Bradley Reitz

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to 18 months' custody, sought an order under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for government-funded legal counsel for his appeal, after Legal Aid Ontario refused coverage.

The court found the applicant lacked sufficient means but was not persuaded that it was in the interests of justice to order legal assistance.

The judge reasoned that the appeal issues were relatively straightforward and could be fairly and properly dealt with by the court on an inmate appeal, despite the applicant's learning disability and challenges with reading comprehension and communication.

The application was dismissed.

The English-speaking appellants, having obtained orders under s. 530(1) of the Criminal Code for trials before English-speaking judges and juries, sought to challenge prospective jurors for cause under s. 638(1)(f) on the ground of insufficient English language proficiency.

The trial judges dismissed these applications, concluding that a s. 530 order alone did not automatically entitle an accused to such a challenge without an "air of reality" or "realistic potential" for language competency issues.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judges' decisions, finding that the s. 530 orders were not necessary in these cases as the trials were already in English, and the purpose of s. 530 is to assist official language minorities, not to enforce minimum fair trial conditions for majority language speakers.

The court affirmed that a threshold showing of realistic potential is required for challenges for cause under s. 638(1)(f), similar to s. 638(1)(b), and that existing jury selection processes (Juries Act qualifications, pre-vetting) adequately address language competency.

The appeals were dismissed, and convictions affirmed.

This is an appeal from convictions for dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The appellant, Joseph Bradley, was convicted after an accident where unbuckled passengers in his vehicle were severely injured.

The appeal raised three grounds: the trial judge conflated the actus reus and mens rea of the offence, erred by considering the unbuckled status of passengers relevant to the actus reus, and failed to address factual causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons, read holistically, demonstrated proper findings on all elements.

The court affirmed that "all the circumstances" under s. 249(1) of the Criminal Code can include factors like unbuckled passengers, as they enhance the dangerousness of the driving, and that implicit findings on causation are acceptable if apparent from the decision.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a respondent charged with committing indictable offences for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a terrorist group under section 83.2 of the Criminal Code.

The respondent was the sole member of his own terrorist group.

The trial judge found the respondent not guilty of the section 83.2 offences but found him not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (schizophrenia) for the underlying predicate offences.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's interpretation that section 83.2 does not apply to a lone wolf terrorist acting as the sole member of a terrorist group, as the provision contemplates a bilateral relationship between the principal committing the offence and a separate terrorist group.

The court dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, convicted of drug trafficking offences, had previously obtained a judicial order returning seized funds to pay for reasonable legal expenses under s. 462.34(4)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code, having demonstrated no other assets or means.

At sentencing, the Crown sought a fine instead of forfeiture under s. 462.37(3) equal to the returned amount.

The majority held that, as a general rule, sentencing judges should not impose a fine instead of forfeiture on funds judicially returned for the payment of reasonable legal expenses, as doing so would undermine Parliament's secondary purposes of providing access to counsel and giving meaningful weight to the presumption of innocence.

The discretion to impose a fine may be exercised only where the offender lacked a real financial need or did not use the funds to alleviate that need.

The dissent would have imposed the fine in lieu unless the offender could demonstrate a constitutional entitlement to state-funded counsel under the Rowbotham test.

Seven appellants appealed their convictions for offences relating to a conspiracy to import and traffic in cocaine, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing their applications for a stay of proceedings based on breach of their Charter right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The appellants contended that the 30-month presumptive ceiling under the Jordan framework should not apply because the Crown preferred an indictment, thereby creating a one-stage proceeding subject to an 18-month ceiling.

They also argued that delay in preferring the indictment constituted "wasted" time and that systemic or institutional delay was not adequately considered.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the 30-month ceiling applied to cases tried in superior court regardless of whether a preliminary inquiry occurred, that the Crown's delay in preferring the indictment was justified and did not constitute wasted time, and that the case's particular complexity justified the delay beyond the presumptive ceiling.

