Kaely Grace Fairfield Whillans

The applicant, Liam Stinson, convicted of three counts of first-degree murder and arson causing bodily harm, brought an application for the trial judge to recuse himself from sentencing.

The application was based on an email sent by the investigating officer to the judge's judicial assistant, which the applicant argued created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court dismissed the application, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The judge noted that the email contained no sentencing submissions or requests for a particular outcome, and that the judge had acted ethically by consulting the Judicial Ethics Committee and disclosing the email to counsel.

The court emphasized the trial judge's unique advantage in sentencing due to having presided over the trial.

The Crown applied to introduce prior discreditable conduct of the accused, Felicity Altiman, in a second-degree murder trial.

The conduct involved threatening to stab a third party and brandishing a knife.

The court applied the four-part test for admitting such evidence, focusing on the probative value versus prejudicial effect.

The court allowed evidence of the accused possessing and brandishing a knife but excluded evidence of the specific threats made due to moral prejudice.

Additionally, evidence of the accused admitting to regularly robbing the deceased was conceded as admissible.

Liam Stinson, charged with three counts of first-degree murder and one count of arson causing bodily harm, brought an application for a directed verdict of acquittal on the murder charges at the close of the Crown's case.

The Crown argued Stinson was a principal perpetrator through the use of innocent agents (Jared Herrick and Phillippe Jeannotte) in the firebombing that resulted in three deaths.

The court dismissed the application, finding sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence for a jury to conclude Stinson intended to commit murder and used the agents to achieve this, having misled them into believing the residence was unoccupied.

The jury subsequently found Stinson guilty of first-degree murder.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings, alleging breaches of his Charter rights (s. 7 and 11(b)) due to a 23-day delay in his bail hearing.

The court declined to hear the application at this interlocutory stage, emphasizing that such Charter applications are best resolved by the trial judge on a full record, except in extraordinary circumstances not present in this case.

The court noted that a stay is a remedy of last resort and that other remedies, such as a reduction in sentence, might be available at trial.

The application was adjourned to be considered by the trial judge.

The applicant sought a bail review after being detained on secondary and tertiary grounds for serious charges including attempted murder and numerous firearm offences.

The applicant argued for release based on an improved bail plan incorporating an ankle bracelet and the health risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic in custody.

The court found that neither the ankle bracelet nor the general risks of COVID-19 constituted a material change in circumstances sufficient to overcome the significant public safety and confidence in justice concerns, especially given the sureties' prior inability to control the applicant.

The application for bail review was dismissed.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm, uttering threats, and breach of probation arising from events on May 30, 2017.

The complainant alleged the accused inflicted bruises on her body during a twelve-hour period at his residence.

The accused raised a self-defence claim, asserting he restrained the complainant to prevent her from harming herself and to protect himself from her aggressive conduct while highly intoxicated.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable due to her extreme intoxication and inconsistencies with her prior statements to police.

The court accepted the accused's version of events and found his use of force was reasonable and proportionate to the circumstances.

The accused was found guilty of breach of probation but acquitted of assault causing bodily harm and uttering threats.