Grace Hyunju Choi

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing consent and credibility.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge's credibility assessment was intelligible, coherent, and based on the totality of the evidence, particularly the implausibility of the appellant's account and the plausibility of the complainant's testimony and physical state.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated sexual assault, which was based on his failure to disclose his HIV-positive status to the complainant.

The appellant was an "elite controller" with a naturally low/undetectable viral load, not on anti-retroviral therapy.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh expert evidence, which clarified that the risk of HIV transmission from an elite controller with a suppressed viral load is negligible, similar to individuals on ART.

The court found this fresh evidence decisive, concluding that no reasonable trier of fact could convict the appellant given the negligible risk of transmission.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault in 2013 for non-disclosure of her HIV-positive status during condomless vaginal intercourse, which the trial judge found vitiated consent due to a realistic possibility of transmission.

On appeal, fresh expert evidence was admitted, demonstrating that with antiretroviral treatment (ART) and an undetectable viral load, the risk of HIV transmission is effectively zero.

The Court of Appeal found that this new scientific understanding undermined the trial judge's conclusion regarding the realistic possibility of transmission in the appellant's specific circumstances.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and an acquittal was entered.

The court declined to make a broader statement on the "realistic possibility of transmission" threshold beyond the specific facts of the case, citing institutional concerns and limitations of the fresh evidence record regarding multiple sexual contacts or viral loads that are suppressed but not undetectable.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder, deemed so under s. 231(6) of the Criminal Code due to the murder occurring while committing criminal harassment.

The appellant appealed on four grounds: errors in jury instructions regarding post-offence conduct, improper admission and use of prior misconduct evidence, improper admission and use of ante mortem statements of the deceased, and insufficient evidence/inadequate jury instruction on the criminal harassment route to first-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reviewable errors in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings, and concluding there was ample evidence to support the conviction.

The appellant, Marc Leduc, appealed two first-degree murder convictions.

The appeal concerned the trial judge's decision to admit similar act evidence across counts and the jury instructions regarding its use.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge correctly applied the "striking similarity" test for admitting similar act evidence to rebut coincidence, which effectively served to prove identity.

The court also upheld the severance ruling, which was based on the likely success of the similar act application.

Finally, the court dismissed the argument regarding jury instructions, noting that defence counsel at trial had specifically objected to the instruction the appellant now sought on appeal, and that the instruction given was adequate.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault on the basis that he struck the complainant with a beer glass, causing multiple lacerations to the face and neck.

The appellant claimed self-defence, asserting that the complainant attacked him first.

The trial judge applied the amended self-defence provisions of the Criminal Code retrospectively and instructed the jury accordingly.

The Crown argued that if the appellant struck first, self-defence was not available.

The trial judge failed to correct this legal misstatement.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown's assertion was legally incorrect, as self-defence can apply even if the accused struck the first blow, provided the accused reasonably believed force or a threat of force was being used against them.

The trial judge's failure to correct this error rendered the verdict unsafe.

A 15-year-old appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault of a 14-year-old complainant following a judge-alone trial.

The incident occurred at a beach near the Scarborough Bluffs where a group of young persons had gathered to celebrate a friend's birthday.

Both the appellant and complainant had consumed alcohol.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty, concluding that the complainant lacked capacity to consent due to extreme intoxication.

The Court of Appeal was divided: Justice Nordheimer (dissenting) would have allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal, finding the conviction unreasonable because the timing of the sexual activity was uncertain and the evidence of incapacity was insufficient.

Justices MacPherson and Feldman (majority) dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's verdict reasonable and emphasizing the trial judge's credibility assessments and comprehensive reasons.

The appellant was convicted of break, enter and assault and two counts of breach of probation, and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment less 24 months' credit for pre-sentence custody, plus two years' probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged both conviction and sentence.

The court rejected the appellant's argument that the trial judge erred by failing to consider exculpatory evidence in his video statement regarding the intentional nature of contact with the homeowner.

The court also rejected numerous other arguments raised for the first time on appeal that were not raised at trial or contained in the trial evidence.

Regarding sentence, the court found no error in principle in the imposition of probationary terms, including non-communication provisions and a requirement to seek counselling for gambling addiction.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was allowed only to the extent of setting aside the victim fine surcharge.

The appellant did not attend the hearing of his sentence appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant had confirmed his mailing address to which appeal materials were sent, but his phone number was out of service and he was not in custody.

In these circumstances, the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed her sentence of 12 years for manslaughter in the stabbing death of her sister-in-law.

The appellant was tried on a charge of second-degree murder but was convicted of manslaughter.

The sentencing judge imposed a 12-year sentence, characterizing the offence as aggravated manslaughter.

The appellant, through duty counsel, challenged three factual findings made by the sentencing judge: that the appellant stabbed the deceased in the neck, that the stabbing would cause bodily harm, and that the deceased was holding her baby at the time of the stabbing.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence as fit and proper.

