Daniel F. Moore

Rossana Lim and her daughter Shannon Lim brought an application for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a breach of section 11(b) (right to trial within a reasonable time).

The accused were charged with fraud-related offences and faced a trial date set for January 8, 2018, approximately 43 months and 9 days after the initial charge.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the delay exceeded the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 18 months, it was justified by defence delay, case complexity, and the transitional exceptional circumstance of good faith plea negotiations conducted under the pre-Jordan legal framework.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against the disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated October 31, 2016.

The appeal was dismissed.

An addendum was issued after the reasons were prepared and signed, noting that counsel for the appellant subsequently provided the reasons for a ruling of July 31, 2014, which stayed the criminal harassment charge.

The trial judge's reasons, which detailed the evidence including the effect on the victim and the appellant's assessment under the Mental Health Act, were acknowledged by counsel to undermine many of the arguments made during the appeal, though the court found these reasons did not change the basis for dismissing the appeal.

An appeal against an Ontario Review Board disposition denying expanded privileges and absolute discharge for an individual found not criminally responsible on a charge of criminal harassment.

The appellant argued the Board failed to conduct a separate and specific analysis of whether his conduct would constitute a serious criminal offence with real risk of physical or psychological harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's reasons demonstrated proper consideration of the seriousness of the offence and the risk to the community.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition maintaining a detention order.

The appellant argued the Board erred in concluding she continued to pose a significant threat to public safety and that detention remained the least restrictive measure.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding the expert evidence established the appellant suffered from schizophrenia with persistent delusional beliefs related to the index offense (assault of her mother), lacked insight into her condition, and would discontinue treatment if discharged.

Although the appellant had been placed in supervised community accommodation since the appeal was filed, the court found this did not undermine the Board's conclusion that conditional discharge would be inadequate to manage the risk.

The detention order was necessary to enable the hospital to approve and supervise the appellant's community placement.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired driving arising from a collision with a parked vehicle while operating a golf cart at a private campground.

The appellant argued that the trial judge improperly inferred that the alleged post‑accident alcohol consumption could not explain the level of intoxication observed by police without expert evidence, applied a stricter credibility standard to defence witnesses, failed to provide adequate reasons for accepting civilian witness testimony, and misapplied the W.D. credibility framework.

The court held that the trial judge was entitled to rely on judicial notice and supporting expert evidence regarding the relationship between rising blood alcohol concentration and increasing impairment.

The court further held that the credibility findings and evaluation of witness testimony were reasonable and entitled to deference, and that the trial judge properly applied the W.D. analysis when rejecting the defence evidence and relying on accepted Crown evidence.

The conviction for impaired driving was upheld.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant executed at his apartment in a trial for possession of narcotics for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought to rely on an edited information-to-obtain that contained redactions to protect a confidential informant's identity.

The Crown proposed that portions of the information that could not be summarized without disclosing the informant's identity be excluded from consideration, while the Crown would rely on the remaining edited portions and judicial summaries.

The court was asked whether the sixth step of the Garofoli procedure permits the Crown to decline to rely on excised material that cannot be summarized without risking disclosure of the confidential informant's identity.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for assault arising from an altercation with his former common law spouse during a child exchange.

He argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, applied unequal scrutiny to the testimony of the complainant and the accused, rendered an unreasonable verdict, and failed to provide adequate reasons.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the trial judge made no material misapprehension of the evidence and was entitled to draw the credibility inferences she did.

The court further held that the trial judge applied the proper analytical framework under R. v. W.(D.), assessed both witnesses with equal scrutiny, and provided legally sufficient reasons.

The conviction for assault and the conditional discharge with probation were upheld.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the approved screening device demand on two Charter grounds: first, that the accused's initial statement was statutorily compelled under the Highway Traffic Act, and second, that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to make the demand, thereby infringing section 8 rights.

The defence also argued that evidence of the accused's alcohol consumption demonstrated her blood alcohol concentration was below the legal limit at the time of driving.

The court rejected all defence arguments, finding no statutory compulsion, that the officer had both subjective and objective reasonable suspicion, and that the accused's evidence was unreliable and did not raise a reasonable doubt.