Mervin L. Riddell

The appellant sought to overturn a lower court decision denying his claim for adverse possession over an unfenced portion of a triangular strip of land adjacent to his property, and his claim for proprietary estoppel.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding no error in the judge's application of the three-pronged test for adverse possession, nor in the rejection of the proprietary estoppel claim.

The court affirmed that the unfenced area could be treated separately from a fenced portion where adverse possession was conceded, and that the appellant failed to prove actual possession, intent to exclude, or effective exclusion for the unfenced area.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her motion for retroactive child support payments against her deceased ex-husband's estate.

The original 1978 Decree Nisi did not state that the child support obligation would bind the estate.

The motion judge ruled that under s. 17 of the Divorce Act, an application to claim or vary a support order against a decedent's estate cannot be brought if the original order is silent on binding the estate.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, confirming that a support obligation under divorce legislation ends upon the payor's death unless specifically agreed otherwise, and that the Divorce Act lacks a provision similar to the Family Law Act that binds an estate.

The applicant brought a motion to change a 1978 divorce order to claim retroactive child support and post-secondary expenses from the estate of her deceased ex-husband, 41 years after the original order.

The respondent estate trustee brought a motion to dismiss the claim on a question of law.

The court held that under the Divorce Act, a support obligation ends upon the payor's death unless the order explicitly provides that it binds the estate.

Because the original order contained no such provision, it died with the payor and could not be retroactively varied post-death.

The applicant's motion to change was dismissed.

This is a child protection matter under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act involving an apprehension of three children with developmental delays.

The father challenged the apprehension and sought dismissal of the protection application as an abuse of process, or alternatively, sought placement of the children in his care without supervision.

The court found that the father's inability to manage his emotions while disciplining the children, combined with his refusal to cooperate with services and his inappropriate responses to allegations of sexual abuse, established a real risk of emotional and physical harm.

The court rejected the father's abuse of process arguments and allegations of bias against the child welfare agency.

The children were placed with the mother subject to supervision, and the father was granted supervised access with specific conditions and recommendations for behavioral modification.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice that varied a prior custody order and granted the respondent sole custody of the parties’ children.

The appeal court held that the trial judge erred in law by varying the custody order despite expressly finding that no material change in circumstances had been proven, contrary to the governing test in Gordon v. Goertz.

The court further found that the trial judge compromised the appearance of judicial impartiality by conducting extensive cross‑examination of a key witness and refusing to permit counsel to ask follow‑up questions, resulting in procedural unfairness.

Because these errors deprived the court of jurisdiction and undermined the fairness of the proceeding, the variation order could not stand.

The appeal was allowed, the impugned order quashed, and a new trial ordered, with the prior custody arrangement reinstated in the interim.

Following the offender's guilty pleas to fraud and money laundering, the Crown brought a forfeiture application.

Two third parties, Picard Foods Ltd. and SNC-Lavalin Profac Inc., claimed interests in the proceeds of the sale of a property.

In a previous ruling, the court found Picard was entitled to a portion of the municipal service costs.

In this final ruling, the court fixed the principal amount owing to Picard at $72,690.29, excluding carrying costs, with 10% interest payable from June 21, 2008.

The court dismissed Picard's application for costs against the Crown and ProFac, finding no Crown misconduct or exceptional circumstances to justify a costs award to a bystander in a criminal proceeding.