Matthew R. Gourlay

The appellant was convicted of firearm offences after an Instagram video showed him displaying what appeared to be a loaded handgun.

The physical weapon was never recovered.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge's finding that the object was a real firearm was unreasonable, as the circumstantial evidence did not exclude the possibility it was an imitation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to conclude the firearm was real based on the video evidence, including the appellant's act of removing the magazine to display ammunition in response to a question about whether the gun was real.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that while the trial judge made minor errors in summarizing the collateral immigration consequences, these errors did not impact the fitness of the sentence imposed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended his evidence due to interpretation issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence and upholding the trial judge's credibility assessments.

The appellant also sought a stay of proceedings for Charter breaches arising from his delayed release and strip search at a correctional complex following a bail order.

The Court found his Charter rights were violated and granted a one-month sentence reduction as a remedy.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of sexual assault, incest, and human trafficking against his biological daughter.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent based on reasonable doubt arising from material inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and reliability concerns related to her hallucinations, delusions, and heavy street drug use.

On appeal, the Crown argued the trial judge relied on myths and stereotypes about mental illness and assessed the evidence piecemeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reliability concerns were grounded in case-specific evidence, not stereotypes, and that he properly assessed the evidence as a whole.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence on appeal following a criminal conviction, arguing that the new witness evidence was reasonably capable of belief on key points relating to self-defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for lack of cogency.

The Supreme Court of Canada, by majority, found no reviewable error in the Court of Appeal's cogency analysis and dismissed the appeal.

In dissent, Karakatsanis and Côté JJ. would have allowed the appeal, finding that the majority erred in law by making its own determination of the witness's ultimate credibility in the cogency analysis and by erring in the due diligence analysis, and would have admitted the fresh evidence and ordered a new trial.

The registrant brought a motion to adjourn her discipline hearing regarding allegations of professional misconduct for failing to comply with a previous discipline order.

She sought the adjournment to bring a motion to vary the previous order, citing impecuniosity and an inability to comply.

The College opposed the adjournment.

The Discipline Committee granted the adjournment, finding no risk to the public as the registrant's certificate of registration was cancelled, no prejudice to the College, and that the short delay was appropriate given her new pro bono counsel's oversight.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual exploitation and related offences involving two high school students.

The central issue was whether the appellant was in a 'position of trust' under s. 153(1) of the Criminal Code when the sexual touching occurred.

The Court of Appeal allowed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law by misapplying the factors for determining a position of trust and focusing on the complainants' subjective impressions rather than the appellant's assumed role.

A new trial was ordered for the sexual exploitation counts, while the sentence appeal for possession of child sexual abuse material was dismissed.

The accused was convicted by jury of the attempted murder of her infant daughter and her mother, and of aggravated assault of the daughter, following an incident in which all three were found unconscious after being injected with insulin.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial on the attempted murder count relating to the mother on the basis that the jury instructions failed to distinguish between attempted murder and the offence of aiding suicide where the mother may have self-administered the insulin.

The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, restoring the conviction, finding no air of reality to the theory that the mother voluntarily injected herself with suicidal intent.

The majority held that trial judges must only instruct on theories lacking air of reality where there is a sufficient evidentiary foundation, and that the cumulative circumstantial evidence did not support a reasonable inference that the mother intended to end her own life.

The dissent would have dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding an air of reality to the inference of autonomous self-injection and holding that the trial judge was required to instruct the jury on the legal significance of I.F.'s possible voluntary participation to the actus reus of attempted murder.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting and killing Ryan Kabuya-Ntumba during a confrontation in Ottawa's ByWard Market on July 1, 2019.

The central issue at trial was whether the appellant acted in self-defence.

The jury rejected the self-defence claim and convicted the appellant, who was sentenced to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 14 years.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence from an eyewitness and challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on self-defence and post-offence conduct.

The majority dismissed the motion to admit fresh evidence, finding it not reasonably capable of belief, and dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

Justice Copeland dissented on the fresh evidence issue, concluding the evidence was reasonably capable of belief and warranted a new trial.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted William Craig Robson’s motion for release pending appeal and a partial stay of his driving prohibition after his conviction for dangerous driving causing death.

The court found that the grounds of appeal were not frivolous and raised significant legal issues, including the definition of “public” under s. 320.13(3) of the Criminal Code and causation in the context of dangerous off-road activities.

The court concluded that Robson did not pose a risk to public safety and that his continued detention was not necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

Summary conviction appeal from four assault convictions arising out of allegations by a spouse in the context of a deteriorating marriage and related family-law conflict.

The court held that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate because they did not meaningfully grapple with the live and central issue of motive to fabricate, despite a substantial evidentiary record bearing on animus, separation, removal from the matrimonial home, and pending family proceedings.

