Lori Hamilton

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding his language barriers, physical limitations, and alternative explanations for his erratic driving.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found no misapprehension of evidence, holding that the trial judge properly assessed the totality of the evidence, including police and civilian witness testimony, and that the findings of fact were reasonably supported.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on an over 80 charge.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent after finding that the failure to conduct an annual inspection of the breathalyzer amounted to improper maintenance, raising a reasonable doubt about the reliability of the results.

On appeal, the Crown argued that a 2012 Alcohol Test Committee position paper constituted new evidence justifying revisiting the Supreme Court's decision in St. Onge Lamoureux.

The summary conviction appeal judge rejected this argument but found that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence by elevating a recommendation for yearly inspections into a rule without a direct link to a malfunction.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for stunt driving and 'over 80'.

He argued that the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter applications regarding the right to privacy (video surveillance in cells), right to counsel, right to know the reason for detention, and the validity of the roadside breath demand.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred in applying different privacy standards to men and women in cells, but correctly refused to order a stay of proceedings.

The court also found that the trial judge erred in finding a section 8 breach regarding the roadside demand, as the demanding officer was entitled to rely on the reasonable suspicion of another officer.

The court conducted its own section 24(2) analysis for a section 9 breach (failure to advise of reasons for detention) and concluded the breath samples should not be excluded.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction decision declaring him not criminally responsible (NCR) for several offences, including criminal harassment, assault causing bodily harm, uttering a death threat, and breaching a recognizance.

He argued the NCR finding was unreasonable and based on a misapprehension of the evidence.

On appeal, the court admitted fresh psychiatric evidence that was unavailable at trial and which raised significant questions about the NCR conclusion.

Accepting the Crown’s concession, the court held that the fresh evidence could reasonably have affected the result.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered, limited solely to the NCR determination.

The Crown appealed acquittals entered by the Ontario Court of Justice on charges of obstructing a peace officer and two counts of failing to comply with a recognizance.

The trial judge had excluded certified court documents establishing the recognizance conditions on the basis that the Crown failed to provide adequate notice under s. 28 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Superior Court held that exemplifications of judicial records are admissible at common law without notice and that the trial judge erred by relying on contrary lower‑court authority rather than binding appellate precedent.

The court also held there was some evidence capable of supporting the obstruct police charge and that the directed verdict of acquittal was therefore improper.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial ordered on all charges.

The appellant appealed convictions for refusing to comply with a breath demand, assault with intent to resist arrest, four counts of assaulting a police officer, and carrying a concealed weapon following a roadside stop for speeding.

The appellant argued the trial judge provided inadequate reasons, erred in dismissing Charter claims alleging violations of s. 10(b), s. 7, and s. 12, and incorrectly found that police had grounds to demand a breath sample.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge’s reasons were adequate and that credibility findings rejecting the appellant’s evidence were entitled to deference.

The court further held that police were justified in delaying access to counsel due to safety concerns and that reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol consumption supported the roadside demand.

The convictions were upheld.

The accused appealed summary conviction findings of guilt for impaired driving and refusal to provide a breath sample following a motor vehicle collision.

The primary ground of appeal alleged a breach of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that police failed to facilitate access to counsel of choice.

The appeal court held that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding that the police acted reasonably and in good faith by providing access to duty counsel, particularly where the accused did not clearly identify a specific lawyer or object to speaking with duty counsel.

Additional Charter arguments under ss. 7 and 8 were rejected, including a claim relating to alleged disclosure issues and an argument about unlawful seizure where no evidence had actually been seized.

The court concluded that the trial judge properly dismissed the Charter motions and that the convictions should stand.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood‑alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood under the Criminal Code.

The appeal alleged that the verdict was unreasonable because the evidence did not establish that the damaged vehicle observed by one officer was the same vehicle later found with the accused, and that the trial judge’s reasons were legally inadequate.

The court held that the circumstantial evidence—timing, proximity, and distinctive damage to the vehicle—reasonably supported the inference that the same vehicle had been observed driving moments earlier.

The court also found that the trial judge’s reasons sufficiently explained the basis for the conviction and allowed meaningful appellate review.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit, arguing the trial judge failed to consider a requested remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter after finding a s. 8 breach relating to an Intoxilizer demand.

The alleged breach arose from an officer’s imprecise description of the approved screening device used during a roadside R.I.D.E. stop.

The trial judge had admitted the breath test results under s. 24(2), finding the breach technical, in good faith, minimally intrusive, and producing reliable evidence.

On appeal, the court held that the trial judge’s rejection of the s. 24(1) remedy was implicit in his findings and that denying the Crown reliance on the presumption of identity would have been disproportionate.

The court emphasized that minor technical breaches do not justify remedies that would effectively mandate acquittal.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired care or control of a motor vehicle arising from an incident in which police found him standing outside a parked truck on the shoulder of Highway 401.

The trial judge convicted on the impaired charge but acquitted on the over‑80 charge, providing brief oral reasons that largely summarized the evidence and arguments without analyzing them.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the reasons were legally inadequate and prevented meaningful appellate review.

