Jolene Hansell

The appellant pleaded guilty to sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, making child pornography, distributing child pornography, possession of child pornography, and two counts of failure to comply with a release order, and received a global sentence of 11 years and 3 months less pre-sentence custody credit.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred in factoring in pre-sentence custody credit and that the sentence was excessive compared to similar cases.

He also challenged ancillary non-communication orders and an internet restriction order.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's treatment of pre-sentence custody, held the sentence was not unfit given the exceptionally serious nature of the offences and numerous aggravating factors, and declined to interfere with the ancillary orders.

Leave to appeal was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and extortion, raising two grounds: (1) whether the application judge erred in dismissing a s. 11(b) Charter application regarding trial delay following a mistrial, and (2) whether the Crown's improper question about child pornography rendered the retrial unfair.

The Court of Appeal held that mistrials do not reset the Jordan clock but must be assessed within the Jordan framework as potential discrete exceptional circumstances.

The mistrial in this case was found to be a discrete exceptional circumstance arising from a shared misunderstanding of law regarding the materiality of dates in the indictment.

The Crown's improper question was adequately remedied by timely and forceful corrective instructions from the trial judge.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed J.S.'s conviction and sentence appeals for child luring and sexual interference.

The court found no error in the trial judge’s assessment of the complainant’s evidence or in the allocation of the burden of proof regarding the possibility of a third-party hacker.

The court also rejected arguments that the trial judge failed to consider the appellant’s personal circumstances or recent appellate guidance on family considerations in sentencing.

The sentence, including the lack of Downes credit for bail conditions, was upheld.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal of P.J.C., who had been convicted of assaulting his three stepchildren and sexually assaulting one of them.

The central issue was whether the trial judge erred in admitting expert evidence from Dr. Lori Haskell on the neurobiology of trauma and its effects on memory.

The Court found that the expert evidence was not necessary for the trial judge to assess the credibility and reliability of the complainants, and that its presentation—particularly through hypotheticals closely tracking the complainants’ evidence—improperly bolstered their credibility.

The prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed any probative value.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sought leave to appeal his three-year imprisonment sentence.

The appellant argued the conviction was unreasonable due to forensic evidence contradicting the complainant's account and that the trial judge erred in sentencing by attempting to reconstruct the jury's path to conviction and providing insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding the verdict reasonable and the trial judge's fact-finding for sentencing to be independent and sufficiently reasoned.

The appellant, designated a dangerous offender and given an indeterminate sentence, appealed his sentence.

He argued that the trial judge failed to consider his treatability at the designation phase, contrary to R. v. Boutilier.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge correctly applied Boutilier, considering treatability at both designation and penalty phases.

Even if there was an error, it caused no prejudice as the conclusion of untreatability would have been the same.

The court also rejected the argument that the trial judge confused "treatability with curability." The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a teacher, was convicted of sexual exploitation and assault involving multiple students.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge adequately analyzed the potential for inadvertent tainting of witness evidence due to extensive discussions among complainants and other witnesses.

The appellate court found that while the trial judge acknowledged the risk, his reasons lacked sufficient analysis and articulation of how he concluded the evidence was reliable despite the "extreme danger" of tainting.

The court emphasized that inadvertent tainting affects reliability, not just credibility, and requires a clear explanation of how the concern was resolved.

The appellant pleaded guilty to impaired driving, drug trafficking, and firearms offences, and was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment just before the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown.

On appeal, he sought a sentence reduction based on the totality principle and the harsh conditions of incarceration caused by the pandemic.

The Crown and the appellant agreed to an 18-month sentence reduction.

The Court of Appeal accepted the joint proposal, finding that the pandemic resulted in significantly harsher conditions than anticipated at sentencing, and reduced the sentence by 18 months.

The appellant, a former high school teacher, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation involving two former students (D.R. and L.G.).

The appeal focused on alleged misapprehensions of evidence by the trial judge concerning L.G.'s and a corroborating witness's testimony, and a misdirection on the reasonable doubt standard, particularly regarding the R. v. W.(D.) principles.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's errors in summarizing evidence were not material and that, despite a misstatement of the W.(D.) steps, the trial judge properly applied the reasonable doubt standard to all allegations.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal of a 23-month reformatory sentence for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish that the appeal had sufficient merit, particularly regarding the availability of a conditional sentence order for sexual assault under the Criminal Code.

The court noted that while Superior Court decisions had found the relevant Criminal Code provision unconstitutional, the Court of Appeal had not yet definitively addressed the issue, creating a legal quagmire for the applicant.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence for second-degree murder, arguing that the sentencing judge erred in principle by equating his moral blameworthiness to that of a first-degree murder offender and made a palpable error in finding his mental illness played no contributing role.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's assessment of high moral blameworthiness given the premeditated nature of the original plan to kill his ex-wife and the attack on her uncle.

The court also upheld the finding that the appellant failed to establish a causal link between his depression and the murder, noting shortcomings in the psychiatric evidence.

The appellant, convicted of multiple robberies and severe assaults, appealed her dangerous offender designation and the determinate sentence of ten years (consecutive to a prior five-and-a-half-year sentence) followed by a ten-year long-term supervision order.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario reviewed the sentencing judge's findings regarding the appellant's high risk of violent recidivism and the application of the totality principle.

The Court found no error in the sentencing judge's apprehension of the evidence, analysis, or conclusion that the appellant met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation, nor in the determination of the sentence, including the rejection of a "spree" characterization for the planned offences.

The appeal was dismissed.

P.C. appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference and sought leave to appeal his four-year sentence.

The appeal raised grounds concerning the trial judge's jury charge, specifically the language used to refer to the unrepresented accused's evidence versus his submissions, and the sufficiency of assistance provided to the unrepresented appellant.

Additionally, the appellant challenged the trial judge's factual findings at sentencing, particularly regarding penetration, and the weight given to mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury charge, that sufficient assistance was provided to the appellant, and that the sentencing judge was entitled to make factual findings not explicitly determined by the jury's verdict.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the appeal was dismissed.