Taufiq Hashmani

The appellant, Haleigh Hutchinson, appealed the length of a 10-year driving prohibition imposed after pleading guilty to dangerous driving causing death.

The collision occurred when the appellant was driving significantly over the speed limit, resulting in the victim's death.

The sentencing judge imposed a conditional sentence, a probation order, and a 10-year driving prohibition.

The appellant argued the judge erred in principle by relying on a benchmark case (R. v. Frickey) and by failing to consider a pre-sentence license suspension.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle.

The court affirmed that deterrence and denunciation are paramount sentencing objectives in dangerous driving cases and that the sentencing judge appropriately considered the overall sentence.

The court found the distinctions from Frickey were not material enough to warrant a shorter prohibition and that the judge's discretion regarding credit for the pre-sentence suspension was not erred.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired driving causing death, arguing Charter violations (s. 8 and s. 10(b)) related to police conduct at the hospital, which he claimed necessitated the exclusion of blood alcohol concentration (BAC) results under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the police smelling the appellant's breath in the emergency room did not constitute a s. 8 Charter breach, nor was the appellant detained for s. 10(b) purposes.

The court held that the BAC results were properly admitted as they were obtained via valid warrants based on untainted information.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms and drug offences, and the sentence imposed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's inference that the appellant knew about the hidden firearm.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by concluding that a conditional sentence was outside the range for firearms offences.

Considering the appellant's significant rehabilitative progress and personal circumstances, the Court varied the sentence for the firearms charge to a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by two years of probation, while maintaining the time served sentence for the drug charges.

The appellant, Justin Longshaw, appealed his convictions for threatening, weapon possession, obstructing a peace officer, and probation breach, stemming from an incident at a bar where identification was the key issue.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of eyewitness identification evidence, particularly the continuous observation by one witness, and her conclusion that providing a false name constituted obstruction.

The sentence appeal was contingent and thus also dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Justice that had dismissed an application for certiorari.

The appellant sought certiorari to quash a provincial court judge's decision to commit him to trial on a charge of first-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the application judge that there was a sufficient basis in the evidence for a properly instructed jury to convict on the charge.

The accused, a young man with no prior criminal record, was found guilty of possession of a prohibited firearm (a sawed-off semi-automatic rifle) with readily accessible ammunition, and possession of cocaine and marijuana.

The firearm and drugs were found hidden in his bedroom during a police search.

The court considered the sentencing principles, including the paramountcy of denunciation and general deterrence for serious firearm offences, while also giving significant weight to the accused's youth, disadvantaged background, and rehabilitative potential.

The court applied Gladue principles by analogy, acknowledging the impact of systemic racism on the accused's life.

A total sentence of 27 months imprisonment was imposed (24 months for the firearm offence, 3 months consecutive for cocaine possession, and 3 months concurrent for marijuana possession), reduced to an effective 18 months after 9 months credit for stringent pre-trial house arrest.

Ancillary orders included a 10-year/life weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug possession, raising various Charter issues regarding the lawfulness of the initial traffic stop, the search incident to arrest, and questioning after invocation of the right to counsel.

The trial judge rejected all Charter arguments.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the initial stop was lawful based on reasonable grounds, the search was a lawful incident of arrest and not unduly intrusive, and while the questioning after invocation of the right to counsel may have constituted a breach of s. 10(b), any such breach would not have resulted in exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

The applicant, Katrina Vanderwyk, sought an order of certiorari to quash her committal to stand trial on a count of attempted murder following a preliminary inquiry.

The application argued that the preliminary inquiry justice erred by committing her in the absence of any evidence on an essential element of the offence, specifically regarding her intent to aid an attempted murder.

The court, applying the "scintilla of evidence" standard for jurisdictional review, found that despite competing inferences and a minor error in considering certain evidence, there remained a sufficient evidentiary basis for a properly instructed jury to infer the requisite elements of attempted murder.

Consequently, the application was dismissed, upholding the committal.

The respondent, Jah-Kiyo Desmond-Robinson, brought a Garofoli application challenging the legality of a search warrant under section 8 of the Charter and seeking to exclude evidence (a firearm, ammunition, and drugs) under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defence argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant, which relied heavily on two confidential informants (CIs), was deficient.

The court considered the un-redacted ITO and a judicial summary, and allowed limited cross-examination of the affiant.

Applying the Debot "3Cs" criteria (compelling, credible, and confirmed), the court found that the CI information provided a reasonable basis for the authorizing justice to issue the warrant.

Consequently, the search was deemed lawful, and no section 8 Charter violation occurred.

In the alternative, had there been a breach, the court determined the evidence would still be admissible under section 24(2) due to the good faith of the police, the high reliability of the evidence, and society's strong interest in prosecuting serious offences involving illegal firearms and drugs.

The accused was charged with possession of a prohibited firearm, ammunition, cocaine, and marijuana following a search of his bedroom.

He admitted possession of the drugs and some ammunition but denied knowledge of a sawed-off rifle found in a knapsack in his closet.

The court rejected the accused's testimony, finding it riddled with coincidences and contradicted by his mother's evidence.

Applying the test for constructive possession and circumstantial evidence, the court concluded the only reasonable inference was that the accused knew about the valuable firearm hidden in his closet.

The accused was convicted on all counts.

The accused were charged with multiple offences arising from an armed robbery of a jewellery store.

One accused pled guilty to several charges but contested the charge of attempted murder, while the other accused contested all charges based on identity.

The court found the circumstantial evidence, including cell tower data and intercepted communications, insufficient to prove the identity of the second robber beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also acquitted the first accused of attempted murder, finding she lacked subjective awareness of any intent to kill by her co-perpetrator.

Both accused were acquitted of the contested charges.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against the disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated October 31, 2016.

The appeal was dismissed.

An addendum was issued after the reasons were prepared and signed, noting that counsel for the appellant subsequently provided the reasons for a ruling of July 31, 2014, which stayed the criminal harassment charge.

The trial judge's reasons, which detailed the evidence including the effect on the victim and the appellant's assessment under the Mental Health Act, were acknowledged by counsel to undermine many of the arguments made during the appeal, though the court found these reasons did not change the basis for dismissing the appeal.

An appeal against an Ontario Review Board disposition denying expanded privileges and absolute discharge for an individual found not criminally responsible on a charge of criminal harassment.

The appellant argued the Board failed to conduct a separate and specific analysis of whether his conduct would constitute a serious criminal offence with real risk of physical or psychological harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's reasons demonstrated proper consideration of the seriousness of the offence and the risk to the community.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings of guilt for two counts of assault and two counts of assault with a weapon arising from a domestic relationship, as well as the sentence imposed.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider consent and self-defence, misapprehended evidence, and provided legally insufficient reasons.

The court held that neither consent nor self-defence were live issues at trial, the alleged misapprehension did not constitute reversible error, and the reasons satisfied the functional requirements for appellate review.

However, the Crown conceded that the sentencing judge should have apportioned pre-sentence custody across the convictions.

The court dismissed the conviction appeal but allowed the sentence appeal in part to apportion pre-sentence custody equally among the assault convictions.