Lia Bramwell

The decision addresses whether the complainant D.P. may give recognition evidence identifying S.P. and Geza Gelencser in videos found on a laptop seized from Mr. Gelencser’s home.

The court finds that D.P. is in a better position than the jury to identify S.P. and Mr. Gelencser based on her prior acquaintance and specific knowledge, and admits the evidence.

The court considered whether M.R. was guilty of sexually assaulting or sexually interfering with his daughter, C.R., when she was three and four years old.

The decision turned on the credibility and reliability of the evidence provided by both M.R. and C.R. The court found that M.R.'s denial could not be rejected, and that C.R.'s evidence was inconsistent and potentially tainted, failing to meet the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

M.R. was acquitted.

The decision addresses the sentencing of Johnny Sawatis, who pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography.

The court considered whether it was necessary to view a representative sample of the images as part of the sentencing process, ultimately ruling that it was required due to the absence of other evidence about the nature and severity of the collection.

The court reviewed the relevant sentencing principles, aggravating and mitigating factors, and the impact of Sawatis' Indigenous background.

A sentence of three and a half years' imprisonment was imposed, along with several ancillary orders.

The defendants, Philip Dass and Oren Lazore, brought s. 11(b) Charter applications for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial completion was 29.46 months.

After deducting 57 days of defence delay for Mr. Dass, the net delay was 27.5 months, which is below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court matters.

The court found that Mr. Dass did not demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings, nor did the case take "markedly longer" than it reasonably should have.

Mr. Lazore's application also failed, partly due to his counsel's unavailability causing further delay.

Both applications for a stay of proceedings were dismissed.

This criminal trial concerned a charge of sexual assault.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the complainant's evidence, who had special needs, alongside testimony from other witnesses.

The judge found significant inconsistencies and implausibility in the complainant's account, both internally and when compared to other evidence.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal.

The accused was charged with three counts of sexual assault and one count of forcible confinement against his former common-law partner.

The Crown applied to admit the complainant's evidence on each sexual assault count as similar fact evidence for the others, which the court dismissed due to the similarities being merely generic.

Applying the W.D. framework, the court acquitted the accused of the sexual assault charges because, although his evidence had frailties, it could not be entirely rejected, leaving a reasonable doubt.

However, the court rejected the accused's evidence regarding the forcible confinement charge, accepted the complainant's evidence, and found the accused guilty on that count.

The accused, Curtis Morrison, was charged with obstructing police, possession of cocaine, and various firearm offences after a search incident to arrest.

Morrison alleged racial profiling, arbitrary detention (s. 9 Charter), and unreasonable search (s. 8 Charter), seeking exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found insufficient evidence of racial profiling.

However, it found that the initial arrest based on an unverified "tax warrant" from Quebec was unlawful, breaching s. 9.

Consequently, the subsequent search of his vehicle, which was not incident to a lawful arrest and lacked other legal authority, breached s. 8.

Applying the Grant framework, the court determined that the seriousness of the police misconduct and the significant impact on the accused's Charter rights outweighed society's interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits, leading to the exclusion of the gun and cocaine evidence.

In the alternative, the court also found that the Crown had not proven possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was found not guilty on all counts.

The accused, K.G., was charged with three counts of sexual assault against his former common-law partner, M.H. The allegations included non-consensual vaginal intercourse while M.H. was in a medication-induced sleep, forced fellatio, forced anal penetration during consensual intercourse, and non-consensual sexual touching after separation.

The Crown sought to admit similar fact evidence.

The court dismissed the similar fact application, finding insufficient similarity between the alleged incidents.

The judge found significant credibility and reliability concerns with the complainant's evidence, including bias, dramatic shifts in demeanor, inconsistencies, and the impact of medication on her memory.

While the accused's denials were not entirely accepted, they could not be entirely rejected, leaving a reasonable doubt.

Consequently, K.G. was acquitted on all three counts.

The Crown applied to admit similar fact evidence against the accused, Raoul Saucier, in a sexual assault trial.

The Crown argued the evidence of a prior sexual assault conviction against K.D. was relevant to consent and the exploitation of vulnerable victims, highlighting similarities in the accused's conduct.

The court, applying the Handy test, found the asserted similarities between the prior conviction and the current allegations to be generic and lacking sufficient cogency to establish an objective improbability of coincidence.

Despite the judge-alone trial, the court found a significant risk of moral prejudice, concluding that the prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value.

The application was dismissed, rendering the similar fact evidence inadmissible.

The appellant, a teacher, was convicted of sexual exploitation and assault involving multiple students.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge adequately analyzed the potential for inadvertent tainting of witness evidence due to extensive discussions among complainants and other witnesses.

The appellate court found that while the trial judge acknowledged the risk, his reasons lacked sufficient analysis and articulation of how he concluded the evidence was reliable despite the "extreme danger" of tainting.

The court emphasized that inadvertent tainting affects reliability, not just credibility, and requires a clear explanation of how the concern was resolved.

The Appellant, Jacques Dansereau, appealed his conviction for operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg, arguing a miscarriage of justice.

He contended that the trial judge accepted an uninformed guilty plea without a proper plea inquiry and sought to admit fresh evidence regarding his state of mind and lack of memory due to a head injury.

The court admitted the fresh evidence but dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's finding of guilt was based on the evidence presented during the trial, not an uninformed guilty plea.

The court concluded that the trial process was not "rife with errors" or "deeply flawed" to constitute a miscarriage of justice.

The applicant, a transgender person, brought a motion under s. 638(1)(b) of the Criminal Code to challenge prospective jurors for cause at her upcoming sexual assault trial.

The applicant argued that there was a widespread bias against transgender people in the community that could taint juror impartiality.

The court found that the applicant met the onus to establish a realistic possibility that bias or prejudicial attitudes exist in the community with respect to transgender people, and that these attitudes could affect juror impartiality.

The motion was granted, allowing for a specific challenge for cause question to be posed to prospective jurors.

The applicant sought leave under R. v. Garofoli to cross-examine the affiant of Informations to Obtain (ITOs) for three search warrants.

The applicant argued the affiant omitted facts and had an ulterior motive to search for drugs rather than evidence of the stabbing.

The court reviewed the timeline and found that the allegedly omitted information was not known to police until after the first ITO was sworn.

The court dismissed the application, concluding the applicant failed to show a reasonable likelihood that cross-examination would assist in determining whether the necessary grounds existed for the issuance of the warrants.

The applicant brought an application to exclude evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant at a hotel room, arguing a violation of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The police had relied on information from an anonymous caller, two confidential informants, and surveillance observations to obtain the warrant.

The court applied the Debot criteria and found the informant information to be compelling, credible, and corroborated.

The court concluded that the issuing justice had sufficient reasonable and probable grounds to issue the warrant and dismissed the application to exclude the evidence.