Jason Pilon

The appellant appealed his conviction for careless driving under the Highway Traffic Act following a rear-end collision.

At trial, the appellant argued his actions amounted to mere momentary inattentiveness when he looked away from the road to read a sign.

The appeal court reviewed the trial justice's refusal to grant a mistrial over late disclosure, the application of the ordinary prudent driver standard, and the assessment of dash camera evidence.

Finding no errors in law, misapprehension of evidence, or miscarriage of justice, the court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant, N.S., appealed his conviction for sexually assaulting two complainants, C.C. and R.Z., raising multiple grounds of appeal.

These grounds included alleged errors by the trial judge in dismissing a directed verdict motion, admitting similar fact evidence, failing to consider innocent collusion, applying different standards of scrutiny, creating a reasonable apprehension of bias, improperly applying the R. v. W.(D.) test, and imposing an excessive sentence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the conviction and the 15-month incarceration sentence.

The appellants, two First Nation individuals with no prior criminal records, appealed their sentences for obstructing police.

They were found guilty after a multi-day trial for interfering with a search warrant at an unlicensed cannabis store on a reserve.

The sentencing judge imposed a 90-day conditional sentence followed by two years' probation, exceeding the Crown's recommendation of a suspended sentence with 12 months' probation and a fine/community service.

Co-accused with criminal records who pleaded guilty received suspended sentences.

The appeal court found that the sentencing judge erred by failing to provide cogent reasons for exceeding the Crown's position, misapplying the principles of parity, restraint, and the sentencing of Indigenous and first offenders, and over-emphasizing denunciation and deterrence without considering the potential of a suspended sentence to achieve these goals.

The appeal was granted, and a suspended sentence with a one-year period of probation was imposed.

The accused, Matthew Picanco, was sentenced for simple assault and assault causing bodily harm.

The court identified several aggravating circumstances, including the accused's underlying bias and racist attitudes towards the complainants (international students and persons of colour), his lack of remorse and insight into his offending conduct, and his failure to comply with pre-sentence report appointments.

The assault causing bodily harm resulted in a serious facial fracture.

The Crown sought a 14-18 month jail sentence, while the defence proposed a conditional or intermittent sentence.

The court imposed a global sentence of eight months in real jail, followed by two years of probation, a DNA order, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and non-contact orders with the victims.

The accused, Donald Waldorf, brought an application to strike his guilty plea to multiple criminal charges, including assault and forcible confinement.

The core issue was whether his plea was informed, specifically regarding the Crown's potential application for a Dangerous Offender or Long Term Offender (DO/LTO) designation, which was not clearly communicated to him or his counsel prior to the plea.

The court found that while the accused was single-minded in seeking early release and had cognitive deficits, his counsel was also unaware of the Crown's DO/LTO intention.

The court ruled that it is patently unfair for an accused to enter a plea without clear, unequivocal advance knowledge of potential indeterminate detention.

The application to strike the plea was granted, as the plea was not informed.

The Appellant, Jacques Dansereau, appealed his conviction for operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg, arguing a miscarriage of justice.

He contended that the trial judge accepted an uninformed guilty plea without a proper plea inquiry and sought to admit fresh evidence regarding his state of mind and lack of memory due to a head injury.

The court admitted the fresh evidence but dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's finding of guilt was based on the evidence presented during the trial, not an uninformed guilty plea.

The court concluded that the trial process was not "rife with errors" or "deeply flawed" to constitute a miscarriage of justice.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit twelve statements made by the accused, who was charged with first-degree murder.

The statements were categorized as 'background statements', 'interrogation statements', and 'implied confession' statements.

The court excluded the 'implied confession' and 'background' statements, finding their probative value was far outweighed by the extreme prejudice of introducing vague allegations of other homicides.

The court allowed edited segments of two 'interrogation statements' to be admitted, finding they retained their proper meaning and provided highly probative evidence regarding blood found in the accused's truck.

The Crown applied under s. 652 of the Criminal Code for an order directing the jury to view the scene where the victim's remains were found and two other nearby locations.

The accused is charged with first-degree murder.

The court applied the test from R. v. Johnson, requiring the applicant to establish a real and demonstrable advantage to the jury's understanding of the evidence.

The court found that the extensive photographic, video, and 3D model evidence available would sufficiently convey the topography, remoteness, and size of the culvert.

The application for a jury view was dismissed.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct towards a third party, arguing it demonstrated animosity towards mentally ill persons or those who upset him, which was relevant to motive in a circumstantial murder case.

The court dismissed the application, finding the proposed evidence lacked context, was not sufficiently cogent to establish a bona fide theory of motive, and its prejudicial impact far outweighed its probative value.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit hearsay statements made by deceased persons in a first-degree murder trial.

The central issue was the threshold reliability of the statements under the principled exception and the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.

The court considered the deceased victim's mental health history, specifically evidence of schizophrenia and paranoia, as a relevant factor in assessing whether statements were made under 'circumstances of suspicion'.

The court admitted one statement made by the victim to a friend, finding it materially corroborated, but excluded the remaining disputed statements due to insufficient threshold reliability.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion to exclude statements made to police under s 24(2) of the Charter, arguing they were tainted by a prior s 8 breach involving an invalid search of his residence.

The court found that statements made during police visits where search-related property was returned or discussed were causally and contextually linked to the prior breach.

