Mitchell C. Brown

The appellant sought to overturn a lower court decision denying his claim for adverse possession over an unfenced portion of a triangular strip of land adjacent to his property, and his claim for proprietary estoppel.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding no error in the judge's application of the three-pronged test for adverse possession, nor in the rejection of the proprietary estoppel claim.

The court affirmed that the unfenced area could be treated separately from a fenced portion where adverse possession was conceded, and that the appellant failed to prove actual possession, intent to exclude, or effective exclusion for the unfenced area.

The plaintiff pharmaceutical manufacturer sued the corporate defendants and their sole director, a pharmacist, alleging unauthorized 'vial-splitting' of a specialty ophthalmic drug.

The individual defendant moved to strike the claims against him personally, arguing they duplicated the claims against the corporate defendants.

The court struck the intentional tort claims but allowed the negligence and unjust enrichment claims to proceed, finding it possible the individual acted in his personal capacity as a pharmacist.

The plaintiff also successfully moved to strike a paragraph in the statement of defence that referenced the contents of its complaint to the Ontario College of Pharmacists, as such contents are inadmissible under section 36(3) of the Regulated Health Professions Act.

The Court of Appeal fixed the respondents' costs of the appeal at $90,000 inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

The appellant physician appealed a jury verdict finding him liable for negligent management of a twin pregnancy, which resulted in premature birth and brain damage to one of the twins.

The appellant argued the jury's verdict on causation was unreasonable due to a lack of evidence that the required treatment, amnioreduction, was available at the referral hospital in 1991.

The appellant also challenged the trial judge's jury instructions regarding adverse inferences, the characterization of expert evidence, and the failure to instruct on loss of chance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that there was an evidentiary basis for the jury's conclusion on causation and that the jury charge was fair, balanced, and legally correct.