Peter N. Fraser

The defendant, Roberto Suarez Flores, was charged with four counts of assault involving his estranged wife and their two sons.

The court assessed the credibility of all witnesses, noting the particular considerations for young witnesses.

While the court found reasonable doubt regarding the assault charge involving the wife due to conflicting accounts and a potentially coercive message from the wife's nephew, it found the defendant guilty of the three assault charges involving his sons.

These included assaults with a snow brush, a speaker wire, and a haircut tool, with the court accepting the sons' consistent and credible testimony despite minor inconsistencies.

Jahmal Graham was convicted after a jury trial for possession of a prohibited firearm with readily accessible ammunition, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

He was also convicted at a judge-alone trial for breach of probation and two firearms prohibition orders.

The court considered aggravating factors, including Graham's recidivism for firearms and drug offences, the public nature of the firearms possession, and the quantity of cocaine.

Mitigating factors included strong family support, some education, spiritual interests, and challenges in his upbringing.

The court rejected claims of historical sexual abuse and anti-black racism as mitigating factors due to lack of proof and found Graham lacked present rehabilitative potential.

The court determined Graham was the principal in possession of the unlawful items.

A total sentence of 10 years imprisonment was imposed, after applying the totality principle and credit for pre-trial custody and lockdown conditions.

Ancillary orders for a lifetime firearms prohibition, DNA order, and forfeiture of seized property were also granted.

The appellant appealed his convictions for failing to provide the necessaries of life to his blind and cognitively impaired mother and sister, resulting in their deaths from starvation and septic shock respectively.

The appellant also appealed his sentence of 18 years (8 years consecutive for criminal negligence in his sister's death and 10 years for manslaughter in his mother's death).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal but allowed the sentence appeal.

The court found that while the verdicts were inconsistent (acquittal on manslaughter but conviction on criminal negligence for the sister's death), the criminal negligence conviction was reasonable and supported by evidence, whereas the manslaughter acquittal arose from a manifest legal error.

The court admitted fresh evidence regarding the appellant's cognitive limitations on the sentencing issue and reduced the global sentence to 14 years, minus presentence custody credit of 1,405 days, resulting in a net sentence of 10 years and 2 months.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for uttering threats to cause death or bodily harm, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition continuing his detention at a forensic mental health facility.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge, arguing there was no evidence he posed a significant threat to public safety, the Board's reasons were insufficient, and his lack of incident while off medication for over a year demonstrated reduced risk.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's reliance on psychiatric evidence of continued mental illness symptoms and escalating risk assessment was reasonable and supported by evidence.

The appellants were convicted by jury of aggravated assault following an attack on a victim in a parking lot in Barrie.

Both appellants conceded presence at the scene but disputed participation in the assault.

The appellants appealed on multiple grounds relating to jury instructions, including eyewitness identification evidence, aiding and abetting liability, jury questions, the definition of bodily harm, and self-defence.

The Court of Appeal found multiple errors in the trial judge's instructions, particularly regarding the inadequacy of the eyewitness identification caution given the specific frailties in the evidence, insufficient guidance on aiding and abetting, discouragement of jury questions, failure to define bodily harm, and reversal of the burden of proof on self-defence.

The court allowed the appeals and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of William Mason.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the testimony of the appellant's co-accused, Jason Lusted, who pleaded guilty to accessory after the fact and became the main Crown witness.

The Crown also led circumstantial evidence including phone records, fire marshal testimony, and evidence from Edmund Huard regarding a plot to kill Lusted.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: errors regarding phone records, withdrawal of fire marshal evidence, and admission of Huard's evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that Huard's evidence was inadmissible as it lacked probative value and required circular reasoning.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sexual assault conviction from the Summary Convictions Appeal Court.

He raised four issues: (1) admission of fresh expert evidence regarding the complainant's medical condition; (2) admission of the complainant's undisclosed criminal record; (3) admissibility of the complainant's videotaped hearsay statement under the Khelawon framework; and (4) whether a Charter s. 11(b) delay violation occurred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the lower courts' decisions and holding that the Jordan framework did not apply retroactively to trials completed before its release.

The appellant appealed her conviction for arson and her sentence.

On the conviction appeal, the sole issue was ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The appellant alleged that she did not receive Crown disclosure, that her lawyer did not communicate with her, did not advance her defence, and promised acquittal.

The Court of Appeal found that the record did not support these assertions and, in some instances, directly contradicted them.

The appellant had received electronic versions of transcripts and voice recordings, and there was voluminous communication between the appellant and counsel regarding trial strategy and witnesses.

Counsel had clearly advanced the defence that the appellant wished to advance: that she had not set the fires and that her admissions in recorded conversations were play-acting.

The Court found no deficiency in trial counsel's representation and no miscarriage of justice.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

Leave to appeal the sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the Court finding no basis to interfere with the restitution order.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred in refusing to admit fresh evidence after his guilty plea that would allegedly establish he was not the driver of the vehicle involved in the June 15, 2012 accident, and in refusing to permit him to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to provide affidavits from potential alibi witnesses and that his guilty plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and informed based on the trial judge's careful inquiry under section 606 of the Criminal Code.

