Cedric Yaacov Laurent Nahum

The court considered a motion by Family and Children’s Services of Renfrew County for a temporary care and custody order regarding B.T., a 7-year-old child.

The Society sought to place B.T. with his paternal aunt and uncle, D.D. and J.D., subject to supervision, with access to the parents, A.R. and A.T., at the Society’s discretion.

The parents opposed and sought B.T.’s return to their care.

The court reviewed the background, including prior Society involvement, substance misuse concerns, and the child’s special needs.

Applying the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 and relevant case law, the court found credible and trustworthy evidence of risk of harm if B.T. were returned to his parents and concluded that B.T. could not be adequately protected in their care, even with supervision.

The court ordered B.T. to remain in the temporary care of D.D. and J.D., with supervised access to the parents.

G.C. (an added party) sought an order for access to the child, V.E.B.P., and S.P. (the mother) brought a cross-motion seeking to have G.C. supervise her access to the child.

The Children’s Aid Society, the father, and the child's kin caregivers opposed both motions.

The court denied G.C.'s motion for interim access, finding that the relationship was not sufficiently beneficial or meaningful to the child, citing concerns about G.C.'s transparency, involvement in adult conflict, and negative messaging about the father.

The court also denied the mother's request for G.C. to supervise access, concluding that G.C. was not a suitable supervisor due to lack of neutrality and past conduct.

The child's stability and positive development in kin care were significant factors in the decision.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss openness applications filed by the mother (J.S.R.) and adult sister (H.S.R.) concerning two children, E. and R., who were in the Society's extended care and subsequently adopted.

The court considered the children's best interests, their consistent views against contact with the applicants, and the requirement for consent for children over 12 under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The motion was granted, dismissing the openness applications and ordering openness only according to the children's wishes as reflected in minutes signed by the Office of the Children's Lawyer and the Society.

This motion addressed whether J.A. qualified as a "parent" of the child A.H.H. under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (CYFSA).

The court examined the definitions of "settled intention" and "lawful custody" as per Section 74(1) of the CYFSA.

J.A. failed to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate a settled intention to treat A.H.H. as his child, citing vague details, lack of consistent financial support, and failure to assert legal rights during periods of separation.

The court also found that J.A. did not have lawful custody, as there was no court order or written agreement.

Consequently, J.A.'s motion to be declared a parent was dismissed.

The accused, Luigi Haaima, applied to attend his summary conviction trial by videoconference, citing his residence being an hour and a half from Pembroke and lack of transportation.

The court reviewed the 2022 amendments to the Criminal Code (Bill S-4) concerning virtual appearances, specifically sections 715.21, 715.23, 715.232, and 715.24, and section 800.

The court interpreted section 715.232, which appears to require consent for non-custodial accused in summary conviction matters, as allowing for residual judicial discretion, especially when read in conjunction with section 800 (permitting trials in absentia).

The court outlined various factors from section 715.23 that must be evidenced to justify a virtual appearance, including personal circumstances, costs, suitability of location, fair hearing rights, and offence seriousness.

The application was dismissed because it only provided bare assertions regarding distance and transportation, which was deemed insufficient without further evidence addressing the enumerated factors.

Leave was granted to file a more comprehensive application.

The moving parties, Shania and Justine Lavallee, sought an order for security for costs against the responding party, Solit Isak, for their successful defamation action and estimated appeal costs.

Isak, the appellant, conceded impecuniosity but argued her appeal was meritorious.

The Court of Appeal found good reason to believe the appeal was frivolous and vexatious due to its lack of merit and Isak's dilatory conduct.

Alternatively, the court found "other good reason" to order security, balancing the parties' interests.

The motion was granted, ordering Isak to post $15,000 in security for costs, staying the appeal until payment, and awarding costs of the motion to the Lavallees.

This motion concerned the temporary care and custody of two children, E.-L. and Z.P., following their apprehension due to ongoing adult conflict between the mother and Z.P.'s father.

The Family and Children's Services sought placement with the maternal grandfather, while the mother sought return of the children or placement with kin caregivers (the L.'s), and Z.P.'s father sought placement of Z.P. with him.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the persistent conflict.

It determined that the children could not safely remain with the mother.

The maternal grandfather was deemed unsuitable due to lack of assessment and negative reports.

The court ordered E.-L. to be placed in the temporary care of the L.'s and Z.P. to be placed in the temporary care of her biological father, Mr. P., conditional on him securing suitable housing.

The L.'s were also added as parties to the child protection proceedings.

The respondent mother, J.L., brought a motion for the presiding judge to recuse herself from hearing pending motions and the upcoming trial, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias due to the judge's prior involvement, evidentiary rulings, and perceived negative language.

The respondent father, A.C., supported the motion.

The Children's Aid Society, counsel for the child B.L., and the added kin parties (T.P. and M.C.) opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the recusal motion, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, emphasizing judicial continuity in complex family law cases and the high threshold for recusal.

Application by defendant Jasmyn Jarrett to join a trial already in progress after she failed to appear on the first day.

The defendant had been arrested on a bench warrant and sought retroactive permission to participate in the trial, having missed the first five days of evidence.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing that the trial had effectively been severed when the Crown proceeded against the three remaining defendants.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Crown has discretion to proceed with co-accused and that allowing the defendant to join retroactively would prejudice the other defendants' right to a timely trial and would require the Crown to have led evidence differently.

The accused, Albert Tremblay and Amanda Ruddy, applied for directed verdicts of not guilty on multiple counts, arguing the prosecution failed to establish a prima facie case.

