Scott K. Campbell

The respondent, Cynthia Meek, sought declaratory relief to allow her to audio record court appearances, including her upcoming trial, arguing that the Practice Direction requiring leave to record is inconsistent with section 136(2)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act and violates the Charter.

The court found that both the Act and the Practice Direction require judicial discretion for recording requests and are not in conflict.

The motion for declaratory relief was dismissed.

The respondent brought a motion seeking a finding that the applicant was in contempt of a September 13, 2023 order by Munroe J., which mandated shared parenting time for their two children.

The applicant acknowledged non-compliance but argued she had made reasonable efforts to ensure the children's attendance.

The court applied the three-part test for civil contempt, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt of an intentional act or omission breaching a clear order with knowledge.

Despite the children's continued refusal to reside with the respondent, the court found the applicant had undertaken substantial, albeit unsuccessful, efforts to facilitate compliance, including imposing consequences and seeking professional assistance.

The court was left in doubt as to whether the applicant's actions constituted an intentional failure to comply.

Consequently, the motion for contempt was dismissed.

The applicant corporation sought various forms of relief regarding building encroachments on a municipal road allowance in Stratford, Ontario, including a concrete retaining wall, a wooden access ramp, a concrete step, and a single-car parking space.

The applicant argued the encroachments were authorized, constituted legal non-conforming uses, or that the municipality was estopped from requiring an encroachment agreement.

The court dismissed the application, finding no explicit or tacit authorization for the encroachments, that they did not meet the criteria for legal non-conforming use, and that the elements for proprietary estoppel against the municipality were not established.

The Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General and the Public Prosecution Services of Canada jointly applied for the appointment of a computer forensic analyst to seize and seal inadvertently recorded audio-video communications made by the Woodstock Police Services.

These recordings included privileged solicitor-client communications and court proceedings.

The court found it had inherent jurisdiction to intervene to protect Charter rights and solicitor-client privilege.

While declining to appoint the analyst directly as requested, the court ordered the appointment of a referee (a member of the Ontario Bar) to select an analyst, oversee the segregation of privileged communications from court recordings, notify affected counsel, and manage the destruction of recordings as appropriate.

The costs of the referee and analyst are to be borne by the Crown.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference involving a child complainant.

The Crown argued the trial judge failed to consider all identification evidence and failed to provide sufficient reasons for the acquittals.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the summary conviction appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and concluding that the reasons provided a clear analytical path explaining the acquittals based on the complainant's reliability.

The plaintiff sought leave to bring a motion for default judgment against the defendants, who had failed to file a statement of defence and abandoned the mortgaged property (a golf course).

The court found the matter urgent and exceptional due to the significant monthly expenses incurred by the plaintiff in preserving the property and the interest from potential buyers.

Leave was granted for the plaintiff to bring the motion for default judgment.

The applicants brought a motion seeking an order to confirm the beneficial ownership of specific lands.

The court reviewed the affidavit evidence and was satisfied that the requested order was appropriate, concluding that Iva Zimmer was the sole beneficial owner of the described property at the time of her death.

The court affirmed paragraphs 2 and 3 of its prior order dated January 4, 2020, incorporating the requested paragraphs from the draft order.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

At the police station, the appellant was provided with an outdated list of lawyers and contacted a lawyer who was suspended from practice.

The trial judge found a breach of the appellant's s. 10(b) Charter rights but admitted the breathalyzer evidence under s. 24(2).

On appeal, the Superior Court found the trial judge erred in characterizing the breach as minor and technical.

Conducting a fresh s. 24(2) analysis, the court held the systemic failure to provide an updated list of lawyers was a serious breach that significantly impacted the appellant's rights.

The breathalyzer evidence was excluded, the conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

The Corporation of the City of Sarnia brought a motion seeking to set aside or vary a previous decision, declare an equitable right to indemnity, and obtain an interim mandatory order against Bluewater Health regarding the maintenance of the Mitton site.

The core issue was whether the court had jurisdiction to hear the motion under Rule 59.06, given that the City was attempting to introduce new causes of action (tort claims) that were not pleaded in the original application, which was premised on a trust relationship.

The court found that it lacked jurisdiction, emphasizing the principle of finality in litigation and that re-opening a case for new arguments would foster litigation in stages, thus dismissing the motion.

The City of Sarnia applied for a declaration that it held legal title to the "Mitton site" properties in trust for Bluewater Health, either as a bare trust or a constructive trust, and sought an equitable right to indemnity for ongoing maintenance costs.

The court dismissed the application, finding no certainty of intention to establish a bare trust from the relevant statutes (1920 Act and 1989 Act) or the parties' conduct.