The appellant appealed a trial conviction, raising three issues regarding the trial judge's reasons.

The appellant argued that the trial judge improperly relied on evidence of a prior consistent statement to corroborate the complainant's evidence, failed to adequately explain why he accepted the complainant's evidence despite inconsistencies, and that the complainant's evidence regarding the appellant's statement about getting "his boys to come down" was insufficient to constitute a threat.

The Court of Appeal rejected all three submissions and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of robbery, breach of recognizance, breach of probation, and possession of proceeds of crime arising from an altercation involving a purported cocaine sale.

The trial judge convicted the appellant of robbery by stealing with violence contrary to s. 343(b) despite the Crown alleging robbery while armed with a firearm contrary to s. 343(d).

The appellant received a global sentence of 20 months in prison and 2 years probation, with 320 days pre-sentence custody credited at 1.5:1, resulting in a net sentence of 4 months.

The appeal addressed whether the trial judge erred in treating robbery with violence as an included offence in a charge of armed robbery, and whether the trial judge improperly placed the burden of proof on the appellant regarding self-defence.

The appellant appealed a sentence of two years imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice following guilty pleas to several counts including robbery.

The original joint submission between Crown and defence was for 18 months, but defence counsel requested the sentencing judge impose two years to enable the appellant to access addiction assistance in a penitentiary.

The Crown consented to this request.

However, the appellant was not placed in a penitentiary but rather remained in a detention facility awaiting trial on another matter.

The Crown subsequently sought to have the original 18-month joint submission imposed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and substituted an 18-month sentence, while increasing the probation period to two years to further rehabilitation goals.

A lawyer convicted of possession of child pornography appealed his conviction and the terms of a section 161(1)(d) prohibition order limiting his Internet access.

The trial judge found multiple Charter breaches under section 8 relating to police handling of seized electronic devices but excluded only limited evidence under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge's Charter and exclusion analysis was reasonable and well-supported by evidence.

The court also upheld the Internet-limiting terms of the prohibition order, finding they were a reasonable response to the risk posed by the offender's possession of a significant volume of child pornography and carefully tailored to his specific circumstances.

The appellant appealed his sentence for flight from police and driving while disqualified.

The sentencing judge imposed a two-year sentence with credit for 283 days of presentence custody on a one-for-one basis, refusing enhanced credit at a 1.5:1 ratio.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in principle by equating violations of federal statutory release with provincial institutional misconduct.

The court held that the loss of early release eligibility alone generally justifies enhanced credit at 1.5:1.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced by 142 days.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break and enter and failure to comply with probation.

He argued that the trial judge erred in failing to consider his specific circumstances when assessing his credibility and intent, and that the trial judge improperly relied on his after-the-fact conduct of fleeing the daycare as evidence of guilt.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was aware of the appellant's personal circumstances and made credible findings that were not subject to appellate interference.

The court also found that the trial judge properly considered the appellant's after-the-fact conduct as circumstantial evidence.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment, breach of recognizance (x2), and pointing a firearm, as well as his sentence.

The appellant pled guilty to all offences except pointing a firearm, which proceeded to trial.

The trial judge found the appellant's testimony not credible and convicted him based on the evidence.

The appellant raised concerns regarding territorial jurisdiction, misuse of his criminal record, and the trial judge's assessment of the victim's credibility.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to disturb the trial judge's conclusions and dismissed the appeal from conviction.

The appellant also sought a one-month sentence reduction to complete his remaining time in a provincial institution, which the Court of Appeal declined to grant.

The appeal from sentence was also dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual offences against his step-daughter, who was 14 years old at the time of the offences.

The appellant, a pastor who had married the victim's mother, appealed both his conviction and sentence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge placed undue reliance on the complainant's demeanour as a witness.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding that while the trial judge did consider the complainant's presentation as a witness in assessing credibility, she did not overemphasize this factor and properly analyzed the substance of the complainant's evidence.

Both the conviction appeal and sentence appeal were dismissed, with the court noting that the sentence imposed was fit.

The appellant appealed both his conviction entered on January 25, 2011 and his sentence imposed on July 11, 2012.

The appellant's submissions consisted solely of attacks on the factual findings of the trial judge, including allegations that key witnesses were liars and challenges to the professional integrity of the police and prosecutor.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the appellant's arguments and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and aggravated sexual assault in the death of a 29-year-old woman found naked in a wooded park in Guelph.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on DNA evidence linking the appellant to the deceased, forensic entomology evidence establishing time of death, and toxicology evidence showing cocaine in the deceased's blood.

The trial judge admitted evidence of a subsequent assault by the appellant on another sex worker (the "Barrie incident") to establish motive and rebut innocent association.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: admissibility of the Barrie incident evidence, unreasonableness of the verdict on causation and fault elements, and adequacy of jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Barrie incident evidence was wrongfully admitted and that the jury instructions on the fault element in murder were deficient.