W ARNI NG
The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice should be attached to the file:
This is a case under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, (being Schedule 1 to the Supporting Children, Youth and Families Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14), and is subject to subsections 87(7), 87(8) and 87(9) of the Act. These subsections and subsection 142(3) of the Act, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:
87.—(7) Order excluding media representatives or prohibiting publication.— Where the court is of the opinion that the presence of the media representative or representatives or the publication of the report, as the case may be, would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding, the court may make an order,
(c) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing.
(8) Prohibition re identifying child.— No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.
(9) Prohibition re identifying person charged.— The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.
142.—(3) Offences re publication.— A person who contravenes subsection 87(8) or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)(c) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N :
Linck Child, Youth and Family Supports
Applicant,
— AND —
M.H. and J.S.
Respondents
Before Justice M. Vickerd
Heard on June 5, 2026
Reasons for Judgment released on June 8, 2026
Renee Carriveau counsel for the applicant society
Mira Dobric counsel for the respondent mother M.H.
Margaret Vicente counsel for the respondent father J.S.
Christa Yu agent for counsel M. Vicente
Vickerd J.:
Overview
1M. Vicente advances a motion seeking to be removed as counsel for the respondent father.
2In support of her motion, Ms. Vicente has filed a Notice of Motion dated May 28, 2026, and Affidavit sworn May 28, 2026.
3These materials were served upon the respondent father on May 28, 2026, by methods of both email correspondence and letter mail. The respondent father attends at the motion’s hearing. He opposes the request of Ms. Vicente to be removed as his counsel. He wishes her to continue to represent him at the pending trial. He has not filed responding materials for the motion.
4Linck Child, Youth and Family Services (“Linck”) and the Respondent mother were served with Ms. Vicente’s Notice of Motion on May 28, 2026, by email correspondence. Neither Linck nor the Respondent mother oppose the motion of Ms. Vicente.
Background
5Ms. Vicente’s motion is advanced within the context of a Child Protection Application concerning the child A.L.H. born […], 2024, presently age nineteen months.
6The Respondents M.H. (“the mother”) and J.S. (“the father”) are the natural parents of the child.
7This Application began in December 2024. An amended Application was filed by the Society in December 2025. In its current Application, Linck requests a finding that the child A.L.H. is in need of protection and an order placing her into the extended care of Linck, with access to the mother. The society makes no request for access to the father.
8The child was taken to a place of safety by the Sarnia-Lambton Children’s Aid Society from the care of the mother on December 10, 2024, following the infant’s discharge from a Sarnia hospital after receiving treatment for failure to thrive. On December 16, 2024, an interim interim order was made by Justice C. Harris, presiding in Sarnia, to place the infant into the care of Linck. On the same date, an order was made to transfer the Application from Sarnia to Chatham courts.
9The child has remained in care of Linck since December 10, 2024.
10An interim order confirming the child’s placement in care of Linck was made, unopposed by the parents, on May 6, 2025.
11The mother is exercising regular supervised parenting time with the child pursuant to the interim order.
12The father has not exercised in-person parenting time despite the existence of an interim access order. He has weekly virtual access.
13The child protection concerns cited by the society include: the mother’s cognitive challenges impeding her ability to meet the child’s needs; the child’s failure to thrive requiring medical interventions while in the mother’s care; intimate partner violence in the parents’ relationship; and the father’s unconfirmed criminal convictions.
14The mother filed an Answer. She is participating in this litigation.
15Although the father has attended each court date, he did not file an Answer until May 13, 2026. He did so with support from his current counsel, facilitated with an order granting him an extension to file his Answer late.
16An initial settlement conference was convened in this Application on October 29, 2025. Both parents attended the conference.
17Ms. Vicente attended court on March 4, 2026, and confirmed that she was newly retained as counsel for the father.
18This matter was set down for trial on March 4, 2026, and assigned to the trial sitings set to begin June 22, 2026.
19A Trial Management Conference/Settlement Conference continuation was convened on May 28, 2026. On that date Ms. Vicente advised that she intended to advance a motion seeking to be removed as the father’s counsel.
20This matter remains set for trial in the sittings set to begin June 22, 2026.
Legal Considerations
21In light of Ms. Vicente’s request to be removed as counsel for the father, I must consider application of the Family Law Rules O. Reg. 114/99. Subrules 4 (10) and (10.1) address the concern of the late removal of counsel in child protection cases. These Rules provide the following:
(10) Change in representation.— Except as subrule (10.1) provides, a party represented by a lawyer may, by serving on every other party and filing a notice of change in representation (Form 4),
(a) change lawyers; or
(b) appear without a lawyer.
(10.1) Exception, child protection case scheduled for trial.— In a child protection case that has been scheduled for trial or placed on a trial list, a party may act under clause (10)(b) only with the court’s permission, obtained in advance by motion made with notice.
22Subrule 4 (10.1) ensures that the court will have the opportunity of weighing the competing considerations if a trial is imminent (Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. F.H., 2011 ONCJ 428.
