Bradley W. Miller

The appellant failed to close on a residential real estate transaction, prompting the respondent to seek damages and move for summary judgment.

After repeatedly breaching court-ordered timetables and failing to pay previously ordered costs, the appellant requested a further adjournment on a peremptory return date, which the motion judge refused.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the refusal, holding that the motion judge exercised her discretion properly in light of the appellant's contumelious delay and failure to comply with court orders, and that there was no denial of procedural fairness.

The appellant vendor entered into an agreement to sell 208 developed building lots to the respondent purchasers.

The vendor chose to build private drinking and wastewater systems and entered into municipal responsibility agreements with the township.

The purchasers refused to pay the capital costs for these private systems, arguing they were not party to the agreements and the purchase price included water services.

The application judge ruled the purchasers were not obliged to pay these costs.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's interpretation of the agreement of purchase and sale.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's decision granting summary judgment in favour of the respondent and finding the action was statute-barred.

The damage to the appellant's building was discovered on October 4, 2019, by the property manager.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the presumption under s. 5(2) of the Limitations Act, 2002 was not rebutted and that the claim was discoverable on October 4, 2019.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their product liability actions against Johnson & Johnson as statute-barred.

They had suffered complications from hernia mesh implants, requiring revision surgeries more than three years before issuing their claims.

The appellants argued their claims were only discoverable when a lawyer advised them the mesh might be defective.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that, with due diligence, the appellants ought to have discovered their claims shortly after the mesh removal, rendering the actions statute-barred.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's determination that the parties separated on June 20, 2022, rather than December 31, 2014.

The trial judge found the respondent more credible and the appellant's assertion that they separated months after marriage but continued to cohabit and maintain joint accounts for eight years implausible.

The Court of Appeal found no errors of fact or law, noting the determination of the date of separation rests on findings of fact and credibility, which are entitled to great deference.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant's claims to set aside a separation agreement and for support were dismissed after she failed to attend the in-person trial, despite multiple warnings.

She appealed on grounds of procedural fairness and failure to adjudicate her claims.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that she should have appealed the order requiring an in-person trial rather than defying it.

The trial judge made no error in proceeding with the trial and resolving the claims based on the evidence before him.

The appellant wife appealed a trial decision ordering the respondent husband to pay a $55,000 lump sum for spousal support, which she argued fell outside the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's discretionary determination, finding no error in principle or misapprehension of evidence regarding the duration, form, or quantum of the non-compensatory support awarded.

The appellants sought production of trust ledgers of the respondents' law firms and unredacted bank statements in a civil fraud action, arguing that the records were necessary to trace funds and determine if the respondents breached Mareva injunctions.

The courts below held that the trust ledgers were presumptively privileged, the presumption was not rebutted, and the crime-fraud exception did not apply.

The Divisional Court also remitted the issue of privilege over the unredacted bank statements to the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trust ledgers were presumptively privileged and the presumption was not rebutted.

The Court also held that while the crime-fraud exception could apply in a civil action for fraud or breach of a court order, the appellants failed to establish a prima facie case for its application.

The Court found no error in remitting the bank statements issue to the motion judge.

The moving party sought review of a motion judge's decision granting a vesting order in an action for specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale.

The moving party argued the responding party delayed in renewing the motion and that the moving party was prejudiced by the denial of rent or use of the purchase money.

The Court of Appeal found the responding party had not breached court orders regarding rent, and that the moving party had repeatedly breached its contractual obligations.

The motion to set aside the motion judge's order was dismissed.

The moving party sought a panel review of an order requiring him to post security for costs and staying his appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no reviewable errors.

The Court noted the moving party's admission that he resides outside the province and lacks assets within it provided sufficient grounds for the order.

The appellant appealed an order declaring him a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The underlying dispute began when a doctor refused to accept the appellant's wife as a patient, leading the appellant to launch numerous unsuccessful claims and regulatory complaints.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the appellant's disproportionate use of the justice system was abusive, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of child sexual abuse material offences.

During the execution of a search warrant at his home, police detained him for hours without properly advising him of his right to counsel.

