Mark Anthony Veneziano

The plaintiff, Tri-South Developments Inc., sued the defendant, 583167 Ontario Inc., for breach of contract, waiver/estoppel, and unjust enrichment related to a failed condominium development project.

The core dispute revolved around a "Severance Condition" in their Contribution Agreement (CA), which required Tri-South to obtain land severance by a specific date.

Tri-South failed to meet this condition, leading to the automatic termination of the CA.

Tri-South alleged the defendant breached its duty of good faith by not disclosing its intent to rely on the severance date and by misleading them regarding design approvals.

The court dismissed all of Tri-South's claims, finding no breach of good faith, no waiver or estoppel by the defendant, and no unjust enrichment, as the plaintiff had control over the condition and failed to meet its obligations.

The applicant, an equal shareholder and medical director of fertility clinics, sought interim relief in a corporate oppression claim against her estranged husband, the sole director of most corporate entities.

She alleged mismanagement, diversion of funds, and exclusion from decision-making.

The court applied the "serious issue" test for interim injunctions, finding a serious issue and irreparable harm to the business and her professional duties if the status quo continued.

The balance of convenience favored the applicant.

The court ordered the applicant to be appointed as a co-director of all respondent corporations with the individual respondent, and restrained the individual respondent from interfering in patient care or medical processes, aiming to prevent deadlock and preserve the business while acknowledging the underlying matrimonial dispute.

The Defendant Physicians sought an extension of time to serve three expert reports under Rule 53.03(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which the Plaintiffs opposed, seeking to exclude the reports due to late service.

The court found that the lawyer's inadvertence constituted a reasonable explanation for the delay.

The court also determined that granting leave would not cause uncompensable prejudice to the Plaintiffs or undue delay, noting that liability was always a live issue despite the Plaintiffs' trial preparations.

The motion was granted, extending the time for service of the expert reports, and the Plaintiffs were granted leave to file reply reports.

The plaintiffs, owners of a downtown Toronto office tower, sued the defendants, operators of the building's parking garage, for unpaid fixed monthly fees from April 2020 to April 2021.

The defendants ceased full payments due to the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on revenue, arguing a binding oral agreement to reduce fees, the application of a force majeure clause, and contract frustration.

The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment.

The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding no valid amendment to the contract due to a "no oral modification" clause and lack of consideration, no detrimental reliance for promissory estoppel, and that neither the force majeure clause nor the doctrine of frustration applied as the contract merely became unprofitable, not impossible to perform.

The appellant underwent a laparoscopic colectomy performed by the respondent surgeon, during which her left ureter was injured, ultimately necessitating removal of her left kidney.

The trial judge found that the surgeon breached the standard of care and that the breach caused the injury requiring the kidney's removal.

The Court of Appeal majority set aside the trial decision, holding the trial judge erred in law in identifying and applying the standard of care.

The dissenting judge found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's approach and conclusions.

The Supreme Court unanimously restored the trial judgment, adopting the reasons of the dissenting judge.

The plaintiffs commenced two actions arising from the purchase of a property with structural issues: one against Stewart Title for breach of title insurance contract and a "tort action" against multiple parties (vendors, home inspector, township, contractors) for property defects.

Stewart Title moved to consolidate the two actions.

The plaintiffs and two defendants from the tort action (the vendors) opposed consolidation, preferring the actions be heard together or one after the other.

The court, applying Rule 6.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, conducted a costs/benefits analysis.

It rejected the notion of an elevated onus for consolidation and found that ordering the actions to be heard together, with common discoveries and pre-trial, best served efficiency and fairness.

This decision was primarily to avoid significant costs and delays associated with potential crossclaims and pleadings disputes that full consolidation would trigger, particularly regarding Stewart Title's potential subrogation claims.

The motion for consolidation was dismissed, and an order for the actions to be tried together was granted with specific directions for common pre-trial and discoveries.

The plaintiff sought a mandatory injunction to compel interim monthly payments of $6,500 from the defendant business, E. Corbiere & Sons Contracting, based on an alleged oral compensation agreement.

The defendants disputed the agreement and claimed the plaintiff had already received significant advances.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a strong prima facie case for the alleged oral agreement and did not demonstrate irreparable harm, as any financial loss was compensable in damages and his claims of impecuniosity were speculative.

The court also noted that the relief sought was akin to a partnership distribution not pleaded in the statement of claim.

The defendant obstetrician, Dr. Jackiewicz, was sued for negligence by the Woods family, alleging that his breach of standard of care in managing a twin pregnancy led to Kelsey Woods incurring cerebral palsy.

During the trial, the defendant objected to the plaintiffs' closing address, which invited the jury to find causation even if the pregnancy prolongation from amnioreduction was less than the five weeks testified to by experts.

The defendant requested an instruction that the jury *must* find against the plaintiffs on causation unless a five-week prolongation was proven.

The court declined this additional instruction, finding that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to infer causation with a shorter prolongation, consistent with the principles from *Benhaim v. St-Germain* regarding the use of statistics and inferences in medical malpractice causation.