23According to Family Law Rule 2(4), the court must apply the Family Law Rules in a manner which is just, by
(a) ensuring that the procedure is fair to all parties;
(b) saving expense and time;
(c) dealing with the case in ways that are appropriate to its importance and complexity; and
(d) giving appropriate court resources to the case while taking account of the need to give resources to other cases
24Generally, courts have allowed counsel to withdraw where ethical reasons exist in a situation of the breakdown of the solicitor-client relationship to the extent that it is impossible for counsel to continue to act for a client in good conscience (R. v. Cunningham, 2010 SCC 10, endorsed in R. v. Short, 2018 ONCA). The principles in the cases supra, apply to child protection cases (Rubin v. Windsor-Essex CAS, 2018 ONSC 3781).
25Justice Sherr in Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. F.H., 2011 ONCJ 428 identifies competing considerations when faced with a request by counsel to be removed, writing
It is with considerable reluctance that I am going to dismiss the motion. Child protection lawyers are the unsung heroes of the legal profession. They often represent vulnerable and challenging clients for little remuneration. The overwhelming majority of child protection counsel with whom this court deals do so with considerable skill, passion, empathy and integrity. It is difficult to order such lawyers to continue to represent clients against their will. The mother’s counsel has conducted herself in a professional manner throughout this case.
However, I must balance any unfairness or prejudice to counsel with the potential harm [to the child] . . . . The mother would be at a considerable disadvantage if she had to represent herself.
Here, the potential harm to the child and the administration of justice outweighs the unfairness or prejudice to counsel.
26Justice Spence in Jewish Family and Child Service of Greater Toronto v. J.Z., 2013 ONCJ 461, reluctantly dismissing counsel’s motion to be removed, cites the above case and adds that: “Unquestionably, there are competing interests at play in a motion such as this. In my view, those competing interests are neatly summarized by the comments of Justice Sherr in F.H., supra”.
27Justice Pazaratz in CCAS v B.W-B. et al., 2017 ONSC 3334, confirms that he adopts the cautious and balanced reasoning found in both OCJ cases cited above, writing that:
While parties have the right to be represented by counsel of their choice, and they have the right to represent themselves, the court must also address the inevitable reality that self-represented parties quite often (and understandably) seek last minute adjournments of trials, even if they have promised not to do so. No amount of promising in advance precludes the issue from arising, and this in turn might predictably jeopardize the trial proceeding and the resolution of this child’s life.
Analysis
28Ms. Vicente’s motion is addressed on June 5, 2026, with seventeen days until the commencement of the trial of this child protection application.
29This is a child protection proceeding wherein the society requests an order placing the child into the extended care of Linck. This is the most profound order which a court can make in relation to families.
30If Ms. Vicente is permitted to be removed as counsel, over the objections of the father, an adjournment of the trial is likely as it would be simply unfair to expect the father, wishing to have counsel, to represent himself. Child protection litigants are vulnerable individuals who face extreme inequities in litigation due to poverty and other forms of marginalization: As noted by Justice L’Heureux-Dubé noted in her concurring reasons in G. (J.)
If we do not face up to this reality we risk forgetting the hard-learned lessons of the past by exacerbating pre-existing inequities and harms. The miscarriages of justice outlined in the Report of the Motherisk Commission (2018: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General) speak, by way of example, to the significant imbalance between parents and Children’s Aid Societies, noting that parents, even when represented by counsel, were “simply overpowered” (at p. 121). Fairness in the child protection context demands recognition of these dynamics.
31The removal of Ms. Vicente at this critical time would exacerbate inequities between the society and the father and may lead to an injustice. The advancement of this motion with seventeen days until the start of trial leaves the father with little chance of retaining new counsel, especially in light of the nature of his retainer through Legal Aid Ontario and the lack of counsel willing to represent parents in child protection proceedings in this region. The potential of retaining new counsel becomes even more unlikely with seventeen days to prepare for trial.
32Further, consideration must be given to the fact that the child has been in care of the Society for a period of 522 days, significantly exceeding the legislative timelines identified in section 122 of the CYFSA. The child protection legislation has as its primary focus the promotion of the best interests, protection and well-being of children. Any decision to be made in the context of a child protection proceeding must be made with consideration for the impact on the child. It is imperative that the trial proceed as scheduled to ensure that the child receives the benefit of permanency. The possibility of an adjournment of the trial for a parent to retain new counsel is simply not in the child’s best interests.
33Ms. Vicente’s evidence is that there has been a breakdown in the solicitor-client relationship. There is no evidence presented that her role as counsel to the father places her at risk of abuse or that the solicitor-client relationship is so toxic that she cannot discharge her role as his representative. From her evidence, I cannot conclude that there is an ethical issue preventing Ms. Vicente from representing the father.
34The potential harm to the child of any further delay to the adjudication of this matter outweighs the potential of unfairness to counsel, The child has been in care of the society in excess of the legislative timelines.
35While I appreciate that this decision may place Ms. Vicente in a difficult position for the pending trial, I cannot ignore the potential impact on the child at the heart of this proceeding and the child’s right to a fair and expedient resolution.
Order
36Given the foregoing, Ms. Vicente’s motion to be removed as counsel for the Respondent father is dismissed.
37Ms. Vicente’s Affidavit filed for the motion shall be sealed and provision made on the electronic filing system to ensure that it is flagged as “sealed.”
Released: June 8, 2026
Signed: Justice M. Vickerd