Upon arrest weeks later, he was subjected to a routine strip search.

The trial judge found breaches of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Charter but admitted the computer evidence.

The Court of Appeal held the trial judge erred by failing to consider the strip search in the section 24(2) analysis.

Conducting a fresh analysis, the Court excluded the evidence due to the seriousness of the breaches and police ignorance of Charter standards, quashing the convictions.

The appellant appealed his first-degree murder convictions for setting a fire that killed his mother and stepfather.

He argued the trial judge erred by admitting his stepfather's dying declarations, admitting his own statements about a knee injury as fabricated, and finding he was not psychologically detained during police interviews.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's admissibility rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant was convicted of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to 4.5 years' imprisonment.

She appealed the sentence, seeking a conditional sentence based on fresh evidence of changed family circumstances, including the birth of a new child and her older daughter's mental health struggles.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence and allowed the appeal.

While a conditional sentence was disproportionate to the gravity of fentanyl trafficking, the Court reduced the sentence by 10 months to 36 months' imprisonment to mitigate the severe collateral consequences of incarceration on the appellant's family.

The appellant brought a wrongful dismissal action in Ontario against the respondents.

The motion judge stayed the action, finding the appellant was an independent contractor and enforcing a forum selection clause in favour of England.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the motion judge made an extricable error of law by conflating the appellant's status as a shareholder with his role in providing services when applying the Belton factors.

Conducting a fresh analysis, the Court concluded the appellant was an employee for the purposes of the Employment Standards Act, rendering the forum selection clause void.

The Court further held that Ontario had jurisdiction simpliciter and that the respondents failed to establish England was a more convenient forum.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence of two years less a day imposed on the respondent for sexually assaulting his stepdaughter when she was a child.

The sentencing judge had imposed the conditional sentence primarily due to the collateral consequences incarceration would have on the respondent's dependent adult son.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the sentence demonstrably unfit given the high moral culpability of the offender and the gravity of the offence.

The Court substituted a three-year custodial sentence, noting that collateral consequences cannot overwhelm other sentencing principles such as denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching against a child complainant.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility, misapplied the W.(D.) framework, and relied on facts not in evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no reviewable errors, holding that the trial judge properly assessed credibility, did not shift the burden of proof, and grounded his findings in the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted by a jury as a party to a commercial robbery for acting as the getaway driver, challenged both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that the circumstantial evidence, including cellphone searches, call activity, her links to the robbers before and after the offence, and her role in transporting the robbers and stolen property, reasonably supported the inference that she knew in advance that a robbery involving violence or threats would occur.

The court also held that although Crown counsel's reconstructed dialogue in closing submissions was improper and should not be used, the tactic did not render the trial unfair in light of the qualifications given, the evidentiary foundation for the inferences, and the trial judge's corrective instruction.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed because no error in principle or factual error was shown and there was no basis to interfere with the custodial sentence.

In an appeal arising from a summary judgment motion in a commercial dispute, the panel held that an order refusing summary judgment on an incomplete record with unresolved credibility issues is interlocutory, not final.

Reconstituting itself as the Divisional Court under the Courts of Justice Act, the panel held that the motion judge erred by failing to invite submissions on the next procedural steps after concluding that summary disposition was unavailable.

Applying the summary judgment principles in Hryniak, the panel affirmed the refusal of summary judgment but remitted the matter to the motion judge or another judge for further case management and trial directions.

The request to require a trial on the existing record only, without new evidence, was rejected.

The appellant challenged an Ontario Review Board disposition continuing his detention under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code after an NCR finding.

He argued that the Board gave insufficient reasons on significant threat and failed to use its inquisitorial powers to test defence counsel's concession that he continued to pose a significant threat to public safety.

The Court of Appeal held that the reasons were sufficient when read in light of the hospital report, the treating psychiatrist's evidence, and the uncontested record showing a link between substance use, psychiatric decompensation, and risk of criminal offending.

The court further held that the Board was not required to make additional inquiries where the position advanced was supported by evidence and had been independently considered by the Board.

The appeal was dismissed.