Daniel F. Moore

The applicant, whose extradition was requested by the United States, consented to committal but resisted surrender, arguing it would violate his s. 7 Charter rights because he risked being killed in U.S. custody in retaliation for cooperating with law enforcement.

After the Minister ordered his surrender, the applicant sought judicial review and brought a motion to seal the court record and hold the hearing in camera to protect his informer privilege.

Media intervenors argued for greater disclosure.

The court found the applicant qualified as a confidential informer and ordered the record redacted to omit information tending to reveal his identity.

The hearing was directed to proceed in public to the greatest extent possible, with in camera portions only where necessary.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for assault arising from an altercation with his former common law spouse during a child exchange.

He argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, applied unequal scrutiny to the testimony of the complainant and the accused, rendered an unreasonable verdict, and failed to provide adequate reasons.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the trial judge made no material misapprehension of the evidence and was entitled to draw the credibility inferences she did.

The court further held that the trial judge applied the proper analytical framework under R. v. W.(D.), assessed both witnesses with equal scrutiny, and provided legally sufficient reasons.

The conviction for assault and the conditional discharge with probation were upheld.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the approved screening device demand on two Charter grounds: first, that the accused's initial statement was statutorily compelled under the Highway Traffic Act, and second, that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to make the demand, thereby infringing section 8 rights.

The defence also argued that evidence of the accused's alcohol consumption demonstrated her blood alcohol concentration was below the legal limit at the time of driving.

The court rejected all defence arguments, finding no statutory compulsion, that the officer had both subjective and objective reasonable suspicion, and that the accused's evidence was unreliable and did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge provided inadequate reasons regarding the complainant's alleged motive to fabricate, failed to assess witness reliability, and applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge implicitly rejected the motive to fabricate by accepting the complainant's evidence.

The Court also noted the trial was short, making express reliability analysis unnecessary, and found no uneven scrutiny, highlighting that the appellant's inculpatory statements supported the complainant's credibility.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that quashed his acquittal.

The trial judge had rejected the applicant's defence of non-insane automatism because he failed to lead expert evidence as required by R. v. Stone.

Furthermore, there was no evidence that the applicant was tricked into consuming alcohol.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding no issue of sufficient merit or importance.

The appellant appealed his sentence for an oxycodone-related offence, arguing the trial judge improperly treated his addiction as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge merely reflected an understanding of the appellant's self-awareness.

The sentence was not manifestly unfit given the appellant's criminal record, the serious problem of oxycodone in the community, and his role in spreading the drug.

The appellants were convicted of multiple counts of GST and income tax evasion based on a net worth analysis.

Their summary conviction was upheld on appeal to the Superior Court of Justice.

They sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, arguing the trial judge improperly stereotyped electricians and engaged in prohibited propensity reasoning by referencing documents about an unrelated fraudulent scheme.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding the trial judge's comments, while unfortunate, did not amount to reviewable error or raise significant issues of trial fairness, and the case against the appellants was overwhelming.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms and drug offences, arguing his arrest and the subsequent search of his vehicle violated his Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal found the police had reasonable grounds for the arrest based on confidential informer tips and surveillance.

Applying the Grant framework, the court held that even if a Charter breach occurred, the evidence was admissible under s. 24(2).

The appellant also appealed his six-year sentence, seeking an adjustment to avoid deportation consequences under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The court dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that immigration consequences cannot justify an unfit sentence.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board denying him an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal found that the hospital report and the treating psychiatrist's testimony provided a reasonable basis for the Board to conclude that the appellant posed a significant threat to public safety, particularly to the victim of the index offence and his own family.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The Crown conceded that the length of the sentence was manifestly excessive in the circumstances.

The Court of Appeal accepted the concession and reduced the conditional sentence to twelve months.

The appellant appealed a ten-month sentence imposed for various breach offences, impaired driving, possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The appellant, a second-time offender, continued to consume and sell marijuana while on bail and later while subject to a conditional sentence order.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was not unfit given the appellant's unrepentant actions and failure to seek treatment previously.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual offences against his stepdaughter, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the W.D. framework by asking if his evidence 'might reasonably be true' rather than if it raised a reasonable doubt.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that despite the inapt phrase, the trial judge clearly understood the Crown bore the burden of proof throughout.

A dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial, finding the error could have affected the verdict given the credibility issues.

The appellants, who were committed for trial on charges of first degree murder, appealed the dismissal of their applications to quash the committal order.

They brought a motion seeking an order that they not be required to pay for additional copies of the preliminary inquiry transcripts for the appeal, having already paid for copies used in the Superior Court.

They also sought an order requiring the court reporters to produce the transcripts on diskette for a nominal fee.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that rule 8(7) of the Criminal Appeal Rules is intended to avoid unnecessary duplication of expense, and ordered the court reporters to produce the transcripts on diskette for $1 each.

The appellant, a paralegal and private investigator, was convicted of attempting to obstruct justice after contacting a complainant in a domestic assault case where his client was bound by a non-communication order.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to give a Vetrovec warning regarding the complainant's testimony, failing to properly instruct the jury on the defence theory, and giving vague instructions on the actus reus.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion regarding the Vetrovec warning, and concluding the jury instructions were full and accurate.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence of two years less a day imposed on an offender with 14 prior convictions for drinking and driving.

The Court of Appeal held that a conditional sentence is not statutorily foreclosed where the Crown fails to serve notice of increased penalty under s. 727 of the Criminal Code.

However, the trial judge erred in imposing a conditional sentence given the offender's extensive record.

The Court found a fit sentence would be 12 months in custody, but given the pre-trial custody and the 14 months of the conditional sentence already served under strict conditions, the sentence was varied to time served, plus a lifetime driving prohibition and three years' probation.