Robert Trenker

The appellant suffered a catastrophic spinal cord injury in a cycling accident on a dirt path adjacent to Stone Church Road in Hamilton.

The City brought a summary judgment motion seeking dismissal under s. 44(8) of the Municipal Act, 2001, which exempts municipalities from liability for damages caused by construction, obstruction, or erection on untravelled portions of highways.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the accident occurred on an untravelled portion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge applied the wrong legal test.

The correct test requires determining whether the portion of highway was commonly and habitually used by the public for travel, not whether such use was reasonably foreseeable.

The court found the dirt path was commonly and regularly used by pedestrians and cyclists and therefore constituted a travelled portion of the highway, placing it outside the statutory exemption.

The decision concerns a motion by Saad Aljabri and related parties for leave to issue a counterclaim in a complex civil action.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed counterclaim for abuse of process and conspiracy was statute-barred under Ontario law, and that the applicants failed to prove that Saudi law applied or that any exception to the limitation period existed.

The court also found that the proposed claims for declaratory relief against additional parties were not supported by a tenable cause of action.

The risk of prejudice to the plaintiffs, including loss of the scheduled trial date and increased costs, further supported dismissal.

The decision grants the motion of Saad Khalid S. Al Jabri for leave to issue a commission and letters of request to obtain evidence from witnesses outside Ontario for use at trial.

The court finds that the anticipated evidence of the proposed witnesses is material to issues in the action, and that the request is bona fide.

The ruling addresses the test for issuing commissions and letters of request, emphasizing the importance of a fair and full trial, and applies the test to several categories of proposed witnesses, including alleged co-conspirators, foreign officials, and counterterrorism experts.

This appeal arose from a civil jury trial concerning a collision between a motorist and a pedestrian, Jasmine Jarvis, who suffered severe brain injuries.

The jury at trial found the motorist not liable.

The appellants (plaintiffs) appealed, arguing the trial was unfair due to the admission of irrelevant and prejudicial bad character evidence (Ms. Jarvis fleeing a taxi without paying fare) and inflammatory remarks by respondent counsel.

The Court of Appeal found the taxi fare evidence inadmissible and its prejudicial impact outweighed its probative value.

The court also found respondent counsel's jury address inflammatory and the trial judge's instructions inadequate to cure the prejudice.

The appeal was allowed, the cross-appeal (on costs) was dismissed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that held them liable for the balance of a business purchase price.

Their defence was based on fraudulent misrepresentations about the business's revenues.

The motion judge had dismissed this defence, relying on an "entire agreement" clause in the purchase agreement and the appellants' opportunities for due diligence.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in law by giving preclusive effect to the entire agreement clause, as such clauses do not immunize against fraudulent misrepresentation.

Furthermore, opportunities for due diligence do not negate a party's right to avoid a contract based on fraudulent misrepresentation if actual knowledge of the untruth was not proven.

The Court concluded that a genuine issue for trial existed regarding the fraudulent misrepresentation and allowed the appeal, setting aside the summary judgment and remitting the matter for trial.

The appellant sought to overturn a jury verdict in a motor vehicle accident case, arguing the jury was improperly constituted because it was selected in Brampton for a trial held in Kitchener.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Regional Senior Judge had the authority to make such logistical decisions, which are subject to a presumption of regularity and should not be lightly second-guessed.

The court also found no miscarriage of justice and rejected the appellant's technical argument regarding the jury's constitution.

The Court of Appeal allowed Her Majesty the Queen's appeal, remitting the case for a new trial due to insufficient reasons from the lower court.

In this costs endorsement, the Crown sought $25,000 in appeal costs, while the respondents requested no costs.

The court awarded no costs for the appeal, citing the regrettable outcome of a new trial and the respondent's limited resources compared to the state.

The costs of the first trial were remitted to the judge hearing the new trial.

The plaintiff brought a motion to enforce its contractual rights following a $5 million default on bearer bonds issued for a renewable energy project in Poland.

The plaintiff sought to terminate the Administration Agreement and assume the role of Administrator of the Trust.

The court found that final relief could not be granted on an interlocutory motion due to credibility issues requiring a trial.

However, the court granted a temporary mandatory injunction allowing the plaintiff to assume the Administrator's duties pending trial, finding a strong prima facie case of default, irreparable harm, and a balance of convenience favoring the plaintiff.

This ruling addresses the issue of costs following a nine-day trial where Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario was found liable to the plaintiffs, with Paul Bruno found 15% contributorily negligent.

The plaintiffs sought $407,074.81 in costs and disbursements, while the defendant proposed $166,365.99.

The court determined partial indemnity rates for counsel, made specific reductions for time spent on claims against dismissed defendants, resolved prior interlocutory motions, and travel time.

The court fixed fees at $210,900.00 plus HST, and disbursements at $105,000.00, for a total award of $343,317.00.

The court declined to reduce costs due to contributory negligence, finding the plaintiff's contribution minimal and not significantly increasing litigation costs or affecting settlement chances.

The plaintiffs, three Russian cyclists, sued the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) and Richard McLaren for damages, alleging they were falsely implicated in a state-sponsored doping scheme and wrongfully excluded from the 2016 Rio Olympic Games.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action on the grounds that the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) had exclusive jurisdiction and that the action was an abuse of process.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the motion, finding that the essential character of the dispute fell within the broad arbitration clauses of the Olympic Charter and the athletes' entry forms.

The court also held that the action was an abuse of process as the plaintiffs were attempting to re-litigate a dispute they had already brought before the CAS.

This decision addresses costs following three motions, where the plaintiff was largely successful in obtaining an extension to file a statement of claim despite breaching a peremptory order.

The plaintiff sought costs, but the court denied them.

