3 total
A self-represented litigant's motion for a declaration allowing her to audio record court proceedings without leave was dismissed.
The respondent, Cynthia Meek, sought declaratory relief to allow her to audio record court appearances, including her upcoming trial, arguing that the Practice Direction requiring leave to record is inconsistent with section 136(2)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act and violates the Charter.
The court found that both the Act and the Practice Direction require judicial discretion for recording requests and are not in conflict.
The motion for declaratory relief was dismissed.
The court granted an urgent motion restoring a stepfather's parenting time after the mother unilaterally terminated contact.
The applicant, J.A.D., brought an urgent motion for parenting time with the child, L., who is his stepson.
The respondent, J.C. (L.'s mother), had unilaterally terminated all contact between J.A.D. and L. after J.A.D. failed to pick L. up from school on one occasion.
J.C. argued that the motion should be dismissed as it was brought before a case conference and that it was in L.'s best interests to have no contact with J.A.D., citing a "toxic" relationship and alleged abuse.
The court granted leave for the motion to be heard urgently, finding that J.C.'s complete denial of contact imperiled the father-son relationship.
The court found that J.A.D. had "authentically parented" L. for his entire life and that J.C.'s reasons for terminating contact were insufficient and not in L.'s best interests.
An interim order was made restoring J.A.D.'s weekly parenting time, including overnight visits, and imposing communication parameters between the parties.
Interim motion to relocate child granted due to primary caregiver's compelling financial hardship.
The applicant mother brought a motion seeking permission to relocate the parties' five-year-old child from London to Stayner, Ontario, due to financial hardship and eviction.
The respondent father objected to the move.
The court applied the provisions of the Children's Law Reform Act and the Plumley factors for interim mobility.
Finding that the child spent the vast majority of time with the applicant, the burden of proof shifted to the respondent to show the move was not in the child's best interests.
The court concluded the respondent failed to meet this burden, noting the applicant's compelling financial reasons and the benefits of family support in Stayner.
The motion was granted on a temporary basis, with the applicant responsible for transportation for the respondent's parenting time.
