Mark Anthony Veneziano

The applicant, Huck Glove Company Inc., sought payment of a Bonus Density Fee under an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a property sold to the respondents.

The respondents argued that the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as the site plan approval that triggered the payment occurred in February 2019, but the application was not filed until April 2023.

The applicant contended that it only discovered the claim in December 2021 when the respondents explicitly denied that the fee was owing.

The court dismissed the application, holding that a reasonable person in the applicant's circumstances would have discovered the claim at the time of site plan approval or when construction commenced in 2019.

The appellant appealed a trial decision ordering specific performance of an oral agreement to sell land to the respondent for $4.1 million.

The appellant argued the oral agreement was unenforceable under s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, contending the detrimental reliance aspect of the doctrine of part performance was not met because the respondent's only obligation was to pay the purchase price, which was tendered but refused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not err in concluding the respondent irremediably carried out its obligations to its detriment by taking all necessary steps to close the transaction while the appellant stood by.

The plaintiff, Tri-South Developments Inc., sued the defendant, 583167 Ontario Inc., for breach of contract, waiver/estoppel, and unjust enrichment related to a failed condominium development project.

The core dispute revolved around a "Severance Condition" in their Contribution Agreement (CA), which required Tri-South to obtain land severance by a specific date.

Tri-South failed to meet this condition, leading to the automatic termination of the CA.

Tri-South alleged the defendant breached its duty of good faith by not disclosing its intent to rely on the severance date and by misleading them regarding design approvals.

The court dismissed all of Tri-South's claims, finding no breach of good faith, no waiver or estoppel by the defendant, and no unjust enrichment, as the plaintiff had control over the condition and failed to meet its obligations.

The applicant, an equal shareholder and medical director of fertility clinics, sought interim relief in a corporate oppression claim against her estranged husband, the sole director of most corporate entities.

She alleged mismanagement, diversion of funds, and exclusion from decision-making.

The court applied the "serious issue" test for interim injunctions, finding a serious issue and irreparable harm to the business and her professional duties if the status quo continued.

The balance of convenience favored the applicant.

The court ordered the applicant to be appointed as a co-director of all respondent corporations with the individual respondent, and restrained the individual respondent from interfering in patient care or medical processes, aiming to prevent deadlock and preserve the business while acknowledging the underlying matrimonial dispute.

The Defendant Physicians sought an extension of time to serve three expert reports under Rule 53.03(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which the Plaintiffs opposed, seeking to exclude the reports due to late service.

The court found that the lawyer's inadvertence constituted a reasonable explanation for the delay.

The court also determined that granting leave would not cause uncompensable prejudice to the Plaintiffs or undue delay, noting that liability was always a live issue despite the Plaintiffs' trial preparations.

The motion was granted, extending the time for service of the expert reports, and the Plaintiffs were granted leave to file reply reports.

The plaintiffs, owners of a downtown Toronto office tower, sued the defendants, operators of the building's parking garage, for unpaid fixed monthly fees from April 2020 to April 2021.

The defendants ceased full payments due to the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on revenue, arguing a binding oral agreement to reduce fees, the application of a force majeure clause, and contract frustration.

The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment.

The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding no valid amendment to the contract due to a "no oral modification" clause and lack of consideration, no detrimental reliance for promissory estoppel, and that neither the force majeure clause nor the doctrine of frustration applied as the contract merely became unprofitable, not impossible to perform.

The plaintiff was entirely successful at a five-day trial for specific performance of an oral agreement for the sale of land and sought partial indemnity costs of $164,698.14.

The defendant argued the costs were excessive due to over-lawyering and suggested $70,000.

The court reviewed the factors under Rule 57.01 and the principles from Apotex, reducing the legal fees to account for duplication but allowing time for an articling student who managed documents during the virtual trial.

The court awarded the plaintiff $100,000 in fees plus $19,120.98 in disbursements, plus HST.

The plaintiff purchaser brought an action for specific performance of an oral agreement to purchase a 32-acre property from the defendant owner.

The parties had negotiated an all-cash deal for $4.1 million, with the purchaser paying a $200,000 broker commission.

The owner later refused to close the transaction, arguing there was no binding agreement and relying on the Statute of Frauds.

The Superior Court of Justice found that a binding oral agreement was reached on all essential terms.

The court held that the doctrine of part performance applied, taking the agreement outside the Statute of Frauds, as both parties had engaged in acts unequivocally referable to the land.

Finding the property unique due to its contiguity with the purchaser's existing land, the court ordered specific performance.

On the eve of trial, the plaintiffs brought a motion for further documentary production and discovery after the defendants provided late answers to questions previously refused during examinations for discovery.

The defendants argued that issue estoppel applied due to previous unsuccessful refusals motions.

The court rejected the issue estoppel argument, finding that the defendants altered the litigation landscape by voluntarily providing the late answers.

The court ordered limited, file-specific documentary production relevant to the new answers, but denied broader discovery requests to avoid delaying the trial.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to enforce a $200,000 settlement under Rule 49.09, arguing they had accepted a 2016 offer from the defendants in 2020.

The court found that while the 2016 letter contained a valid Rule 49 offer that remained open for acceptance, the plaintiffs' purported acceptance in 2020 introduced new terms regarding mutual releases and costs involving parties not represented by the offeror's counsel.

Consequently, the purported acceptance was a counter-offer, and no agreement on essential terms was reached.

