Davin Michael Garg

The appellant, Daniel Wright, appealed a three-and-a-half-year custodial sentence for sexual exploitation of his stepdaughter, committed between 1988 and 1990.

He argued the sentence was excessive, the judge erred in applying contemporary sentencing principles to a historical offence, and sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding a risk assessment and prior willingness to take responsibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or palpable and overriding error of fact, and that the sentence was fit.

The court also denied the fresh evidence application, concluding it would not have affected the outcome, and declined jurisdiction over the SOIRA order given the sentence was not reduced.

The Crown appealed a decision by the Summary Conviction Appeal Court (SCAC) that had allowed the respondent's appeal of his "over 80" and impaired driving convictions, ordering a new trial and excluding breathalyzer results.

The SCAC found errors in the trial judge's s. 10(b) Charter compliance findings and the adequacy of reasons for the impaired driving conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding no s. 10(b) breach by the police and that the trial judge's reasons were adequate.

The "over 80" conviction was restored, and the stay on the impaired driving charge was maintained.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired driving causing death, arguing Charter violations (s. 8 and s. 10(b)) related to police conduct at the hospital, which he claimed necessitated the exclusion of blood alcohol concentration (BAC) results under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the police smelling the appellant's breath in the emergency room did not constitute a s. 8 Charter breach, nor was the appellant detained for s. 10(b) purposes.

The court held that the BAC results were properly admitted as they were obtained via valid warrants based on untainted information.

The applicant, convicted of sexual exploitation and sentenced to 3.5 years, sought bail pending sentence appeal, leave to appeal sentence, and a stay of the SOIRA order.

The court dismissed the bail application, finding the appeal lacked sufficient merit to cause unnecessary hardship if detained.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted as it was not opposed and not frivolous.

The application for a stay of the SOIRA order was adjourned to the panel hearing the sentence appeal, as the jurisdiction of a single judge to grant such a stay was an open question.

Robert Vanier, former CEO of Onco Petroleum Inc., appealed his conviction for publishing a false prospectus under s. 400 of the Criminal Code, for which he received an 8-year sentence.

The false prospectus misrepresented the company's liquid funds.

Vanier, self-represented at trial, raised several grounds of appeal, including trial unfairness (denial of a Rowbotham application, inadequate preparation assistance, language issues, and evidence presentation), errors in jury instructions (distinction between motive and intent, witness credibility), and the admissibility of evidence found on an abandoned hard drive (Charter s. 8).

He also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge relied on unproven aggravating factors and failed to deduct pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no errors by the trial judge regarding trial fairness, jury instructions, or the s. 8 Charter analysis.

The court also found no error in the sentence, affirming that the trial judge's assessment of aggravating factors was appropriate and that pre-sentence custody deductions were not warranted as Vanier was incarcerated for a separate conviction.

Robert Vanier was convicted of two counts of perjury for making false statements under oath in Personal Information Forms (PIFs) submitted to the TSX and CNQ exchanges.

He appealed, arguing that s. 131 of the Criminal Code did not apply because the statements were not "permitted, authorized, or required by law" to be made under oath, and that he should have been charged under s. 134.

He also claimed a violation of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the statements were indeed permitted by law as they stemmed from the Securities Act and the exchanges' regulatory powers, and that there was no unreasonable delay.

L'appelant a été reconnu coupable d'agression sexuelle.

Il a interjeté appel, alléguant que le juge de première instance avait erré dans l'évaluation de la crédibilité et de la fiabilité des témoins, et que les motifs étaient insuffisants.

La Cour d'appel a confirmé les conclusions du juge de première instance, soulignant le degré élevé de déférence accordé aux évaluations de crédibilité et ne trouvant aucune erreur significative dans le raisonnement ou la suffisance des motifs du juge.

L'appel a été rejeté.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for impaired driving and driving with excessive blood alcohol after police conducted a random sobriety stop on private property.

The officers had formed the intention to stop the respondent while he was on the highway under s. 48(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, but only effected the stop after he had pulled onto a private driveway.

The Supreme Court held that s. 48(1) did not authorize random sobriety stops on private property, as the respondent was no longer a 'driver' within the HTA's definition when stopped, and the police breached his s. 9 Charter rights.

However, applying the Grant framework, the Court declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2), finding that the legal uncertainty at the time rendered the breach not egregious, and the reliable and crucial nature of the evidence combined with the serious public interest in combatting impaired driving outweighed the first two lines of inquiry.

The appellant was convicted of impaired operation of a vessel causing death and criminal negligence causing death after an incident where an eight-year-old boy drowned when their canoe capsized in dangerous river conditions.

The appellant appealed the convictions and sentence, arguing that a canoe is not a "vessel" under the Criminal Code, his s. 10(b) right to counsel was infringed, and expert evidence was required for the criminal negligence conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a canoe is a vessel, the s. 10(b) right to counsel was permissibly suspended for the Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand even in a hospital setting, and expert evidence was not necessary for criminal negligence given the obvious risks.

The six-year sentence was also upheld as fit.

The accused, Hussein Assaad and Jason Ishraki, brought an application under Section 11(b) of the Charter for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay for Assaad was over 26 months and for Ishraki over 30 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued complexity and the COVID-19 pandemic as exceptional circumstances.

