Marnie Vickerd

This decision addresses a motion by the Walpole Island First Nation (WIFN) seeking full, unredacted disclosure of child protection files held by Linck Child, Youth, and Family Supports concerning Indigenous children under their care.

The court reviews the applicable legislative framework, including the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (CYFSA), the federal Act Respecting First Nations, Inuit and Metis Children, Youth and Families, and the Family Law Rules.

The judge emphasizes the paramount importance of Indigenous children's best interests, cultural continuity, and the duty of consultation with Indigenous communities.

The court rejects the child protection agency's redactions and limitations on disclosure, finding that full disclosure to the First Nation is necessary to enable meaningful participation in care planning and to uphold Indigenous rights and reconciliation principles.

The motion is granted with orders for unredacted disclosure and restrictions on use to protect privacy.

This decision concerns a Default Hearing under the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, 1996, involving Christopher John Knotek's failure to pay child support arrears owed to Amy Lynn Knotek.

The Ontario Court of Justice found that Knotek owed $29,558.32 in arrears as of September 3, 2024, and had the ability to pay but deliberately failed to do so.

The court rejected Knotek's claim of financial hardship, noting misleading financial disclosure and significant corporate assets.

The court ordered full payment of arrears by March 14, 2025, ongoing monthly support payments, and imposed committal terms for defaults, including incarceration.

Costs were awarded to the Family Responsibility Office due to Knotek's bad faith and delays.

This decision concerns a child protection application under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, involving serious sexual offence charges against the father, Dr. RW, unrelated to his own children but occurring in the family home.

The Ontario Court of Justice considered the admissibility and reliability of evidence from police and society workers, rejecting double hearsay and parental testimony about children's views.

The court emphasized the paramountcy of children's best interests and protection, finding reasonable grounds to believe the children would be at risk if placed in joint parental care.

The interim order places the children with the mother under society supervision and restricts the father's access to supervised visits, denying unsupervised access or cohabitation due to the risk of sexual and emotional harm.

Linck Child, Youth and Family Supports brought a motion for temporary care and custody of the child Z, seeking placement in society care and supervised access for the mother.

The respondent mother, S.A., opposed the motion, seeking Z's immediate return to her care.

The court granted the mother's request to provide oral evidence due to her self-represented status and past delays.

The court found that Linck failed to discharge its onus to prove a risk of harm to Z in the mother's care, criticizing the society's evidence as speculative, inconsistent, and tailored to justify apprehension.

The court also found Linck's interventions unjustified and overly intrusive, noting a pattern of baseless apprehensions.

The motion for temporary care was dismissed, and Z was ordered to be immediately returned to the mother's care without supervision.

The Mother brought an urgent motion to vary a final parenting order, seeking supervised parenting time for the Father after their child suffered a severe THC overdose while in his care.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the child's ingestion of THC and the Father's subsequent lack of transparency and poor judgment.

The motion was granted, and an interim order for supervised parenting time by the paternal grandmother was issued to ensure the child's safety.

The applicant, J.A.D., brought an urgent motion for parenting time with the child, L., who is his stepson.

The respondent, J.C. (L.'s mother), had unilaterally terminated all contact between J.A.D. and L. after J.A.D. failed to pick L. up from school on one occasion.

J.C. argued that the motion should be dismissed as it was brought before a case conference and that it was in L.'s best interests to have no contact with J.A.D., citing a "toxic" relationship and alleged abuse.

The court granted leave for the motion to be heard urgently, finding that J.C.'s complete denial of contact imperiled the father-son relationship.

The court found that J.A.D. had "authentically parented" L. for his entire life and that J.C.'s reasons for terminating contact were insufficient and not in L.'s best interests.

An interim order was made restoring J.A.D.'s weekly parenting time, including overnight visits, and imposing communication parameters between the parties.

This is a motion to change brought by the father seeking to restore the child's primary residence to Wallaceburg after the mother unilaterally relocated with the child to London.

The court found that the mother's relocation constituted a material change in circumstances.

Despite the mother being the primary caregiver, the court determined that the relocation was not in the child's best interests, primarily due to the significant disruption to the child's established community, school, extracurricular activities, and frequent contact with the father and extended family.

