Ian Carter

Four appellants appealed their convictions, arguing that their Charter s. 11(b) rights to be tried within a reasonable time were violated due to unreasonable delay.

The application judges had dismissed their s. 11(b) applications, finding that despite delays exceeding the Jordan ceiling (18 months), the Crown had demonstrated the cases were complex and had a concrete plan to minimize delay.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judges' decisions, finding no reversible error in their assessment of the Crown's plan and the complexity of the cases.

The applicants, charged with aggravated assault, applied to sever their trial from a co-accused charged with second-degree murder on the same indictment.

They argued the charges did not arise from the same transaction and that a joint trial would cause prejudice.

The court dismissed the application, finding the events shared a factual, temporal, and legal connection under s. 589 of the Criminal Code.

The court also held that severance under s. 591(3) was not required in the interests of justice, as the evidence of the murder was highly relevant to the aggravated assault charges and the risk of prejudice was low.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit twelve statements made by the accused, who was charged with first-degree murder.

The statements were categorized as 'background statements', 'interrogation statements', and 'implied confession' statements.

The court excluded the 'implied confession' and 'background' statements, finding their probative value was far outweighed by the extreme prejudice of introducing vague allegations of other homicides.

The court allowed edited segments of two 'interrogation statements' to be admitted, finding they retained their proper meaning and provided highly probative evidence regarding blood found in the accused's truck.

The Crown applied under s. 652 of the Criminal Code for an order directing the jury to view the scene where the victim's remains were found and two other nearby locations.

The accused is charged with first-degree murder.

The court applied the test from R. v. Johnson, requiring the applicant to establish a real and demonstrable advantage to the jury's understanding of the evidence.

The court found that the extensive photographic, video, and 3D model evidence available would sufficiently convey the topography, remoteness, and size of the culvert.

The application for a jury view was dismissed.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct towards a third party, arguing it demonstrated animosity towards mentally ill persons or those who upset him, which was relevant to motive in a circumstantial murder case.

The court dismissed the application, finding the proposed evidence lacked context, was not sufficiently cogent to establish a bona fide theory of motive, and its prejudicial impact far outweighed its probative value.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit hearsay statements made by deceased persons in a first-degree murder trial.

The central issue was the threshold reliability of the statements under the principled exception and the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.

The court considered the deceased victim's mental health history, specifically evidence of schizophrenia and paranoia, as a relevant factor in assessing whether statements were made under 'circumstances of suspicion'.

The court admitted one statement made by the victim to a friend, finding it materially corroborated, but excluded the remaining disputed statements due to insufficient threshold reliability.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion to exclude statements made to police under s 24(2) of the Charter, arguing they were tainted by a prior s 8 breach involving an invalid search of his residence.

The court found that statements made during police visits where search-related property was returned or discussed were causally and contextually linked to the prior breach.

The court rejected the Crown's request to merely edit the statements, ruling that the tainted statements must be excluded in their entirety to prevent the administration of justice from being brought into disrepute.

Statements made during visits unrelated to the seized property were not excluded.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion to exclude evidence obtained from a covert search of his residence authorized by a general warrant.

The police sought to find items linking the accused to the murder, including a composition book containing a map of alleged crime scenes.

The court found that the Information to Obtain (ITO) the general warrant lacked sufficient objective and subjective grounds, relying on stale-dated information and a conditional psychiatric opinion.

Consequently, the search violated the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that the serious nature of the Charter-infringing state conduct and the significant impact on the accused's privacy interests outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The evidence was excluded.

The appellant was convicted of knowingly using forged documents, fraud, and conspiracy to commit fraud.

As executive director of a non-profit organization providing services to new immigrants, he orchestrated a large-scale, sophisticated fraudulent scheme against the federal government over several years, causing the organization to claim reimbursement for expenses that were not incurred or paid.

The fraud resulted in a surplus of approximately $2 to $2.5 million, led to the organization's bankruptcy, and caused approximately 150 employees to lose their jobs.

The trial judge imposed a two-year sentence.

The Crown appealed the sentence as demonstrably unfit, while the appellant appealed his conviction on grounds of Crown disclosure breaches and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant appealed his convictions for repeatedly communicating by way of telecommunication with intent to harass contrary to section 372(4) of the Criminal Code, breach of recognizance, and breach of probation.

The sole issue on appeal was identification: whether the appellant was the person who met the complainant at a bar and subsequently sent her harassing messages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that the trial judge properly analyzed the identification evidence as recognition evidence based on the complainant's prior acquaintance with the appellant during several hours of close contact on the night in question.

The appellant was convicted of voyeurism after a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown's case was that during a camping trip, the appellant used his cellphone to record the complainant changing into her bathing suit.

