Liam K. Thompson

Brandon Sero and Marie Miller were charged with drug trafficking offences following a search warrant executed on February 8, 2024.

Sero brought a Charter application under section 24(2) to exclude evidence seized during the search, arguing the warrant was invalid due to breaches of section 8 rights.

The applicant challenged the validity of the warrant, claiming the Information to Obtain failed to disclose reasonable and probable grounds and that confidential source information was insufficiently credible, compelling, and corroborated.

The court found the warrant was valid despite material omissions from the ITO regarding the background and credentials of confidential sources.

The court applied the Garofoli process to manage disclosure while protecting informer privilege and ultimately dismissed the Charter application, finding the evidence admissible under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of possession of controlled substances (cocaine and crystal methamphetamine) for the purpose of trafficking and one count of failing to comply with a release order.

He received a global sentence of two years imprisonment after credit for pre-sentence custody.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on grounds of alleged Charter violations relating to searches and access to counsel, and challenged the sentence on grounds of inadequate consideration of systemic discrimination and a procedurally unfair forfeiture order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no Charter breaches.

The Court admitted fresh evidence on the sentence appeal but dismissed it on the merits, except for setting aside the forfeiture order for the funds seized.

The applicant brought a Charter application challenging his prosecution for possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued that the prosecution should be stayed as it offended the rule against double jeopardy following his conviction on institutional disciplinary charges; that the search of his cell violated s. 8 of the Charter; that questioning by correctional officers violated s. 10(b) of the Charter; and that evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2).

The court dismissed all arguments, finding that s. 11(h) does not apply to inmate disciplinary proceedings; that the search was properly authorized; that no s. 10(b) violation occurred; and that evidence exclusion was not warranted.

The applicant, Liam Stinson, convicted of three counts of first-degree murder and arson causing bodily harm, brought an application for the trial judge to recuse himself from sentencing.

The application was based on an email sent by the investigating officer to the judge's judicial assistant, which the applicant argued created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court dismissed the application, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The judge noted that the email contained no sentencing submissions or requests for a particular outcome, and that the judge had acted ethically by consulting the Judicial Ethics Committee and disclosing the email to counsel.

The court emphasized the trial judge's unique advantage in sentencing due to having presided over the trial.

Liam Stinson, charged with three counts of first-degree murder and one count of arson causing bodily harm, brought an application for a directed verdict of acquittal on the murder charges at the close of the Crown's case.

The Crown argued Stinson was a principal perpetrator through the use of innocent agents (Jared Herrick and Phillippe Jeannotte) in the firebombing that resulted in three deaths.

The court dismissed the application, finding sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence for a jury to conclude Stinson intended to commit murder and used the agents to achieve this, having misled them into believing the residence was unoccupied.

The jury subsequently found Stinson guilty of first-degree murder.

This decision concerns the sentencing of the defendant, P.H., who was convicted of one count of Sexual Interference involving a child victim, M.H., over multiple occasions when she was 3-4 years old.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the profound breach of trust, the victim's extreme vulnerability, the multiple incidents, and the use of physical force.

Mitigating factors included the defendant's status as a first-time offender for sexual offences, his struggles with addiction and mental health issues, and a low risk of sexual re-offending as supported by expert opinion and a decade without further sexual offences.

The Crown sought a penitentiary term of 3-4 years and a 20-year SOIRA order, while the Defence sought an upper reformatory term of 18-24 months and opposed the SOIRA order.

The court imposed a sentence of 2 years less a day imprisonment, followed by a two-year probation order, and various ancillary orders, but dismissed the request for a SOIRA order, finding it grossly disproportionate given the low risk of sexual recidivism.

The applicant, J.A.D., brought an urgent motion for parenting time with the child, L., who is his stepson.

The respondent, J.C. (L.'s mother), had unilaterally terminated all contact between J.A.D. and L. after J.A.D. failed to pick L. up from school on one occasion.

J.C. argued that the motion should be dismissed as it was brought before a case conference and that it was in L.'s best interests to have no contact with J.A.D., citing a "toxic" relationship and alleged abuse.

The court granted leave for the motion to be heard urgently, finding that J.C.'s complete denial of contact imperiled the father-son relationship.

The court found that J.A.D. had "authentically parented" L. for his entire life and that J.C.'s reasons for terminating contact were insufficient and not in L.'s best interests.

An interim order was made restoring J.A.D.'s weekly parenting time, including overnight visits, and imposing communication parameters between the parties.

The accused, Liam Stinson, is charged with first-degree murder and attempted murder.

This is a voir dire ruling on the admissibility of ante-mortem hearsay statements made by the deceased victim, Jamie Lynn Rose.

The Crown sought to admit these statements under the *res gestae* exception or the principled approach to hearsay, arguing their relevance to the deceased's state of mind, the accused's animus, motive, and identity.

The court applied the tests of necessity, reliability (procedural and substantive), and the probative value versus prejudicial effect.

Many statements were excluded due to lack of contemporaneousness, suspicious circumstances, contradictory evidence, or the declarant's motive to lie.

Other statements, particularly those made closer to the time of death and without reliability concerns, were admitted.

The court emphasized avoiding "trials within a trial" and undue prejudice from cumulative evidence.

This motion addressed whether a main action and a third-party action, stemming from a property dispute involving an encroaching structure, should be heard concurrently or sequentially.

The Plaintiffs sought a combined hearing, while the Defendants and Third Parties preferred separate proceedings.

The court, emphasizing judicial efficiency and fairness, determined that the intertwined factual and legal issues, particularly concerning the appropriate equitable remedy for the admitted trespass and the allocation of financial responsibility among all parties, necessitated a single, consolidated trial.

The motion for concurrent hearings was granted to avoid multiplicity of actions and the risk of inconsistent findings.