The court emphasized that unilateral actions creating a new status quo are not condoned and ordered the child's residence to be restored to Wallaceburg, outlining parenting schedules depending on whether the mother returns to Wallaceburg or remains in London.

The applicant Society, joined by the mother and Inuit representative, sought to vary an interim order to place children with the mother and permit their relocation to Northern Quebec.

The father opposed, requesting custody and maintenance of the non-removal order.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the parents' separation and the father's criminal charges.

Applying principles from the Child, Youth and Family Services Act and the federal Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis Children, Youth and Families, with a strong emphasis on cultural continuity for Indigenous children, the court granted the Society's motion, allowing the mother to relocate with the children to their Inuit community, despite the impact on the father's access.

Foster parents moved to be added as parties in a child protection proceeding involving three children who had been in their care for 22 months.

The Sarnia-Lambton Children's Aid Society and the children's parents sought a final order based on a Statement of Agreed Facts, which proposed placing the children in three different kin homes.

The court dismissed the foster parents' motion for full party status, finding they did not qualify as statutory parents and lacked a legal interest for discretionary party status.

However, recognizing their significant role and the need for all relevant evidence, the court granted the foster parents expanded participatory rights, including the ability to file evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and make submissions regarding the children's disposition of care.

The court also declined to issue the final order based on the Statement of Agreed Facts due to concerns about the proposed plan and missing evidence, requiring a focused hearing on disposition.

The Sarnia-Lambton Children's Aid Society brought a motion to add Aamjiwnaang First Nation (AFN) as a party to a child protection Status Review Application concerning a child whose father is a status member of AFN.

AFN opposed being added, arguing that its participation is an entitlement, not an imposition, and that it has limited resources and the child is not eligible for band membership.

The court granted the motion, finding that under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA) and federal legislation, the representative of a child's band is a mandatory party, and this status serves the child's best interests by preserving the option for future participation and ensuring all entitlements under child protection legislation.

The court emphasized that while party status is mandatory, active participation is not compelled.

The applicant mother sought leave to advance a Status Review Application under s. 115(5) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, aiming for a final order placing the child in her joint care with the father.

The court granted leave, finding that the mother met the established criteria, including good faith, lack of alternative remedies, unusual circumstances (child in continuous care without permanent placement), and a prima facie case.

The court also found the child continued to be in need of protection.

However, due to insufficient evidence regarding the child's special needs, current services, and the impact of transition, the court deferred the disposition of care, ordering an expedited hearing for supplemental evidence.

The Windsor-Essex Children’s Aid Society brought a motion within a child protection application under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The Society sought a finding that the child was in need of protection and an extension of the statutory time limit for the child to remain in care.

The court found the child to be in need of protection by consent of the parties.

However, the court dismissed the Society's request for a six-month extension of the child's time in care, finding it was not in the child's best interests given the lack of a concrete permanency plan after 24 months in care and the parents' ambivalence about resuming care.

The matter was set down for trial for further litigation planning.

The Respondent brought a motion seeking an order to compel an Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) clinician to attend for questioning and produce records related to an OCL report.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Respondent failed to satisfy the three-part test under Family Law Rule 20(5) for compelling a non-party's attendance.

Additionally, the Respondent had not filed a statement disputing the OCL report within the timelines required by Family Law Rule 21(e), rendering the report uncontested evidence.

The applicant brought a motion seeking a final order for child support and contributions to special and extraordinary expenses.

The parties had consented to a child support amount lower than the Child Support Guidelines table amount, citing the respondent's obligation to a new family as a reason for undue hardship.

The court rejected the proposed consent order due to insufficient financial disclosure from the respondent and the principle that child support is a right of the child that cannot be contracted out of without proper justification.

The court issued an interim interim child support order and compelled the respondent to provide full financial disclosure.

The respondent mother, A.D., brought a motion to vary a previous statutory finding under subsection 90(2) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, to include a finding that her children, K.Re. and A.Re., are Métis persons.

The court considered its jurisdiction to revisit prior findings, interpreting the CYFSA remedially to allow for such variations in the children's best interests, especially given the Act's emphasis on Indigenous children's cultural identity and community connection.

Based on the uncontroverted evidence of the parents' self-identification and engagement with Métis community services, the court found sufficient credible and reliable evidence to support the Métis identification.

The motion was granted, vacating the previous finding and declaring the children Métis.