An appeal against an Ontario Review Board disposition denying expanded privileges and absolute discharge for an individual found not criminally responsible on a charge of criminal harassment.

The appellant argued the Board failed to conduct a separate and specific analysis of whether his conduct would constitute a serious criminal offence with real risk of physical or psychological harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's reasons demonstrated proper consideration of the seriousness of the offence and the risk to the community.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against the disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated October 31, 2016.

The appeal was dismissed.

An addendum was issued after the reasons were prepared and signed, noting that counsel for the appellant subsequently provided the reasons for a ruling of July 31, 2014, which stayed the criminal harassment charge.

The trial judge's reasons, which detailed the evidence including the effect on the victim and the appellant's assessment under the Mental Health Act, were acknowledged by counsel to undermine many of the arguments made during the appeal, though the court found these reasons did not change the basis for dismissing the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of robbery with a firearm and related offences following a jury trial and sentenced to five years' imprisonment.

The sole issue at trial was identification.

The appellant appealed from conviction and requested leave to appeal sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge's charge on eyewitness identification evidence was adequate given the strength of the circumstantial evidence, and that the trial judge had vetted the charge with counsel.

The court also found that photo line-up evidence had no probative value as witnesses could not identify the fleeing passenger, and that the surveillance video instruction was adequate.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed, as the trial judge had imposed the minimum sentence for very serious offences and had not disregarded pre-sentence custody or house arrest bail.

The appellant was convicted of five counts of robbery with a firearm and five counts of theft over $5,000 following a trial by judge alone.

Following conviction, the defence advanced a not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCR) plea.

Two forensic psychiatrists testified with conflicting opinions on whether the appellant knew his actions were morally wrong at the time of the offences, with their opinions based on the appellant's self-reports during interviews.

The trial judge assigned no weight to the experts' opinions because they were based on hearsay statements and the appellant had not testified.

The trial judge dismissed the NCR application.

Subsequently, defence counsel informed the trial judge that counsel had agreed before the hearing that the appellant's self-reports could be relied upon for their truth without the appellant testifying.

The trial judge declined to reopen, holding she lacked jurisdiction to do so after rendering a verdict.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in concluding she had no jurisdiction to reopen and erred in failing to engage in proper analysis of the conflicting expert evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for multiple sexual offences against his step-sister, who was significantly younger.

The trial judge found the appellant had been in a position of trust and had exploited the complainant's vulnerability.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: (1) apprehension of bias based on the trial judge's interventions during trial, and (2) misapprehension of evidence.

The Court of Appeal rejected both grounds, finding the trial judge's interventions were appropriate and did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, and that there was no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings of fact.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal the dismissal of his Summary Conviction Appeal by Justice Ferguson, which upheld the conviction and sentence imposed by Justice Armstrong at trial.

The primary issue concerned whether the trial judge was obliged to demonstrate an appreciation of the potential impact of interpreter use on credibility assessment.

The Court of Appeal held that while trial judges must bear in mind the effect of testifying through an interpreter on credibility assessment, no specific formulation is required and the approach depends on the circumstances of each case.

The court found no evidence in the trial record that the trial judge failed to account for the appellant's use of an interpreter.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The accused was charged with robbery, threatening damage to property, threatening death, and breaching probation and recognizance.

The Crown's case rested primarily on eyewitness identification by the robbery victim.

The defence challenged the reliability of the identification evidence, citing discrepancies in the victim's descriptions and procedural flaws in the photo lineup.

The court found the victim's identification credible and reliable, supported by circumstantial evidence including the accused's residence near the robbery scene and his arrest with the co-accused.

The court rejected the co-accused's testimony that a third party was the actual accomplice, finding it self-serving and unworthy of credit.

The accused was convicted on all counts.

The accused was charged with eight counts of fraud and forgery related to the fraudulent sale of Records of Employment (R.O.E.s).

The Crown alleged the accused played a significant role in a scheme whereby fraudulent R.O.E.s were sold for approximately $3,000 each, which were then submitted to Service Canada to obtain Employment Insurance benefits to which the purchasers were not entitled.

The trial involved testimony from witnesses involved in the scheme, accountants, and investigators.

The court found the accused guilty of two counts related to the sale of a fraudulent R.O.E. to Kunaseelan Kandasamy and acquitted him on the remaining counts due to evidentiary issues, including the inadmissibility of hearsay statements and insufficient corroboration.

Following a conviction for assault causing bodily harm after a judge-alone trial, the accused brought a motion to re-open the trial on the grounds that trial fairness required such an exceptional remedy.

The accused had been self-represented for most of the trial after discharging his initial counsel.

Post-conviction, police occurrence reports were disclosed revealing the complainant's ex-partner's history of domestic violence.

The accused sought to testify and raise a self-defence claim.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the decision not to testify and the scope of cross-examination reflected deliberate tactical choices made with competent counsel, and that the new evidence was not relevant to the trial strategy actually employed.