The court rejected the Crown's request to merely edit the statements, ruling that the tainted statements must be excluded in their entirety to prevent the administration of justice from being brought into disrepute.

Statements made during visits unrelated to the seized property were not excluded.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion to exclude evidence obtained from a covert search of his residence authorized by a general warrant.

The police sought to find items linking the accused to the murder, including a composition book containing a map of alleged crime scenes.

The court found that the Information to Obtain (ITO) the general warrant lacked sufficient objective and subjective grounds, relying on stale-dated information and a conditional psychiatric opinion.

Consequently, the search violated the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that the serious nature of the Charter-infringing state conduct and the significant impact on the accused's privacy interests outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The evidence was excluded.

The defendant, Kaitlyn Gougoula, pleaded guilty to multiple charges including conspiracy to commit murder, attempt to render the victim insensible by choking, aggravated assault, forcible confinement, and breaches of probation under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The charges stemmed from a severe and prolonged torture of the victim, Shawn Theobald-Lewertoff, involving duct-taping, burning, cutting, stabbing with a dirty needle, and physical assault, motivated by an accusation of theft and being a police informant.

The court considered a joint sentencing submission of 71 months global sentence, minus time served, taking into account aggravating factors such as the defendant being on probation, drug use during the crime, victim vulnerability, and group mentality, balanced against mitigating factors like an early guilty plea, remorse, youth, and family support.

Kaitlyn Gougoula, facing serious charges including conspiracy to commit murder, aggravated assault, and confinement, applied for judicial interim release.

The Crown opposed her release on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found that despite a proposed plan of house arrest with her grandparents as sureties, Gougoula's history of impulsivity, severe drug addiction, escalating violence, and inability to be controlled by family indicated a substantial likelihood of re-offending and interfering with the administration of justice.

The extreme gravity and deliberate nature of the alleged torture, coupled with the strong Crown case and potential lengthy imprisonment, necessitated detention to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The application for judicial interim release was denied.

The accused, K.D.B., was charged with sexual assault, administration of a stupefying substance (lorazepam), and breaches of undertaking and firearm prohibition.

The Crown withdrew two firearm-related counts.

The complainant testified that the accused provided her with a pill for anxiety, after which she experienced severe heaviness and memory loss, waking up next to the accused with semen on her back.

The accused denied the allegations, presenting an alibi and challenging the complainant's credibility.

The court found the accused not credible due to inconsistencies, exaggerations, and failure to call corroborating witnesses.

The complainant was found credible and reliable, supported by expert toxicological evidence confirming lorazepam in her system consistent with her timeline and described effects.

The court concluded that the accused intentionally administered lorazepam to facilitate sexual assault.

K.D.B. was found guilty of sexual assault, administration of a stupefying drug, and breach of undertaking and firearm prohibition.

An appeal from a conviction under section 159(3) of the Highway Traffic Act for failing to move into another lane for an emergency vehicle if safe to do so.

The appellant argued that the offence could only be committed upon passing a stopped emergency vehicle, not upon approaching it.

The trial justice found the appellant guilty based on the interpretation that the obligation to move lanes is triggered "upon approaching" a stopped emergency vehicle.

The appeal court upheld the conviction, finding the statutory language clear and unambiguous.

The accused, James Norton, was charged with two counts of assault and one count of sexual assault.

The complainant, MP, alleged two physical assaults and one instance of non-consensual anal intercourse.

The defence denied the assaults and claimed the anal intercourse was consensual.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of MP's testimony, noting inconsistencies, disingenuous statements, and the influence of her sister-in-law, K, who fabricated evidence of injuries.

The court also considered the accused's character as a "Lothario" and his deceptive conduct in relationships.

Ultimately, the court found significant reservations regarding the veracity of MP's allegations and acquitted Mr. Norton of all charges, concluding that the evidence as a whole left reasonable doubt.

D.O. was convicted of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching involving a 12-year-old complainant.

The court considered sentencing principles, including denunciation, deterrence, proportionality, and the unique circumstances of an Indigenous offender under *Gladue*.

Aggravating factors included the victim's age, the offender's position of trust, and the significant impact on the victim.

Mitigating factors included the offender's positive pre-sentence report, strong family connections, and pro-social conduct while on release.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for child sexual abuse, ultimately imposing a six-year penitentiary sentence, along with ancillary orders.

The accused was charged with fraud, uttering forged documents, and falsifying employment records.

He brought an application under section 24(1) of the Charter seeking a stay of proceedings due to an infringement of his section 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the swearing of the information to the anticipated end of the trial was 45.5 months.

After deducting defence delay, the net delay was 38 months, which exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court found no exceptional circumstances or transitional exceptional circumstances to justify the delay.

The application was granted and a stay of proceedings was entered.

Sebastien Bouchard was found guilty of second-degree murder after a jury re-trial.

This ruling determined the period of parole ineligibility, which is a mandatory component of the life sentence.

The Crown sought 15 years, while the defence sought 10 years.

The court considered the character of the offender, the nature and circumstances of the offence, and jury recommendations, as mandated by section 745.4 of the Criminal Code.

The court also considered the impact of new evidence and the offender's rehabilitation efforts since the first trial.

Ultimately, the court maintained the previous determination of 15 years parole ineligibility, finding that the new facts were not sufficient to derogate from the original reasoning.