Edmond O'Donoghue Brown

The accused was charged with three counts of sexual interference against his step-daughter over a five-year period when she was between four and nine years old.

The complainant's evidence was admitted as a hearsay exception through videotaped police interviews and preliminary hearing testimony.

Two jury trials resulted in hung juries.

The trial judge, applying section 669.2(4) and (5) of the Criminal Code, resolved the case without additional evidence.

The judge found the complainant credible but had significant concerns about the reliability of her evidence regarding the third count, which involved recovered memories disclosed for the first time at the preliminary hearing after a nearly four-year gap.

The judge also questioned the accused's credibility regarding the mattress incident but found the Crown had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on any count.

Not guilty verdicts were entered on all three counts.

The accused was charged with possession of cannabis for the purpose of exportation contrary to section 11(2) of the Cannabis Act.

On September 1, 2023, the accused attended at Pearson Airport with two checked bags containing 29.77 kilograms of cannabis destined for export to the United Kingdom.

The central issue was whether the accused had knowledge that the bags contained cannabis.

The trial began as a jury trial but was converted to a judge-alone trial mid-trial due to disclosure issues regarding text messages.

The court found that while the accused's credibility was questionable, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew the bags contained cannabis.

The accused was acquitted.

The Ontario Court of Justice sentenced E.T. to 5½ years imprisonment for sexual assault with a weapon involving his former spouse and their child.

The Court considered aggravating factors including the use of a knife, the involvement of the child, and the breach of trust, alongside mitigating factors such as E.T.'s lack of criminal record, supportive family background, and mental health diagnosis of bipolar disorder.

The Court imposed ancillary orders including a lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA sample provision, a 20-year SOIRA order, and a non-communication order with the victim while in custody.

The decision highlights the balance between denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation in sentencing sexual offences involving intimate partners and children.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing that the trial judge failed to provide sufficient reasons for concluding that he intended to kill the deceased or cause serious bodily harm likely to cause death.

The appellant conceded guilt for manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons, when read as a whole, sufficiently explained the finding of intent based on the brutality of the beating, even without explicitly addressing an alternative theory raised for the first time on appeal.

This decision concerns the sentencing of two young offenders, U.K. and R.P., convicted by a jury of sexual assault.

The victim, aged 17, was severely intoxicated and unable to consent.

U.K. committed non-consensual fellatio, and R.P. committed non-consensual fellatio and attempted intercourse.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the victim's vulnerability, the multiple acts of assault, and the profound, lasting impact on the victim.

Mitigating factors included the offenders' youth, lack of prior criminal records, and prospects for rehabilitation.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as paramount sentencing principles, balancing them with rehabilitation.

Both offenders were sentenced to two years less a day incarceration, followed by two years probation, along with ancillary orders including a publication ban, weapons prohibition, and DNA sample order.

The English-speaking appellants, having obtained orders under s. 530(1) of the Criminal Code for trials before English-speaking judges and juries, sought to challenge prospective jurors for cause under s. 638(1)(f) on the ground of insufficient English language proficiency.

The trial judges dismissed these applications, concluding that a s. 530 order alone did not automatically entitle an accused to such a challenge without an "air of reality" or "realistic potential" for language competency issues.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judges' decisions, finding that the s. 530 orders were not necessary in these cases as the trials were already in English, and the purpose of s. 530 is to assist official language minorities, not to enforce minimum fair trial conditions for majority language speakers.

The court affirmed that a threshold showing of realistic potential is required for challenges for cause under s. 638(1)(f), similar to s. 638(1)(b), and that existing jury selection processes (Juries Act qualifications, pre-vetting) adequately address language competency.

The appeals were dismissed, and convictions affirmed.

The applicant, an English-speaking accused, sought to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on their English language proficiency, pursuant to s. 638(1)(f) of the Criminal Code, having obtained a s. 530(1) order for an English trial.

The court denied the application, finding that the s. 530 order was not serving its intended purpose of ensuring equal access to justice in an official language where it would not normally occur.

The court also found that the applicant failed to establish an "air of reality" to the need for such a challenge, as the provided census data on "mother tongue" did not directly correlate to current English language abilities, and the standard jury selection process already addresses language competence.

The Crown sought to prevent the accused from re‑litigating two pre‑trial rulings made during an earlier jury trial that ended in a mistrial after the trial judge recused himself for a reasonable apprehension of bias arising from a personal tax dispute with the Canada Revenue Agency.

The Crown relied on s. 653.1 of the Criminal Code, which presumes that evidentiary and Charter rulings from a mistrial remain binding at a new trial unless the interests of justice require otherwise.

The court held that although the provision creates a presumption favouring preservation of prior rulings, the circumstances of the recusal and the trial judge’s own comments suggesting that earlier rulings might appear influenced by the conflict undermined confidence in those decisions.

Given that concern, the interests of justice required that the impugned motions be re‑litigated before the new trial judge.

The Crown’s application to bind the parties to the earlier rulings was dismissed.