John A. McMunagle

The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal for refusing to provide a roadside breath sample under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge had found that the accused’s statement that he would not provide a sample without first speaking to a lawyer constituted an equivocal refusal and that the Crown failed to prove the required mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt.

On appeal, the court held that the trial judge correctly applied the governing law and properly assessed credibility under the framework in R. v. W.(D.).

The appellate court clarified that the decision did not create a precedent permitting suspects to consult counsel before providing a roadside sample, but rather turned on the specific factual finding that the accused’s response was ambiguous.

Finding no reversible error, the court declined to interfere with the acquittal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code and the sentence imposed following a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown cross‑appealed the acquittal on the related impaired driving charge under s. 253(1)(a), arguing the trial judge erred in failing to rely on uncontradicted expert toxicology evidence to infer impairment.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge committed no legal or factual error in admitting the accused’s statements, inferring operation of the vehicle, or concluding that the evidence did not prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt despite the expert report.

The court affirmed that a breathalyzer reading or expert opinion on blood alcohol concentration alone does not automatically establish impairment without considering the totality of the evidence.

The sentence of an $1,500 fine, 18‑month driving prohibition, and three years’ probation was found to be within the acceptable range.

Both the defence appeal and the Crown appeal were dismissed.

The defendant municipality moved for summary judgment dismissing a personal injury action arising from a winter slip-and-fall on a sidewalk, arguing the claim was statute-barred because the plaintiff failed to provide notice within the ten-day period required by s. 44(10) of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The plaintiff argued that the municipality suffered no prejudice because weather conditions changed shortly after the accident and any evidence of snow or ice would have dissipated even with timely notice.

The court considered the summary judgment framework under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the statutory saving provision in s. 44(12) permitting late notice where there is a reasonable excuse and no prejudice to the municipality.

The motion judge held that the issues of prejudice and reasonable excuse could not be determined on the motion record and required a trial.

Summary judgment was therefore refused and a trial ordered to determine whether the municipality was prejudiced and whether the mistaken belief about ownership of the sidewalk constituted a reasonable excuse for late notice.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on charges of impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

The trial judge had found that the Crown failed to prove the accused had care or control of an operable vehicle within the two-hour statutory presumption period under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Evidence showed the accused was seated in a damaged and potentially inoperable vehicle awaiting a tow truck after a collision, and the timing of the incident relative to the breath samples was uncertain.

The appeal court held that the trial judge correctly applied the law governing care or control and the statutory presumption, and that the factual findings regarding operability and timing were supported by the evidence.

The Crown therefore failed to establish any legal error or unreasonable verdict.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing a Charter application challenging the arresting officer’s reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and breath demand.

The appellant contended the officer improperly relied on an unidentified bystander’s identification and that evidence obtained after the arrest should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appeal court held that the officer’s subjective belief was objectively reasonable when considering the totality of the circumstances, including dispatch information, the accident scene, the bystander identification, and the appellant’s signs of impairment.

The court found no Charter breach and concluded the trial judge properly applied governing jurisprudence.

Alternatively, even if a breach existed, exclusion of the breath samples and statements would not have been justified under the Grant framework.

The children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a final order for Crown wardship of a newborn child.

The parents had a history of child protection involvement, with two previous children made Crown wards due to the father's untreated sexual offender history and both parents' substance abuse and neglect issues.

The court applied the summary judgment rules and found no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court concluded the child was in need of protection and that Crown wardship for the purpose of adoption was in the child's best interests.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood under s. 253(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal focused on whether the Crown proved that the first breath sample was taken within two hours of the accused operating a motor vehicle, permitting reliance on the evidentiary presumption in s. 258(1)(c).

The appellant argued the timing evidence was unreliable due to uncertainty in the officer’s timekeeping methods and discrepancies in the recording of events.

The court held that the trial judge reasonably relied on corroborated timing evidence, including synchronization of watches and consistent records of the breath technician call.

Applying the deferential appellate standard for unreasonable verdicts, the court found the conviction supported by the evidence and the reasons sufficient for appellate review.

The plaintiff brought a motion for default judgment after the defendant adventure park operator failed to defend a personal injury action arising from a zipline accident.

The court accepted the plaintiff’s allegations as proven and determined that Ontario had jurisdiction because the contract was formed in Ontario and the defendant’s business targeted Ontario residents through its internet advertising and operations.

The court found the defendant breached contractual representations regarding supervision, training, and safety equipment, and further held that the defendant’s conduct constituted negligence and gross negligence.

Liability waivers presented after the contract formation and not provided in the plaintiff’s language were held ineffective.

Default judgment was granted with damages for income loss and general damages for serious ankle injuries.

The applicant brought a motion to vary a prior order requiring him to pay $700 per month in spousal support following an 18‑year marriage.

After his employment ended and he entered retirement, his income dropped substantially and he began receiving a pension.

The court found a material change in circumstances under s. 17 of the Divorce Act and considered the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, noting that the applicant had already paid support for more than 18 years, which exceeded the guideline duration range for the length of the marriage.

The respondent sought continuation of support and effectively a retroactive variation but had previously failed to pursue her own variation application for many years.

The court held it would be unfair to allow a retroactive claim and found that both parties now had similar incomes, making ongoing support unnecessary.