The court granted directed verdicts for counts related to possession of stolen property (chainsaws) due to lack of recent possession evidence, and for fraud counts due to absence of economic deprivation to the pharmacies.

However, the court denied directed verdicts for a count of possession of property obtained by crime (cash), and for counts of illegal possession of narcotics (fentanyl and oxycodone), finding sufficient circumstantial evidence to proceed to a jury.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that S.L. was in need of protection and placement in extended Society care for adoption.

The mother consented to the plan, but the father opposed, seeking S.L.'s return to his care.

The court, relying on previous judicial findings regarding the parents' violent relationship and non-compliance with court orders, found that the father had not raised a genuine issue for trial.

The court determined that S.L. was in need of protection due to the risk of emotional harm from exposure to domestic violence and that adoption was in her best interests, ensuring permanency, cultural connection, and stability.

The Society's motion was granted for S.L., while the father's opposition was dismissed.

The Children's Aid Society sought an order to place one child, B.L., in the temporary care of kin pending trial.

The parents brought a cross-motion to return all five children to their temporary care under a supervision order.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the kin placement approval for B.L. and the parents' recent housing and service engagement for the other children.

The court granted the Society's motion for B.L., placing him with kin, finding it in his best interests and that he could not be returned to parents.

The parents' cross-motion for the four youngest children was adjourned to allow them more time to demonstrate sustained progress in addressing mental health, addiction, and parenting concerns.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings or, alternatively, for an order excluding evidence due to alleged Charter violations.

The application concerned two main issues: lost police photographs from a search and unlawfully obtained/undisclosed medical prescription records.

The court found that the loss of photographs did not constitute unacceptable negligence or prejudice the defence, thus denying their exclusion.

However, the court determined that two specific prescription documents (Exhibits #26 and #27) were unlawfully seized without a production order, infringing the accused's privacy rights under sections 7 and 8 of the Charter, and were not disclosed in a timely fashion.

Applying the Grant factors, these two exhibits were deemed inadmissible.

A stay of proceedings was not warranted as the Charter-infringing conduct did not amount to an abuse of process.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa-Carleton brought a motion for summary judgment seeking extended society care for two children, F.M.-C. and L.M., and findings of need of protection.

The mother, supported by the father and maternal grandparents, opposed the motion, arguing that there were genuine issues requiring a trial, including her progress in addressing Society concerns and the improper admission of evidence as business records.

The court dismissed the Society's motion, finding that there were genuine issues requiring a trial for both children, particularly regarding the mother's progress in addressing homelessness, substance use, and mental health, and the admissibility of the Society's evidentiary record.

The court emphasized the cautious approach required for summary judgment in child protection cases due to the high stakes and Charter rights involved.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa brought a protection application concerning two children, S.B. and A.O.H., alleging physical harm and a pattern of neglect by their mother.

The mother failed to attend trial, and her counsel was removed.

The fathers of the children agreed with the Society's protection findings and sought custody.

The court found the children in need of protection due to the mother's inappropriate physical discipline, inadequate supervision, lack of provision for necessities, and threats.

Custody of S.B. was granted to her father, and joint legal custody of A.O.H. was granted to her paternal grandmother and father, with primary residence with the grandmother.

Access to the mother was made discretionary for the custodial parents, considering the children's views and best interests.

Orders were also made to facilitate obtaining passports for the children without the mother's consent.

Four co-accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on all charges, alleging violation of their right to trial within a reasonable time.

The charges included numerous break and enter offences and drug offences.

The court found that the total delay from October 18, 2017 (date charges laid) to the anticipated completion of trial in April 2020 was 30 months.

After deducting defence-caused delay (7 months and 25 days), waiver (1 day), discrete events (5 days), and case complexity (3 months), the net delay was 19 months, exceeding the Jordan ceiling of 18 months for provincial court trials.

The court granted the stay of proceedings, finding that the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay through exceptional circumstances.

Key issues included late and disorganized disclosure from police and Crown, inadequate trial time allocation, and the departure of the case manager from the police investigation without replacement.

The Respondent Mother, J.K., sought an order for costs against the Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa for alleged delays in returning her child, X.K., to her temporary care and custody.

The Society opposed this request and brought its own motion for costs.

The court dismissed the Mother's motion for costs, finding that the evidentiary record did not support the conclusion that the Society acted in a patently unfair and indefensible manner, despite some initial delays in worker assignment.

The court emphasized the special considerations for First Nations, Inuit, and Métis children under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, but concluded that the Mother had not demonstrated sufficient stability for an earlier return of the child.

The Society's motion for costs was adjourned.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order that the child, H., was in need of protection and for a disposition of extended society care for purposes of adoption, with no parental access.

The respondent mother could not be located, and the respondent father filed a plan of care lacking detail and did not participate further.

The court granted the Society's motion, finding the child in need of protection due to parental neglect, severe drug abuse by the mother, and the father's violent criminal history.

The court also determined that extended society care was in the child's best interests and denied parental access, citing the lack of parental contact, the child's young age, and the potential impairment to adoption opportunities.

The Children's Aid Society sought an order for extended society care for two Indigenous children, S.L. and L.E.L., due to ongoing exposure to domestic violence and the parents' non-compliance with court orders.

The parents, E.L. (mother) and I.O. (father), opposed this, seeking the children's return.

The court found the children remained in need of protection, citing the high risk of domestic violence and the parents' inability to adhere to supervision orders.

Despite acknowledging the importance of Indigenous heritage and the historical harms of assimilation, the court prioritized the children's safety and stability.

Extended society care was granted, with the court retaining jurisdiction over access to ensure meaningful contact with birth parents and cultural preservation.