During a medical malpractice jury trial, the plaintiffs challenged the impartiality of the defendant Dr. Jackiewicz's proposed expert witness, Dr. William Mundle.

The plaintiffs argued that Dr. Mundle's prior solicitor-client relationship with defense counsel and his history of testifying in favor of Dr. Jackiewicz compromised his impartiality.

The court, applying the principles from *White Burgess Langille Inman*, found that the prior solicitor-client relationship did not preclude Dr. Mundle's testimony.

While acknowledging concerns about Dr. Mundle's history of defending Dr. Jackiewicz, the court declined to preclude his testimony, limiting his evidence to causation and prohibiting questioning that would reveal Dr. Jackiewicz's disciplinary history due to the high risk of undue prejudice to the jury.

Limited cross-examination on the duration and nature of Dr. Mundle's professional or personal acquaintance with Dr. Jackiewicz was permitted.

In a medical negligence jury trial, the plaintiffs sought to introduce demonstrative aids (illustrations and charts) through their expert witness, Dr. Cecil Hahn, to explain complex medical concepts related to brain pathology, injury evolution, and statistical relationships between gestational age and neurodevelopmental outcomes.

The defendant, Dr. Allan Jackiewicz, opposed the use of these aids, arguing they were inaccurate, incomplete, unnecessary, and prejudicial.

The court, applying established legal principles for demonstrative aids, found them admissible with one minor excision to prevent misleading information, concluding that they would assist the jury in understanding complex expert evidence without being unduly prejudicial or constituting improper advocacy.

The Plaintiffs in a medical negligence action moved for leave to call four expert witnesses at trial, arguing that section 12 of the Ontario Evidence Act allowed for three experts per issue.

The court rejected this interpretation, holding that leave is required for more than three experts on all issues combined.

The motion for leave was denied, restricting the Plaintiffs to a total of three expert witnesses, citing factors such as the Defendant's objection, sufficiency of three experts for the core issues (standard of care and causation), the Defendant also calling three experts, lack of custom for more than three liability experts in medical malpractice, potential prejudice, and substantial duplication among the proposed experts.

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment against Stewart Title Guaranty Company for $223,555.74, alleging coverage under their title insurance policy due to structural defects in their home that violated the Ontario Building Code and rendered the property unmarketable.

The court found that while the property's title was unmarketable under Covered Title Risk (CTR) clause 19, coverage was excluded by exclusion clause 7, which pertained to structures not built in accordance with applicable building codes.

The court also found no coverage under CTR clause 20, as there was no evidence of a governmental authority forcing remedial work.

Consequently, the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment against Stewart Title was dismissed.

Following reasons on the underlying application, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

Applying s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and the discretionary factors in Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court emphasized the result of the proceeding, the reasonableness of the steps taken, and proportionality.

Although the respondent argued that the applicants’ legal fees were high relative to his own expenses, the court found the applicants’ partial indemnity bill of costs and disbursements generally reasonable.

Exercising its discretion, the court fixed partial indemnity legal fees at $65,000 plus HST and disbursements.

The respondent was ordered to pay total costs of $84,092.17.

Following a successful medical negligence trial, the plaintiffs sought costs after achieving complete success on liability and damages of $190,000.

The plaintiffs had made a Rule 49 offer of $150,000 inclusive of prejudgment interest prior to trial and argued that the judgment exceeded the offer by 31%, entitling them to substantial indemnity costs from the offer date.

The defendant argued the claimed costs were disproportionate to the damages and that agreeing to damages prior to trial prevented a determination that the offer had been beaten.

The court found the plaintiffs had repeatedly attempted settlement and that the defendant displayed intransigence in proceeding to trial despite the standing offer.

Applying the principles of fairness, reasonableness, and the reasonable expectations of the parties, the court awarded the plaintiffs their full claimed costs and disbursements.

Following reasons granting an interlocutory injunction in a dispute involving alleged breach of fiduciary duties and misuse of confidential information, the court addressed disagreements over the form of the order and costs.

The plaintiff sought additional wording expanding the scope of entities and confidential technology referenced in the injunction, which the court refused because the relief had not been sought in the motion record or oral submissions.

The court required that the original wording of the injunction regarding preservation of confidential information be maintained.

A stay of the data‑imaging paragraph was granted for two defendants pending determination of their motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

Costs of the interlocutory injunction motion were ordered to be in the cause.

Insurers disputed responsibility for satisfying a tort judgment arising from a fatal apartment fire.

One insurer had paid the balance of the judgment after the other insurer exhausted its primary policy limits and refused to contribute further pending resolution of a priority dispute.

The court held that liability of the building owner and property manager—treated as a single defendant in the underlying tort action—should be apportioned equally between them for indemnity purposes.

Applying principles analogous to Aetna Insurance Co. v. Canadian Surety Co. and restitutionary doctrines, the court concluded the paying insurer had overpaid and was entitled to reimbursement.

Judgment was granted requiring the responding insurer to reimburse the excess amount.