Marie-Lise Dufort

The accused, charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder, re-elected trial by judge alone.

The sole issue was whether the accused was Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) by virtue of a mental illness under section 16 of the Criminal Code.

Expert psychiatric evidence established that the accused suffered from psychosis due to schizophrenia, which rendered him incapable of appreciating the moral wrongfulness of his actions, despite knowing the physical nature and quality of the acts.

The court accepted the defence's burden and found the accused NCR.

The accused was charged with assault with a weapon (jailhouse shank), assault causing bodily harm, and aggravated assault following an altercation in the maximum security section of a detention centre.

The defence argued that two other inmates caused the complainant's injuries using pencils.

The court analyzed video evidence and found that neither inmate had a pencil.

The court concluded that the accused removed a wrapped object from his waistband, unwrapped it, and used it to slash the complainant across both cheeks, causing wounds.

The accused was convicted of all three charges.

John McRae was found guilty of second-degree murder of his son, Michael McRae.

The court determined the period of parole ineligibility, considering the character of the offender, the nature and circumstances of the offence, and the jury's recommendation.

Aggravating factors included the abuse of a position of trust and the brutal nature of the murder.

Mitigating factors included the offender's age and health.

The court imposed a life sentence with parole ineligibility set at 12 years, balancing deterrence, denunciation, and the specific circumstances.

During a jury trial, the Crown brought an application under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act to cross-examine its own witness on a prior inconsistent statement.

The witness claimed to have no memory of conversations and events that he had previously detailed in a police statement.

The court found the witness's claim of memory loss was not credible, noting he could recall other significant details from the same day.

The court granted the application, permitting the Crown to cross-examine the witness on the prior statement.

D.D. was convicted of eight offences, including aggravated assault, sexual assault causing bodily harm, unlawful confinement, and failing to provide necessaries of life, against his 11-year-old son.

The court considered aggravating factors such as breach of trust, extreme violence, sexualized nature of abuse, and starvation, and mitigating factors including D.D.'s lack of criminal record and mental health issues (PTSD, depression, anxiety, obsessive-compulsive and narcissistic personality traits).

The court found D.D.'s mental health explained his behaviour but did not cause it, thus prioritizing denunciation and deterrence over rehabilitation.

A global sentence of 15 years' imprisonment was imposed, with specific apportionments for each offence, and various ancillary orders.

The applicant, K.H., brought an application under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to exclude all evidence seized at his residence and three statements made to the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP).

K.H. argued that the OPP breached his rights under sections 7, 8, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter, and that his statements were not voluntary.

The court found that K.H. was psychologically detained when he entered the police vehicle, and his Charter rights under sections 7, 10(a), and 10(b) were breached because he was not immediately informed of his rights.

The first and second statements were excluded due to these breaches.

The third statement was excluded because the Crown failed to prove its voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt due to inadequate police record-keeping during the search and subsequent interactions.

The warrantless search of K.H.'s residence was found to be unreasonable and in breach of section 8 of the Charter, as exigent circumstances were not established, and the police had sufficient grounds to obtain a warrant.

Applying the Grant factors under section 24(2), the court concluded that admitting the evidence (statements, handgun, ammunition, and long guns) would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and therefore excluded all evidence.

The accused was charged with sexual assault of a 19-year-old Algonquin College student on January 16, 2016.

The complainant was walking on campus with a crutch when the accused, a 21-year-old University of Ottawa student, approached her and touched her buttock without consent.

The central issue was whether the accused held an honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework and found that there was an air of reality to the defence of mistaken belief in consent.

The court concluded that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew the complainant was not consenting, and that the accused had taken reasonable steps to ascertain consent by asking permission before touching.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused were charged with offences under sections 86(3), 88(2), and 91(3) of the Criminal Code.

The trial commenced with an application challenging the validity of a search warrant obtained by Ottawa Police on February 4, 2011, to search the residence at 24 Robinson Avenue.

The applicant argued the warrant was obtained without reasonable and probable grounds, that the affidavit contained misleading statements, and that the statutory preconditions for a telewarrant were not met.

The court found that the telewarrant was invalid due to lack of urgency and impracticability, that the information from confidential informants was insufficiently reliable and detailed, and that the affidavit contained careless and misleading drafting.

The court determined the search constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in breach of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Under section 24(2), the court excluded the physical evidence seized, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute given the serious nature of the police conduct and the significant intrusion into the accused's private residence.

The Crown appealed an order staying criminal proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter for unreasonable delay.

The lower court had found that the elapsed time between charge and trial violated the accused’s right to be tried within a reasonable time.

Applying the framework from Morin and related jurisprudence, the appeal judge reassessed the allocation of delay, finding that certain periods—including intake procedures and delay following a mistrial—were neutral and not attributable to the Crown.

After deducting these neutral periods, the institutional delay fell within acceptable guidelines.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.