. 276 of the Criminal Code for leave to cross-examine complainants on aspects of their prior involvement in the sex trade with an unconnected third party.

The Crown opposed.

The court allowed the applications in part, permitting cross-examination on specific inconsistencies and untruths related to the complainants' prior knowledge and involvement in the sex trade (e.g., taking photos for online ads, knowledge of Leo List), but prohibited questions that would invoke the "twin myths" (i.e., that prior sexual activity makes a complainant more likely to have consented or less worthy of belief).

The court emphasized that the cross-examination must be tightly controlled and accompanied by mid-trial and final jury instructions.

S.T. applied for a stay of proceedings, arguing that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms had been violated due to delay.

The total delay from the information being sworn to the anticipated end of trial was 955 days (31 months and 12 days).

The Crown argued for 468 days of defence delay, which would bring the net delay below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court attributed 36 days of defence delay for not scheduling a Crown Pre-trial (CPT) earlier despite sufficient initial disclosure, 175 days for not proceeding with a Judicial Pre-trial (JPT) due to missing videotaped disclosure (which the court found was not essential to move the case forward), and 257 days for defence unavailability for earlier trial dates offered by the Crown.

The total defence delay was calculated as 468 days, resulting in a net delay of 487 days (16.01 months), which is below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The court found that the defence did not demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

This ruling addresses Crown applications in a human trafficking trial for two complainants, aged 15 and 16 at the time of the alleged offences, to testify from outside the courtroom.

The applications were brought under section 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code, which permits such orders to facilitate a full and candid account or in the interest of the proper administration of justice.

The court considered the complainants' anxiety and fear, particularly one who experienced panic attacks during the preliminary hearing.

The court noted the lowered threshold for such orders following a 2015 amendment to the Criminal Code.

Both applications were granted, subject to technical transmission quality, with instructions to the jury not to draw adverse inferences from the use of testimonial aids.

Jabir Khan was convicted of possession of a restricted firearm and occupation of a motor vehicle knowing it contained an unregistered restricted firearm.

The offences involved a sawed-off shotgun with ammunition, which Khan took as a favour for a friend.

The Crown sought a 4-year sentence, while the defence proposed 2.5 years, potentially as a conditional sentence.

The court considered aggravating factors, including Khan's lengthy criminal record, multiple lifetime firearms prohibitions, and the dangerous nature of the weapon.

Mitigating factors included 26 months of house arrest bail, pre-trial custody credit, significant gaps in his criminal record, current employment, and expressed remorse.

The court imposed a global sentence of 3 years, resulting in 2 years and 323 days remaining to be served after credit for pre-trial custody.

A concurrent 12-month sentence was imposed for the vehicle offence.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime firearms prohibition, a DNA order, and a no-contact order with the co-accused while in custody.

The accused, Jabir Khan, was charged with possession of a restricted firearm and occupation of a motor vehicle knowing it contained an unregistered restricted firearm.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved the knowledge component of the possession counts.

The accused testified he believed the duffel bag he received contained cocaine, not a firearm.

The court found the accused's testimony not credible, citing inconsistencies with the size of the bag, the implausibility of the false story, and detailed knowledge revealed in wiretap conversations, including the involvement of Nelson's girlfriend in transferring the firearm.

The lack of effort to disguise the firearm also indicated the accused's knowledge.

The court concluded that the accused knowingly accepted the transfer of the sawed-off shotgun and ammunition.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of his arrest and the search of his vehicle under sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown sought to establish that police had reasonable grounds to arrest the defendant based on evidence from a wiretap investigation into a jewelry store robbery.

The defendant argued that certain information was inadmissible and that the remaining evidence was insufficient to establish reasonable grounds.

The court found that the admissible evidence, including wiretap intercepts discussing the movement of a firearm, observations of a meeting between the defendant's vehicle and a suspect, and subsequent communications, provided a sufficient objective basis for the arrest and search.

The applicant challenged the warrantless seizure of his cellular phone subscriber information obtained by police during a Part VI wiretap authorization for a robbery investigation.

The applicant was not a suspect and was not named in the authorization.

Police obtained his subscriber information after intercepting an innocuous conversation between the applicant and a named target.

The court found that the seizure violated s. 8 of the Charter as it was not authorized by law.