The appellant denied intentionally recording.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's reasoning regarding the intentional nature of the recording, arguing the trial judge engaged in speculation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error.

The trial judge had made clear findings that the appellant's conduct—including plugging in the phone as a pretext, positioning it to record, and the series of steps required to activate the video function—demonstrated intentional conduct beyond a reasonable doubt.

Crown appeal from a successful defence summary conviction appeal.

The respondent was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge convicted the respondent based on circumstantial evidence including observations of impairment, prescription pill bottles found in the vehicle, and the effects of the drugs matching the respondent's behaviour.

The summary conviction appeal court set aside the conviction and entered an acquittal, finding insufficient evidence that the pill bottles contained the drugs on their labels or that those drugs were in the respondent's system.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding the summary conviction appeal court erred in applying an incorrect standard of review and substituting its opinion for that of the trial judge.

The conviction was restored.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault entered by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant had bitten off the complainant's ear during an altercation at the complainant's residence.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge failed to resolve material inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence regarding the description of the attack and his drinking habits; and second, that the trial judge impermissibly speculated about the cause of the injury without expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed the complainant's credibility, that any inconsistencies were minor and did not undermine the core allegations, and that the trial judge did not speculate but rather accepted the complainant's uncontradicted testimony.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and failing to remain at the scene of an accident arising from a carjacking on May 24, 2016 in Ottawa.

The case turned on identity.

The victim testified that the appellant was not the man who attacked him, providing confused and unconvincing evidence about a prior high school connection and a bar encounter.

The trial judge rejected the victim's testimony as unreliable and hazy, and instead relied on video evidence, testimony from the Brown brothers, and DNA evidence to find the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's findings and that the verdict was amply supported by the evidentiary record.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay charges of assault causing bodily harm against the respondent due to unconstitutional delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge had attributed a six-month delay to the Crown for failing to disclose the child's neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) medical records.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the NICU records were third-party documents held by the hospital, not first-party Crown disclosure, and the delay in requesting them was attributable to the defence.

Alternatively, the court found that the trial judge erred in applying the transitional exception by failing to properly weigh the seriousness of the offence and the moderate complexity of the case.

The stay was lifted and the matter remitted for trial.

The accused, Marc Leduc, pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault, attempted choking to overcome resistance, break and enter, and breach of probation against Rita Denobriga.

The offences, which occurred in Ms. Denobriga's apartment, involved premeditation, the use of a knife, prolonged violence, and a life-threatening chokehold, causing severe physical and emotional trauma to the victim.

The court considered Leduc's extensive criminal record, including two prior first-degree murder convictions (under appeal), and his lack of remorse or psychiatric explanation.

Emphasizing protection of society, denunciation, and deterrence, the court concluded that Leduc posed an ongoing danger.

A life sentence was imposed for the aggravated sexual assault and attempted choking, with concurrent sentences for the other offences, and parole ineligibility set at 10 years.

The accused was charged with sexual assault.

The Crown alleged the complainant did not consent to sexual activity due to intoxication.

The complainant had no memory of the events due to alcohol consumption.

The accused testified he obtained consent before engaging in sexual activity.

The court applied the WD analysis and considered whether the Crown proved the absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found the accused's evidence credible and reliable, and that it raised a reasonable doubt regarding consent.

The court acquitted the accused.

The offender was convicted of attempted murder, aggravated sexual assault, and administering a noxious thing after intentionally attempting to infect multiple sexual partners with HIV.

The court found that the offender acted deliberately and maliciously, lying about his HIV status and seeking out vulnerable young men.

The court sentenced the offender to a global sentence of 14 years imprisonment, reduced by pre-sentence custody.

The court also designated the offender as a long-term offender and imposed a 5-year supervision order, finding a substantial risk of reoffending based on his pattern of reckless and predatory conduct.

In a terrorism prosecution, the applicants sought further disclosure from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service relating to payments made to a human source relied upon in a CSIS affidavit supporting investigative warrants under the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.

The court held that records detailing remuneration and reimbursements paid to the source were likely relevant to a pending Garofoli voir dire because financial incentives may affect credibility and the affiant’s assessment of reliability.

Production of records relating to payments to the source was therefore ordered.

However, the request for disclosure of any CSIS reliability assessments concerning a target of the investigation was refused, as the target was not a traditional informant whose reliability required evaluation.

The applicants brought a motion to reconsider a previous decision denying production of CSIS source documents and sought leave to cross-examine the CSIS affiant on a Garofoli voir dire.

The court found that newly disclosed information revealed an apparent contradiction in the CSIS affidavit regarding whether a target was actively seeking a gun.

This contradiction met the threshold to show the affiant may have failed to make full, frank, and fair disclosure.

The court ordered the CSIS source documents to be produced for judicial review to determine their relevance to the Garofoli application.