The court found that while the case had some hallmarks of complexity, the primary cause of delay was the Crown and police's chosen method of disclosure triage, not inherent complexity.

The court also found the pandemic did not justify the extent of the delay.

The proceedings against both accused were stayed.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal from a conviction for sexual assault.

The Crown opposed, arguing the applicant failed to satisfy the public interest criterion of the R. v. Oland test, citing the seriousness of the offense, the applicant's criminal record including prior breaches of release conditions, and the perceived weakness of the appeal grounds.

The court granted bail, finding the proposed appeal grounds were not frivolous and that the time already served by the applicant was relevant to public confidence.

The court balanced the enforceability of the judgment against its revisability, concluding that the latter outweighed in this instance.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of criminal negligence causing bodily harm, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, impaired driving causing bodily harm, and causing bodily harm while being over 80.

The respondent had collided with an oncoming vehicle on Lakeshore Boulevard in Toronto, causing serious injuries to three occupants.

The Crown's case was hampered by the unavailability of blood alcohol evidence due to continuity concerns and a malfunctioning breathalyzer.

The only evidence of alcohol consumption was the respondent's own statement to paramedics that she had consumed two glasses of wine.

The trial judge acquitted on all counts.

The Crown appealed, arguing the trial judge failed to consider all evidence regarding impairment and whether the driving constituted a marked departure.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons demonstrated thorough consideration of all evidence and that the Crown had failed to prove a marked departure beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered on September 4, 2013 by Justice James Ramsay of the Superior Court of Justice.

The appellant took no steps to advance the appeal for several years and could not be located despite efforts by the RCMP.

The Crown sought dismissal of the appeal as abandoned.

The Court of Appeal granted the Crown's request and dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal but proceeded with a sentence appeal.

The Crown conceded that a Gladue report, which was not considered at the original sentencing, should be accepted as fresh evidence on appeal.

The Court of Appeal accepted the Crown's concession and varied the sentence to a global sentence of 7 years less pre-trial custody of 2.5 months.

The Court imposed 6 years for robbery and 1 year concurrent for counts 5 and 6, consecutive to the robbery count, with pre-trial custody applied to reduce the 1-year sentence to a net of 9.5 months.

The Court rejected submissions for a 6-year global sentence and denied credit for house arrest due to bail breaches and absconding.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal and proceeded only with a sentence appeal.

The appellate court found that the trial judge had been misinformed regarding the amount of pre-sentence custody credit available, resulting in an understatement of credit by two months.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, and the pre-sentence custody credit was adjusted from the original calculation to 27.5 months against a three-year sentence, resulting in a net sentence of 8.5 months.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of Diane Werendowicz, who was sexually assaulted and strangled in 1981.

The appellant's DNA matched semen found on the victim.

The case proceeded through four trials: the first resulted in conviction (later overturned on appeal), the second and third ended in hung juries, and the fourth resulted in conviction.

The Crown's key evidence included a 911 call traced to a phone booth near the appellant's workplace, voice identification evidence, and DNA evidence.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on the call tracing evidence, voice identification evidence, and other matters.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate and fair.

The appellant was convicted of knowingly using forged documents, fraud, and conspiracy to commit fraud.

As executive director of a non-profit organization providing services to new immigrants, he orchestrated a large-scale, sophisticated fraudulent scheme against the federal government over several years, causing the organization to claim reimbursement for expenses that were not incurred or paid.

The fraud resulted in a surplus of approximately $2 to $2.5 million, led to the organization's bankruptcy, and caused approximately 150 employees to lose their jobs.

The trial judge imposed a two-year sentence.

The Crown appealed the sentence as demonstrably unfit, while the appellant appealed his conviction on grounds of Crown disclosure breaches and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant was convicted by jury of second degree murder in the death of Orin Felix and attempted murder of Trevor Hunter following an altercation between two groups outside a bar.

The appellant appeals on grounds relating to the trial judge's jury instructions on post-offence conduct evidence and a corrective instruction regarding the appellant's testimony about a witness named Latoya Dejonge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's handling of the post-offence conduct evidence or the corrective instruction, and concluding that the trial remained fair despite some unfortunate judicial decisions.

The appellant, a professional truck driver, was convicted of dangerous driving after his dump truck collided with the Burlington Skyway Bridge on the Queen Elizabeth Highway.

The collision occurred when the trailer box rose higher than the bridge's clearance because the Power Take-off (PTO) system was left engaged.

The appellant was detained in a police cruiser for approximately 2.5 hours at the accident scene, during which police detected the smell of alcohol on his breath.

The appellant challenged the admissibility of evidence relating to the alcohol detection, arguing the detention was arbitrary and his Charter rights were violated.

The trial judge excluded breath sample evidence but admitted the evidence of the smell of alcohol.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving and sentenced to one year in custody.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld both the conviction and sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the sentence imposed.

The appellant argued that the guilty verdict was unreasonable, that the photographic identification procedure was flawed, that the DNA evidence was weak and that the trial judge misunderstood its limitations, and that it was unreasonable for the judge to conclude that the appellant's two-hour flight from police could not be explained by a license plate issue or traffic violation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly considered the identification issues, correctly understood the limitations of DNA evidence, and reasonably concluded there was no plausible alternative to the appellant's guilt based on the totality of the evidence.