The assistance order under s. 487.02 does not authorize expansion of investigations to unnamed persons without reasonable grounds.

The court excluded the subscriber information and any derivative evidence under s. 24(2), finding the breach serious and that admission would undermine public confidence in the rule of law.

The applicant brought a motion to exclude evidence under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter, arguing that police lacked lawful authority to search cell phones and intercept conversations.

The court dismissed the application, with written reasons to follow, to allow counsel to prepare for the upcoming trial.

The court delivered reasons for sentence for three co-accused, David Kawal, Tyrel Nicholson, and Devonte Rowe, involved in a botched robbery and kidnapping scheme.

Kawal was convicted of attempted murder of a police officer, robbery with a firearm, and kidnapping with a firearm.

Nicholson pleaded guilty to robbery with a firearm, kidnapping with a firearm, and breach of recognizance.

Rowe was convicted of robbery and kidnapping simpliciter.

The judge emphasized the gravity of handgun violence and offences against police officers, applying principles of general deterrence and denunciation.

Kawal received a life sentence with normal parole eligibility.

Nicholson was sentenced to 10 years (63 months actual after pre-trial credit).

Rowe received a 4-year sentence (time served) based on a joint submission.

The court declined to delay parole for Kawal, citing the parole board's superior position to assess rehabilitation.

The offender was convicted by a jury of importing 1.34 kilograms of cocaine.

The Crown sought a sentence of 45 months, while the defence sought 30 months.

The court considered the offender's significant personal hardships, including a difficult upbringing, abuse, severe health challenges, and a long history of steady employment despite these issues.

Finding that the offender's unique circumstances justified a departure from the usual 3 to 5 year range for importing a kilogram of cocaine, the court imposed a sentence of 33 months imprisonment.

The accused, charged with kidnapping, robbery, and attempted murder, applied under s. 7 and s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude statements he made to undercover police officers placed in his cell after his arrest.

The accused had previously exercised his right to silence.

The court applied the Hebert framework and found that the undercover officers did not actively elicit the statements or engage in the functional equivalent of an interrogation.

The accused spoke voluntarily and freely to his cellmates.

The application to exclude the statements was dismissed.

On a Crown evidentiary motion in a joint criminal trial, the court considered whether parole-source evidence linking one accused to a cell phone and related biographical information was admissible.

The court held the evidence had high probative value because the cell tower data was a major pillar of the Crown case and the accused's likely possession of the phone was a key circumstantial link.

Although the evidence carried some moral prejudice by revealing the accused was on parole, the jury would not learn the underlying offences and a limiting instruction could reduce prejudice.

The court rejected the Crown's submission that anticipated character attacks on a complainant supported admission, but still ruled the evidence admissible and encouraged counsel to prepare an agreed statement of facts to minimize prejudice.

During a first-degree murder trial where identification was the sole issue, the defence sought to allow the jury a closer physical view of the accused's eyes.

The only eyewitness had described the shooter as having "colourful eyes" and the defence argued the current courtroom configuration prevented the jury from properly assessing this evidence.

The Crown opposed, contending the request was a formal "view" under s. 652 of the Criminal Code or amounted to calling new evidence.

The court rejected the Crown's arguments, clarifying that a jury's observation of an accused's physical appearance constitutes "real evidence" and is distinct from a formal "view." The court ruled that the jury should be permitted a closer view of the accused's eyes to ensure a fair trial and proper assessment of the evidence, noting that the accused's right to a fair trial should not be contingent on courtroom layout.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought pre-trial applications to exclude evidence under the Charter and challenge the voluntariness of a statement.

The accused argued that a brief interaction with police in a stairwell months before the murder constituted an arbitrary detention, and that obtaining his phone number from Ontario Works violated his s. 8 rights.

The court found that the stairwell encounter was a brief, consensual interaction that did not amount to a detention, and the statement was voluntary.

The court also held that the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his phone number obtained from Ontario Works.

The applications were dismissed and the evidence was ruled admissible.

The accused, charged with homicide, brought an application to adduce evidence that a third party was the true perpetrator.

The defence argued the alternate suspect had opportunity, motive, propensity, and was identified as the shooter.

The court dismissed the application, finding no sufficient connection between the alternate suspect and the crime, as the evidence for opportunity, motive, propensity, and identification was seriously lacking or completely absent.