The appellant was convicted of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking based primarily on a police officer's identification of the appellant as the driver of a minivan that sped past the officer at 50 km/h from a distance of 15 feet.

The officer's fleeting observation lasted only seconds and was limited to describing the driver as an Asian male with dark hair.

The appellant's wallet containing an OHIP card with photograph and an inhaler were found in the vehicle, along with seven large garbage bags of marijuana.

The trial judge found these items, combined with the officer's identification, sufficient to establish the appellant's guilt.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the conviction unreasonable and unsupported by evidence.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered by the Ontario Court of Justice.

At the hearing date, the respondent could not be located despite service of the Notice of Appeal and efforts by Crown counsel.

The Crown did not request that the appeal proceed in the respondent's absence but instead sought an adjournment to allow further efforts to locate the respondent.

The Court of Appeal adjourned the matter to September 4, 2019, with the Crown directed to be prepared to either argue the merits or request dismissal of the appeal as abandoned if the respondent does not appear.

The appellant appealed his convictions on one count of possession for the purpose of trafficking and one count of possession of proceeds of crime.

The appeal involved two main issues: (1) whether the police violated the appellant's Charter rights (ss. 8 and 9) when they arrested and searched him based on information from a confidential informant, and (2) whether certain telephone calls received on seized cellular phones were admissible as evidence under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The trial judge rejected the Charter challenge and admitted the telephone evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Debot test for assessing confidential informant information and finding the telephone calls admissible under the principled exception to hearsay as established in Baldree.

The appellants were convicted of production of and possession for the purposes of trafficking in marijuana, and possession of proceeds of crime.

They appealed their convictions, arguing that the police violated their Charter section 8 rights by obtaining energy consumption data from their electricity provider, Horizon Utilities, without consent or judicial authorization.

The appellants contended that this data was used to obtain a search warrant for their residence.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellants had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the energy consumption data, and that the police examination and use of that data without judicial authorization constituted a breach of section 8.

However, the court found that the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, as the police had acted reasonably given the state of the law at the time, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits outweighed the Charter breach.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of property obtained by crime.

Police seized cash and drugs from multiple locations.

Before sentencing, the appellant obtained a court order releasing seized funds to pay legal fees.

The sentencing judge refused to order a fine in lieu of forfeiture, reasoning that the appellant had obtained no benefit from the funds other than exercising his constitutional right to counsel.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the sentencing judge erred in principle by refusing to order a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The court also upheld the forfeiture of the appellant's interest in a condominium unit used for drug trafficking.

The appellant appealed his convictions on multiple firearm and drug offences.

The central issue was whether evidence seized during a warrantless search on March 6, 2012 should have been admitted despite a prior illegal warrantless search on February 29, 2012.

The trial judge had excluded evidence from the first search but admitted evidence from the second search, which was conducted pursuant to a warrant.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in his section 24(2) analysis by impermissibly diminishing the seriousness of the Charter breach and considering irrelevant factors.

The court held that the deliberate and ongoing nature of the police misconduct required exclusion of the evidence to preserve public confidence in the administration of justice.

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking following a search of his residence conducted pursuant to a warrant issued under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The warrant did not specify a date for execution but authorized entry "at any time." The appellant appealed, arguing the warrant was invalid because it failed to specify an execution date, rendering the search a violation of Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that while the warrant did not expressly state an execution date, an execution date could be implied from the date of issuance.

The court rejected the appellant's characterization of the warrant as expressly non-expiring and held that the absence of an express date was a technical fault that did not invalidate the warrant.

The applicant, charged with attempting to communicate safeguarded information and preparatory acts under the Security of Information Act, brought a motion challenging the constitutionality of s. 22(1)(c) of the Act.

He argued that the provision violates s. 7 of the Charter by being unconstitutionally overbroad unless interpreted to require an objectively reasonable possibility of committing the underlying offence.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the provision does not cast an unconstitutionally wide net, as the Attorney General's consent is required for prosecution and the de minimis threshold would insulate an accused from guilt based on mere criminal ideation.