The motion to enforce the settlement was dismissed.

The appellant underwent a laparoscopic colectomy performed by the respondent surgeon, during which her left ureter was injured, ultimately necessitating removal of her left kidney.

The trial judge found that the surgeon breached the standard of care and that the breach caused the injury requiring the kidney's removal.

The Court of Appeal majority set aside the trial decision, holding the trial judge erred in law in identifying and applying the standard of care.

The dissenting judge found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's approach and conclusions.

The Supreme Court unanimously restored the trial judgment, adopting the reasons of the dissenting judge.

At a case conference, the Varone Parties sought compliance with a previous discovery plan order made by Master Muir, which the Concord Adex Parties had failed to meet.

The court ordered the Concord Adex Parties to serve their Affidavit of Documents within 10 days and varied the litigation timetable accordingly.

The court also provided directions on how to address an undetermined costs issue from the previous motion, as Master Muir had passed away before rendering his decision on costs.

The Court of Appeal fixed the respondents' costs of the appeal at $90,000 inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

The plaintiffs commenced two actions arising from the purchase of a property with structural issues: one against Stewart Title for breach of title insurance contract and a "tort action" against multiple parties (vendors, home inspector, township, contractors) for property defects.

Stewart Title moved to consolidate the two actions.

The plaintiffs and two defendants from the tort action (the vendors) opposed consolidation, preferring the actions be heard together or one after the other.

The court, applying Rule 6.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, conducted a costs/benefits analysis.

It rejected the notion of an elevated onus for consolidation and found that ordering the actions to be heard together, with common discoveries and pre-trial, best served efficiency and fairness.

This decision was primarily to avoid significant costs and delays associated with potential crossclaims and pleadings disputes that full consolidation would trigger, particularly regarding Stewart Title's potential subrogation claims.

The motion for consolidation was dismissed, and an order for the actions to be tried together was granted with specific directions for common pre-trial and discoveries.

The plaintiff sought a mandatory injunction to compel interim monthly payments of $6,500 from the defendant business, E. Corbiere & Sons Contracting, based on an alleged oral compensation agreement.

The defendants disputed the agreement and claimed the plaintiff had already received significant advances.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a strong prima facie case for the alleged oral agreement and did not demonstrate irreparable harm, as any financial loss was compensable in damages and his claims of impecuniosity were speculative.

The court also noted that the relief sought was akin to a partnership distribution not pleaded in the statement of claim.

The appellant physician appealed a jury verdict finding him liable for negligent management of a twin pregnancy, which resulted in premature birth and brain damage to one of the twins.

The appellant argued the jury's verdict on causation was unreasonable due to a lack of evidence that the required treatment, amnioreduction, was available at the referral hospital in 1991.

The appellant also challenged the trial judge's jury instructions regarding adverse inferences, the characterization of expert evidence, and the failure to instruct on loss of chance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that there was an evidentiary basis for the jury's conclusion on causation and that the jury charge was fair, balanced, and legally correct.

Prior to a medical malpractice jury trial, the court ruled on several procedural and evidentiary motions.

The plaintiffs had entered into a Pierringer Agreement with the defendant hospital and nurses, leaving only the physicians as defendants.

The court ruled that both the plaintiffs and the physicians could cross-examine the settling nurses at trial.

The court also determined the sequencing and phrasing of jury questions, ruling that standard of care must be determined before causation, and permitting 'caused or contributed' language due to the presence of multiple tortfeasors.

Finally, the court allowed the plaintiffs to use photographs of the amputations in their opening address but restricted the experts' use of lengthy PowerPoint presentations.

The plaintiff, a foreman for a drywall contractor, was summarily dismissed after working for the defendant for several years.

The defendant argued the plaintiff was an independent contractor not entitled to notice.

The court applied the Sagaz test and found the plaintiff was an employee, as he worked exclusively for the defendant, used their tools, and did not share in profits or losses.

The court awarded a 6-month reasonable notice period based on the Bardal factors and found the defendant failed to prove a failure to mitigate.

Damages of $62,780 were awarded.

The appellant physician appealed the liability and penalty decisions of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.

The Committee had found the appellant guilty of sexual abuse and unprofessional conduct regarding two patients and ordered the revocation of his licence, as well as requiring him to post security for patient counselling.

The Divisional Court upheld the liability findings, concluding the Committee's credibility assessments were reasonable.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on penalty, finding that the Committee erred in principle by failing to balance all sentencing criteria, ignoring proportionality, and incorrectly applying retrospective legislation.

The penalty of revocation was set aside and remitted to the Committee.

The order for security for counselling was varied to apply only to the patient who demonstrated a need for it.

The defendant obstetrician, Dr. Jackiewicz, was sued for negligence by the Woods family, alleging that his breach of standard of care in managing a twin pregnancy led to Kelsey Woods incurring cerebral palsy.

During the trial, the defendant objected to the plaintiffs' closing address, which invited the jury to find causation even if the pregnancy prolongation from amnioreduction was less than the five weeks testified to by experts.

The defendant requested an instruction that the jury *must* find against the plaintiffs on causation unless a five-week prolongation was proven.

The court declined this additional instruction, finding that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to infer causation with a shorter prolongation, consistent with the principles from *Benhaim v. St-Germain* regarding the use of statistics and inferences in medical malpractice causation.