Furthermore, the court found no basis for a constructive trust, as the City was seeking to impose a burden (decommissioning costs) rather than remedy an unjust enrichment or condemn a wrongful act by Bluewater.

The court emphasized that constructive trusts are typically used to provide a proprietary remedy for a party's loss or to prevent wrongful gain, not to transfer liabilities.

Estate trustees sought approval of amended estate accounts following an earlier decision identifying deficiencies in the original accounts.

A beneficiary objected to several capital disbursements, including payments to a consulting entity and payments to an alleged charitable foundation.

The court approved most of the amended accounts but refused to approve payments made to the purported foundation due to lack of evidence of its legitimacy or authorization under the will.

Certain accounting entries relating to amounts owed by the objector were also corrected.

Trustee compensation was fixed and reduced by the amount paid to the consulting entity.

Estate trustees applied to pass accounts in the administration of a substantial estate.

An objector beneficiary challenged various entries including payments made to a charitable foundation allegedly based on a letter from the deceased promising contributions.

The court held the letter did not create an enforceable testamentary obligation and lacked consideration to support a promissory note, rendering the estate payments improper.

Several accounting entries were found deficient or unsupported, including certain accounting expenses and alleged unrealized assets.

The court declined to approve the accounts and directed the estate trustees to prepare amended accounts consistent with the reasons.

The appellant appealed a probation condition imposed following guilty pleas to several offences, including communication for the purpose of prostitution, breaches of court orders, failure to attend court, and uttering threats.

The appellant sought removal of a curfew condition on the basis that it was punitive and lacked a nexus to rehabilitation or public protection.

The Crown argued the sentencing judge considered the offender’s rehabilitation and community protection when imposing the curfew.

Applying appellate deference principles, the court held that the sentencing judge committed no error in principle and that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The probation condition, including the curfew, was upheld.

The plaintiff mortgagee brought a motion for summary judgment seeking foreclosure without a reference on a mortgage securing approximately $104,985.53.

The parties agreed on the outstanding balance but disputed the applicable interest rate under a series of unconventional mortgage extension agreements that referenced a dollar amount per day rather than a percentage.

The court held that the agreements did not clearly establish an agreed interest rate and therefore s. 3 of the Interest Act applied, fixing the rate at 5 percent per annum.

The court also assessed substantial indemnity costs but reduced the amount claimed as modestly excessive under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Judgment for foreclosure was granted with interest calculated at the statutory rate.

In a family law proceeding, the respondent brought a motion seeking to dismiss or stay the applicant’s motion to change a separation agreement on the basis that the applicant had failed to pay approximately $42,000 in spousal support arrears.

The court considered whether such a motion could proceed before a case conference under the Family Law Rules.

The court held that a request to stay or dismiss a motion to change due to non‑payment of support arrears engages substantive rights and therefore cannot be heard prior to a case conference unless an exception applies.

The respondent failed to demonstrate urgency or hardship sufficient to bypass the conference requirement.

The motion was therefore adjourned to be addressed after the scheduled case conference.

In a family law motion involving separated spouses with two young children, the court addressed interim issues concerning the children’s contact with farm animals, the potential sale of the matrimonial home, interim child support, and police enforcement of custody and access.

The court ordered that goats and sheep kept at the property be secured in an enclosure preventing unsupervised contact with the children and requiring adult supervision for any interaction.

The motion regarding the sale of the matrimonial home was adjourned to permit the applicant an opportunity to submit a formal purchase offer capable of completion on the same terms as a third‑party purchaser.

Pending full financial disclosure, the court ordered interim interim child support based on estimated incomes under a shared custody set‑off.

The request for interim police enforcement of custody and access was adjourned absent evidence that either party had failed to comply with the recent custody order.

Following a decision concerning the passing of estate accounts, the court determined the appropriate costs awards between self-represented family members involved in the litigation.

Both sides sought substantial costs, including claims for compensation for time spent litigating.

The court applied the principles governing costs for self‑represented litigants, requiring proof of opportunity cost from foregone remunerative activity.

Finding no such evidence from either side, the court declined to award counsel fees but allowed limited recoverable disbursements.

Each side was granted reimbursement for certain documented expenses only.

The respondent brought a motion to change seeking to terminate a long-standing spousal support obligation arising from a consent order.

The moving party argued that a material change in circumstances occurred after losing full‑time employment and transitioning to part‑time work with CPP and WSIB benefits, resulting in significantly reduced income.

The court accepted that the moving party currently lacked the ability to pay meaningful support but found that a final termination was inappropriate given the long-term marriage and the possibility of future financial improvement.

The court ordered nominal spousal support of $1 per month beginning October 1, 2012, preserving the recipient’s right to seek review if the payer’s circumstances improve.