Grace Hyunju Choi

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible (NCR) and detained at CAMH, appealed a Review Board disposition continuing his detention despite being designated as alternate level of care.

The appellant proposed a conditional discharge with a Young clause and treatment compliance conditions, or alternatively, living with family due to a lack of community housing.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board failed to properly consider the proposed safeguards, did not adequately inquire into family accommodation, and based its risk assessment on speculative concerns and unsupported assumptions.

The Court also overturned its previous decision in Negash regarding the enforceability of hospital readmission under section 672.93(2) of the Criminal Code.

The matter was remitted for a new hearing.

The appellant, who suffered from schizophrenia and represented himself at trial, appealed his first-degree murder conviction.

He argued he was unfit to stand trial and urged the Court of Appeal to overturn or modify the 'limited cognitive capacity' test from R. v. Taylor to require that an accused be capable of making rational decisions in their best interests.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Taylor test, clarifying that while an accused must have a reality-based understanding of their legal predicament and the ability to make decisions, they need not possess 'analytic capacity' to make decisions in their own best interests.

The Court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to the voluntariness of statements made to a Crown psychiatrist and refused to admit fresh psychiatric evidence to substitute a verdict of not criminally responsible.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing consent and credibility.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge's credibility assessment was intelligible, coherent, and based on the totality of the evidence, particularly the implausibility of the appellant's account and the plausibility of the complainant's testimony and physical state.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated sexual assault, which was based on his failure to disclose his HIV-positive status to the complainant.

The appellant was an "elite controller" with a naturally low/undetectable viral load, not on anti-retroviral therapy.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh expert evidence, which clarified that the risk of HIV transmission from an elite controller with a suppressed viral load is negligible, similar to individuals on ART.

The court found this fresh evidence decisive, concluding that no reasonable trier of fact could convict the appellant given the negligible risk of transmission.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault in 2013 for non-disclosure of her HIV-positive status during condomless vaginal intercourse, which the trial judge found vitiated consent due to a realistic possibility of transmission.

On appeal, fresh expert evidence was admitted, demonstrating that with antiretroviral treatment (ART) and an undetectable viral load, the risk of HIV transmission is effectively zero.

The Court of Appeal found that this new scientific understanding undermined the trial judge's conclusion regarding the realistic possibility of transmission in the appellant's specific circumstances.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

The court declined to make a broader statement on the "realistic possibility of transmission" threshold beyond the specific facts of the case, citing institutional concerns and limitations of the fresh evidence record regarding multiple sexual contacts or viral loads that are suppressed but not undetectable.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder, deemed so under s. 231(6) of the Criminal Code due to the murder occurring while committing criminal harassment.

The appellant appealed on four grounds: errors in jury instructions regarding post-offence conduct, improper admission and use of prior misconduct evidence, improper admission and use of ante mortem statements of the deceased, and insufficient evidence/inadequate jury instruction on the criminal harassment route to first-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reviewable errors in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings, and concluding there was ample evidence to support the conviction.

The appellant, Marc Leduc, appealed two first-degree murder convictions.

The appeal concerned the trial judge's decision to admit similar act evidence across counts and the jury instructions regarding its use.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge correctly applied the "striking similarity" test for admitting similar act evidence to rebut coincidence, which effectively served to prove identity.

The court also upheld the severance ruling, which was based on the likely success of the similar act application.

Finally, the court dismissed the argument regarding jury instructions, noting that defence counsel at trial had specifically objected to the instruction the appellant now sought on appeal, and that the instruction given was adequate.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a notice regarding a publication ban under section 517 of the Criminal Code.

The underlying decision in the applicant's motion contains information covered by the non-publication order imposed at the bail hearing in the court below.

The full decision will be available once the publication ban ceases to be in effect.

A young person convicted of sexual assault appealed on the basis that the verdict was unreasonable, arguing the trial judge illogically accepted selective parts of the accused's evidence while rejecting others due to intoxication.

The majority held the verdict was reasonable, finding the trial judge provided sound reasons for accepting some portions of the accused's evidence while rejecting others.

The appellant also challenged the constitutionality of s. 37(10) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, which denies young persons the automatic appeal rights available to adults under s. 691 of the Criminal Code.

The majority upheld s. 37(10) as consistent with ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter, while Abella J. (with Karakatsanis and Martin JJ.) found it to be an unjustified breach of s. 15.

The appeal was dismissed, with Côté J. dissenting on the reasonableness of the verdict and declining to address the constitutional questions as moot.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and carrying a weapon, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting and relying on recognition evidence from two police officers who identified him from video surveillance.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in admitting one officer's evidence due to insufficient prior acquaintance, the error was harmless and curable under the proviso because the trial judge independently concluded the appellant was the perpetrator based on high-quality video and photographic evidence.

The court also held the verdict was not unreasonable, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for aggravated sexual assault arising from sexual intercourse with multiple complainants without disclosure of HIV-positive status.

He argued, through reopening and fresh evidence, that condom use alone should negate the realistic possibility of HIV transmission notwithstanding the absence of a low viral load.