The court also held that the trial judge erred by preventing the self-represented accused from calling two defence witnesses after incorrectly treating the anticipated evidence as inadmissible hearsay, rather than hearing the evidence and ruling on admissibility as it emerged.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered on all four counts.

The appellant, Seyed Amir Yaghoubi-Araghi, appealed his convictions and sentence for firearm and drug offences following a R.I.D.E. stop, police pursuit, and search that uncovered a handgun and methamphetamine.

He argued that the trial judge erred in failing to exclude the evidence due to breaches of his rights under section 10(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge properly recognized the seriousness of the Charter breaches, the evidence was lawfully obtained and the balancing of factors under R. v. Grant did not warrant exclusion.

The conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed J.C.'s appeal from a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, finding a miscarriage of justice due to the limited, non-adversarial role assigned to amicus curiae at the original hearing.

The Court held that, in light of subsequent Supreme Court guidance in R. v. Kahsai, the trial judge erred in principle by not appointing amicus with a broader, adversarial mandate to ensure fairness, given the appellant's self-represented and self-defeating position.

The Court ordered a new hearing.

The appellant, convicted of arson and other charges, appealed his conviction on two grounds: alleged legal and factual errors by the trial judge and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's comprehensive findings in an overwhelming circumstantial case, and concluding that the appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel did not meet the required threshold of incompetence.

The appellant, D.B., appealed his convictions for three historical sexual offences against his niece.

The appeal raised three grounds: improper use of evidence regarding the appellant's reaction/inaction when confronted with allegations, improper Crown submissions inviting the jury to infer the appellant lied to secure an acquittal, and failure to caution the jury on extrinsic misconduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury was not sufficiently instructed on the lack of probative value of the reaction evidence and on the impermissible reasoning regarding the appellant's motive to lie.

These errors undermined the presumption of innocence and left the jury unequipped to fairly decide the case.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, sentence set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Jamil Ahmad Qureshi, appealed his conviction for dangerous driving causing bodily harm and death, arguing the trial judge erred in her legal analysis of the mens rea element.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapplied principles regarding momentary lapses and conflated civil and criminal negligence standards by failing to adequately explain how the appellant's conduct constituted a "marked departure" from the standard of care.

The Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, but declined to order an acquittal, finding the verdict was not otherwise unreasonable.

The applicant sought state funding under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for counsel on his appeal.

The appeal concerned the trial judge's decision to admit evidence despite finding Charter breaches (arbitrary detention and unreasonable search), based on a finding that police acted in good faith.

The applicant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the seriousness of the state conduct under the R. v. Grant test.

The court granted the application for state-funded counsel, finding that the applicant lacked means, had arguable grounds, and could not effectively advance his appeal without counsel due to the legal complexities, particularly in light of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence.

The appellant, S.B., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the imposed sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The majority found that the trial judge erred by failing to properly consider the appellant's evidence regarding the complainant's capacity to consent, constituting a W.(D.) error.

MacPherson J.A. also found an error in the rejection of the honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent defence.

The applicant, a registered clinical psychologist, sought judicial review of a decision by the College of Psychologists of Ontario's Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) ordering him to complete a specified continuing education or remedial program (SCERP) regarding professionalism in public statements.

The ICRC's order followed an investigation into the applicant's social media posts and public statements, which the committee found posed moderate risks of harm to the public and the profession.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the ICRC reasonably balanced the applicant's Charter right to freedom of expression with the College's statutory mandate to regulate the profession in the public interest, in accordance with the Doré framework.

The Court also held that the ICRC's decision met the Vavilov standard of justification, transparency, and intelligibility.

The appellant, Jason Ebanks, appealed his conviction for attempted murder with a firearm and other related charges, as well as his sentence.

The primary ground of appeal concerned the trial judge's jury charge regarding the victim's photo line-up identification of the appellant.

The appellant argued that the caution given was insufficient because the victim already knew the appellant and believed him to be the shooter, rendering the line-up identification of little value.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the jury instructions, while not perfect, adequately equipped the jury to assess the photo line-up evidence in light of the specific frailties raised by the defence.

Leave to appeal sentence was refused as no submissions were made.

The applicant, a Justice of the Peace on long-term disability, sought judicial review of a decision by the Justices of the Peace Review Council recommending her removal from office.

The Council found she committed judicial misconduct by practicing law without a license or insurance on three occasions.

The applicant argued the hearing panel breached procedural fairness by not granting a further adjournment and that the penalty was unreasonable due to her cognitive disabilities.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the hearing was procedurally fair and the recommendation for removal was reasonable given the lack of reliable medical evidence supporting a cognitive deficit and the severity of the misconduct.