The denial was based on the plaintiff having received a substantial indulgence from the court, the necessity of much of the evidence and argument regardless of the defendants' position, and the plaintiff's failure as a self-represented litigant to provide evidence of lost income.

The defendant obstetrician, Dr. Jackiewicz, was sued for negligence by the Woods family, alleging that his breach of standard of care in managing a twin pregnancy led to Kelsey Woods incurring cerebral palsy.

During the trial, the defendant objected to the plaintiffs' closing address, which invited the jury to find causation even if the pregnancy prolongation from amnioreduction was less than the five weeks testified to by experts.

The defendant requested an instruction that the jury *must* find against the plaintiffs on causation unless a five-week prolongation was proven.

The court declined this additional instruction, finding that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to infer causation with a shorter prolongation, consistent with the principles from *Benhaim v. St-Germain* regarding the use of statistics and inferences in medical malpractice causation.

During a medical negligence jury trial involving the management of a twin pregnancy, the defendant obstetrician requested a jury instruction permitting an adverse inference against the plaintiffs for failing to call a treating physician from McMaster Hospital.

The court declined to give the instruction, applying the principle from Lambert v. Quinn that an adverse inference should not be drawn if the witness is equally available to both sides.

The court found the witness was compellable by the defendant and not peculiarly within the plaintiffs' power to produce.

During a medical malpractice jury trial, the plaintiffs challenged the impartiality of the defendant Dr. Jackiewicz's proposed expert witness, Dr. William Mundle.

The plaintiffs argued that Dr. Mundle's prior solicitor-client relationship with defense counsel and his history of testifying in favor of Dr. Jackiewicz compromised his impartiality.

The court, applying the principles from *White Burgess Langille Inman*, found that the prior solicitor-client relationship did not preclude Dr. Mundle's testimony.

While acknowledging concerns about Dr. Mundle's history of defending Dr. Jackiewicz, the court declined to preclude his testimony, limiting his evidence to causation and prohibiting questioning that would reveal Dr. Jackiewicz's disciplinary history due to the high risk of undue prejudice to the jury.

Limited cross-examination on the duration and nature of Dr. Mundle's professional or personal acquaintance with Dr. Jackiewicz was permitted.

In a medical negligence jury trial, the plaintiffs sought to introduce demonstrative aids (illustrations and charts) through their expert witness, Dr. Cecil Hahn, to explain complex medical concepts related to brain pathology, injury evolution, and statistical relationships between gestational age and neurodevelopmental outcomes.

The defendant, Dr. Allan Jackiewicz, opposed the use of these aids, arguing they were inaccurate, incomplete, unnecessary, and prejudicial.

The court, applying established legal principles for demonstrative aids, found them admissible with one minor excision to prevent misleading information, concluding that they would assist the jury in understanding complex expert evidence without being unduly prejudicial or constituting improper advocacy.

The Plaintiffs in a medical negligence action moved for leave to call four expert witnesses at trial, arguing that section 12 of the Ontario Evidence Act allowed for three experts per issue.

The court rejected this interpretation, holding that leave is required for more than three experts on all issues combined.

The motion for leave was denied, restricting the Plaintiffs to a total of three expert witnesses, citing factors such as the Defendant's objection, sufficiency of three experts for the core issues (standard of care and causation), the Defendant also calling three experts, lack of custom for more than three liability experts in medical malpractice, potential prejudice, and substantial duplication among the proposed experts.

The plaintiff, Sae-Bin Im, sought an extension of time to file a statement of claim, while several defendants moved to dismiss the action for breach of a peremptory order and for delay.

The court found the plaintiff's explanation for non-compliance, including self-representation, involvement in other litigation, and medical issues (depression and anxiety), to be satisfactory and not intentional.

The court also found no significant prejudice to the sophisticated defendants, who were aware of the proceedings and could preserve evidence.

The court granted the plaintiff an extension to file the statement of claim and dismissed the defendants' motions to dismiss, emphasizing that the plaintiff's claim, though lengthy, was not frivolous or vexatious.

The plaintiffs moved to add Dr. Peter Law as a defendant in a medical negligence action after the expiration of the applicable limitation period, alleging negligent misreading of x-rays.

The court considered the doctrines of "Special Circumstances" and "Fraudulent Concealment." While the discoverability principle did not apply to the Trustee Act limitation period, the court found that the plaintiffs successfully rebutted the presumption of prejudice against Dr. Law and established exceptional "special circumstances" due to the late, critical, and unexplained disclosure of x-ray imaging and interpretation notes by Southlake Regional Health Centre years after the limitation period expired.

The court rejected the argument of fraudulent concealment.

The motion to add Dr. Law as a defendant and amend the statement of claim was granted.

The plaintiffs, three Russian cyclists, sued the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) and Richard McLaren for damages related to their exclusion from the 2016 Olympic Games.

The defendants brought Rule 21 motions to dismiss or permanently stay the proceeding for lack of jurisdiction and abuse of process, and to strike the statement of claim against McLaren.

The court found that resolving the jurisdictional issues would require extensive fact-finding, including assessing conflicting expert opinions and credibility, which exceeds the scope of a Rule 21 motion.

Consequently, the Rule 21.01(3) motions were ordered to be reconstituted as Rule 20 summary judgment motions or a trial of issues, and McLaren's Rule 21.01(1)(b) motion was deferred.

Appeal from a Superior Court judgment finding the indemnifier liable under an indemnity agreement for unpaid rent and related losses.

The indemnifier challenged the finding of liability based on alleged pre-contractual misrepresentations by the landlord regarding park improvements.

The court upheld the finding of liability, rejecting the misrepresentation defence.

On the quantum issue, the court dismissed the indemnifier's appeal regarding restoration costs and legal fees, but allowed the landlord's cross-appeal to extend liability for future rent through the end of the lease term, subject to mitigation credits.