The Court of Appeal held that the proposed evidence was not sufficiently cogent under the fresh evidence framework because it attacked the legal foundations of the governing Supreme Court authority rather than demonstrating a material change in the factual underpinnings relevant to condom effectiveness.

Applying stare decisis and the governing fraud-and-consent analysis in HIV non-disclosure cases, the court declined to alter the existing rule requiring both condom use and a low viral load to negate a realistic possibility of transmission.

The fresh evidence application and the appeal were dismissed, subject to a minor amendment to one count on consent.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault on the basis that he struck the complainant with a beer glass, causing multiple lacerations to the face and neck.

The appellant claimed self-defence, asserting that the complainant attacked him first.

The trial judge applied the amended self-defence provisions of the Criminal Code retrospectively and instructed the jury accordingly.

The Crown argued that if the appellant struck first, self-defence was not available.

The trial judge failed to correct this legal misstatement.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown's assertion was legally incorrect, as self-defence can apply even if the accused struck the first blow, provided the accused reasonably believed force or a threat of force was being used against them.

The trial judge's failure to correct this error rendered the verdict unsafe.

A 15-year-old appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault of a 14-year-old complainant following a judge-alone trial.

The incident occurred at a beach near the Scarborough Bluffs where a group of young persons had gathered to celebrate a friend's birthday.

Both the appellant and complainant had consumed alcohol.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty, concluding that the complainant lacked capacity to consent due to extreme intoxication.

The Court of Appeal was divided: Justice Nordheimer (dissenting) would have allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal, finding the conviction unreasonable because the timing of the sexual activity was uncertain and the evidence of incapacity was insufficient.

Justices MacPherson and Feldman (majority) dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's verdict reasonable and emphasizing the trial judge's credibility assessments and comprehensive reasons.

The appellant was convicted of break, enter and assault and two counts of breach of probation, and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment less 24 months' credit for pre-sentence custody, plus two years' probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged both conviction and sentence.

The court rejected the appellant's argument that the trial judge erred by failing to consider exculpatory evidence in his video statement regarding the intentional nature of contact with the homeowner.

The court also rejected numerous other arguments raised for the first time on appeal that were not raised at trial or contained in the trial evidence.

Regarding sentence, the court found no error in principle in the imposition of probationary terms, including non-communication provisions and a requirement to seek counselling for gambling addiction.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was allowed only to the extent of setting aside the victim fine surcharge.

The appellant did not attend the hearing of his sentence appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant had confirmed his mailing address to which appeal materials were sent, but his phone number was out of service and he was not in custody.

In these circumstances, the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed her sentence of 12 years for manslaughter in the stabbing death of her sister-in-law.

The appellant was tried on a charge of second-degree murder but was convicted of manslaughter.

The sentencing judge imposed a 12-year sentence, characterizing the offence as aggravated manslaughter.

The appellant, through duty counsel, challenged three factual findings made by the sentencing judge: that the appellant stabbed the deceased in the neck, that the stabbing would cause bodily harm, and that the deceased was holding her baby at the time of the stabbing.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence as fit and proper.

The appellant appealed a trial conviction, raising three issues regarding the trial judge's reasons.

The appellant argued that the trial judge improperly relied on evidence of a prior consistent statement to corroborate the complainant's evidence, failed to adequately explain why he accepted the complainant's evidence despite inconsistencies, and that the complainant's evidence regarding the appellant's statement about getting "his boys to come down" was insufficient to constitute a threat.

The Court of Appeal rejected all three submissions and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of robbery, breach of recognizance, breach of probation, and possession of proceeds of crime arising from an altercation involving a purported cocaine sale.

The trial judge convicted the appellant of robbery by stealing with violence contrary to s. 343(b) despite the Crown alleging robbery while armed with a firearm contrary to s. 343(d).

The appellant received a global sentence of 20 months in prison and 2 years probation, with 320 days pre-sentence custody credited at 1.5:1, resulting in a net sentence of 4 months.

The appeal addressed whether the trial judge erred in treating robbery with violence as an included offence in a charge of armed robbery, and whether the trial judge improperly placed the burden of proof on the appellant regarding self-defence.

The appellant appealed a sentence of two years imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice following guilty pleas to several counts including robbery.

The original joint submission between Crown and defence was for 18 months, but defence counsel requested the sentencing judge impose two years to enable the appellant to access addiction assistance in a penitentiary.

The Crown consented to this request.

However, the appellant was not placed in a penitentiary but rather remained in a detention facility awaiting trial on another matter.

The Crown subsequently sought to have the original 18-month joint submission imposed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and substituted an 18-month sentence, while increasing the probation period to two years to further rehabilitation goals.

A lawyer convicted of possession of child pornography appealed his conviction and the terms of a section 161(1)(d) prohibition order limiting his Internet access.

The trial judge found multiple Charter breaches under section 8 relating to police handling of seized electronic devices but excluded only limited evidence under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge's Charter and exclusion analysis was reasonable and well-supported by evidence.

The court also upheld the Internet-limiting terms of the prohibition order, finding they were a reasonable response to the risk posed by the offender's possession of a significant volume of child pornography and carefully tailored to his specific circumstances.