Jason Harley Gilbert

The offender, Timothy Godin, pleaded guilty to numerous offences including personation, dangerous operation of a vehicle causing bodily harm, failure to stop at an accident scene, breach of undertaking, various Highway Traffic Act offences, impaired driving, and arson causing damage to a vehicle and dwelling house.

The offences occurred over two years, linked to the offender's alcoholism and cocaine use.

The Crown sought five years incarceration or two years imprisonment followed by three years probation, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence due to the seriousness of the arson and dangerous driving.

The defence sought a conditional sentence of 18 months to two years less a day, highlighting the offender's rehabilitation efforts.

The court found denunciation and deterrence paramount, particularly for serious arson, and determined that a conditional sentence was inappropriate.

This is a sentencing decision for an accused (PC) found guilty of two counts of sexual assault against an intimate partner (HL).

The court considered aggravating factors, including the two distinct assaults, the accused being on probation for a prior offense against the same victim, and the significant victim impact.

Mitigating factors included the accused's employment, engagement with mental health support, and, crucially, diminished moral blameworthiness due to a history of Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs) and intellectual disability.

The court applied the R. v. AJK sentencing range for penetrative sexual assault on an intimate partner (three to five years).

Despite the diminished moral blameworthiness, the court found the accused's lack of insight and defensive personality made treatment more difficult.

The final sentence was three years in the penitentiary, with ancillary orders including DNA, weapons prohibition, non-contact, and a 10-year Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order, reduced from the Crown's requested 20 years due to disproportionality.

This ruling addresses an application by the Crown to remove defence counsel due to an apparent conflict of interest.

Defence counsel represented the accused in a murder trial while also representing the mother of the Crown's key witness in an unrelated criminal matter.

The court found a significant appearance of divided loyalties, particularly concerning the cross-examination of the key witness whose credibility was central to the defence theory.

Despite the accused's desire to retain counsel and counsel's assertion of no actual conflict, the court prioritized public confidence in the administration of justice and ordered the removal of counsel.

The applicant, David Blackwood, sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code following a detention order for charges including robbery and choking.

The court found a material change in circumstances, triggering a de novo review.

Despite a strong surety and consideration of difficult jail conditions, the court determined that Blackwood's extensive history of non-compliance with court orders and criminal record indicated a substantial likelihood of re-offending.

The application for release was dismissed, and his detention was maintained.

The case concerns the sentencing of Tyson Kennedy for multiple offences, including fraud over $5000, possession of fentanyl for trafficking, impaired driving, and breach of release orders.

The primary issue was the calculation of pre-sentence custody credit, specifically the application of "Duncan credit" for harsh conditions due to COVID-19 lockdowns.

The court reviewed the joint submission for a 42-month sentence, finding it lenient but acceptable, and then determined the appropriate credit, granting 0.5 days Duncan credit for each of the 73 lockdown days, in addition to the standard 1.5:1 Summers credit.

The Crown applied under s. 521(1) of the Criminal Code for a review of a Justice of the Peace's decision to release the accused on strict conditions.

The Crown argued the Justice of the Peace erred in considering the rareness of detention on the tertiary ground as a guiding principle and in giving inappropriate weight to electronic monitoring and COVID-19 delays.

The court found no error in the Justice of the Peace's analysis regarding the tertiary ground or the weight given to electronic monitoring and COVID-19's impact on trial delays.

The Crown's application was dismissed, and the accused's release was maintained.

The Children's Aid Society sought a finding that the child, W.M.J.C., was in need of protection under sections 37(2)(b)(ii) and 37(2)(g) of the Child and Family Services Act, and an order of Crown Wardship for adoption.

The mother opposed, seeking the child's return under supervision or an extension of Society wardship.

The court found the child in need of protection due to the mother's continued lack of insight into her parenting deficiencies and the significant risk of future emotional harm, despite some improvements in the home environment.

The mother's plan for care was deemed not viable, and the father was uncooperative.

The court dismissed the mother's request for an extension and ordered Crown Wardship for adoption, finding it to be in the child's best interests.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code and the sentence imposed following a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown cross‑appealed the acquittal on the related impaired driving charge under s. 253(1)(a), arguing the trial judge erred in failing to rely on uncontradicted expert toxicology evidence to infer impairment.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge committed no legal or factual error in admitting the accused’s statements, inferring operation of the vehicle, or concluding that the evidence did not prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt despite the expert report.

The court affirmed that a breathalyzer reading or expert opinion on blood alcohol concentration alone does not automatically establish impairment without considering the totality of the evidence.

The sentence of an $1,500 fine, 18‑month driving prohibition, and three years’ probation was found to be within the acceptable range.

Both the defence appeal and the Crown appeal were dismissed.

The accused brought a mid‑trial motion for a mistrial alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias arising from comments and findings made by the trial judge during a bail hearing conducted after the accused absconded during the trial.

The accused argued that the judge made adverse credibility findings and factual findings regarding emails sent to a witness in breach of bail conditions.

The court held that the comments made during the bail decision did not amount to credibility findings demonstrating bias and were based largely on accepting the accused’s own evidence.

The court further held that trial judges routinely make credibility determinations during interlocutory proceedings and that such findings do not require recusal.

Evidence and comments relating to the bail decision could not play any role in determining guilt at trial.

The motion for a mistrial based on reasonable apprehension of bias was therefore dismissed.

The Crown applied on a voir dire for a ruling that inculpatory statements made by the accused to two corporate investigators and a police officer were voluntary and admissible at trial for theft over $5,000.

The accused argued the statements were induced by promises that police would not be called if she confessed and that an oppressive atmosphere existed during questioning at her employer’s office.

The court applied the common law confessions rule and assessed whether threats, promises, inducements, oppression, lack of operating mind, or police trickery undermined voluntariness.

Rejecting the accused’s testimony as not credible, the court found no evidence of threats, inducements, or oppressive conditions.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements to both the employer representatives and the police officer were voluntary and admissible.

A youth was charged with robbery while using a firearm following a bank robbery on December 29, 2010.

The Crown's case rested primarily on fingerprint evidence found on the interior exit door of the bank and eyewitness testimony.

The accused was not the actual robber but the second youth who entered and exited the bank with the robber.

The court found serious deficiencies in the expert fingerprint evidence, including failure to provide a proper expert report, disclosure violations, documentary errors, and use of prints from a different arrest date without disclosure.

The court also found insufficient evidence of the use of a firearm and no evidence of the accused's knowledge or participation in the robbery beyond mere presence.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.