The court held that trial reasons must disclose the logical connection between the evidence, the law, and the verdict, and must resolve the substance of the live issues, including credibility and key factual findings.

Because the trial judge failed to make essential findings or explain the basis for the conviction and acquittal, the reasons were insufficient.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired driving and dangerous driving following a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appeal challenged only the dismissal of a s. 7 Charter application alleging that police failed to preserve the accused’s tractor trailer for mechanical testing, thereby causing lost evidence relevant to potential brake or steering failure.

The court reviewed the jurisprudence on lost evidence and the three categories of possible s. 7 breaches: disclosure violations due to unacceptable negligence, abuse of process, and prejudice to the right to a fair trial.

The court held that although the potential relevance of mechanical testing met the low Stinchcombe threshold, the police conduct did not amount to unacceptable negligence and the evidence was only peripherally relevant.

The appellant also failed to establish actual prejudice to trial fairness or entitlement to a stay of proceedings.

The trial judge’s dismissal of the Charter application was upheld.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for breaching a peace bond contrary to s. 811 of the Criminal Code.

The recognizance prohibited direct or indirect contact or communication with specified complainants.

While attending a church service he was permitted to attend, the appellant pointed at one complainant from a short distance and loudly called her an insulting name to others nearby.

The trial judge held this conduct constituted indirect contact or communication in breach of the recognizance.

The appeal court found the trial judge’s conclusion reasonable and consistent with jurisprudence interpreting indirect communication and contact, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for spousal assault, arguing the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence, improperly took judicial notice of medical evidence from photographs, failed to apply the W.(D.) framework correctly, and provided insufficient reasons.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed credibility, reasonably inferred the cause of injuries from photographic evidence without requiring expert testimony, correctly applied the three-step W.(D.) analysis, and provided legally adequate reasons for the conviction.

The appellant appealed convictions for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg and impaired operation.

The central issue was whether the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence regarding the time of driving, which was critical to the Crown’s toxicological “read‑back” evidence.

The appellate court found there was no evidentiary basis to conclude the accident occurred no earlier than 2:30 a.m., and that the trial judge improperly inferred this timing from an absence of evidence.

Because the Crown’s expert evidence depended on that assumption, the misapprehension undermined the convictions.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals entered.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of failing to comply with a recognizance contrary to s. 145(3) of the Criminal Code.

The accused had been subject to a bail condition prohibiting him from driving while also serving a 90‑day administrative driver’s licence suspension under the Highway Traffic Act.

After the suspension expired and a temporary licence was issued, he drove and was charged with breaching the bail condition.

The trial judge acquitted on the basis that the accused may have honestly forgotten the bail condition and therefore lacked the necessary mens rea.

The Superior Court held that s. 145(3) requires subjective fault and that an honest mistake of fact may raise a reasonable doubt, while a mistake of law cannot.

As there was some evidentiary basis for the trial judge’s reasonable doubt regarding the accused’s state of mind, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing or refusing to provide a suitable breath sample contrary to s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing contradictions in the evidence regarding alcohol consumption, improperly accepted the officer’s testimony that he refused to provide a breath sample, failed to consider the mens rea element, and imposed a harsh sentence.

The appeal court held that the trial judge was entitled to prefer the officer’s evidence and that credibility findings are owed deference on appeal unless unsupported by the evidence.

The court found the trial judge had an evidential basis to conclude the appellant intentionally failed or refused to provide a proper sample despite multiple opportunities.

The $1,500 fine was slightly above the statutory minimum and not demonstrably unfit.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay impaired driving charges against the respondent due to an alleged violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was just over 15 months.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred in characterizing the delay periods, particularly by failing to properly account for neutral intake time, inherent time requirements for pre-trial conferences, and the time needed for counsel to prepare.

The court concluded the systemic delay was within acceptable guidelines and the societal interest in prosecuting drinking and driving offences outweighed the minimal prejudice to the respondent.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The applicant sought writs of certiorari and mandamus to quash a Justice of the Peace's decision refusing to issue process against a police officer for a private prosecution.

The applicant also sought to prohibit his own upcoming criminal trial.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the applications, finding no jurisdictional error by the Justice of the Peace, who properly considered the applicant's evidence and concluded there was no rational inference of criminal intent.

The court further noted that even if there were jurisdictional error, it would decline to issue the writs as there was no reasonable prospect of conviction.

The accused applied for certiorari to quash a preliminary inquiry judge’s decision committing him to stand trial on charges of dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm arising from a highway collision involving a tractor trailer.

The applicant argued the preliminary inquiry judge erred by focusing on the consequences of the driving rather than the manner of driving, and by failing to conduct a limited weighing of circumstantial evidence.

The reviewing court held the preliminary inquiry judge properly considered the evidence, including expert accident reconstruction and traffic conditions in a construction zone where lanes were merging.

The court concluded there was evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could convict.

The application for certiorari was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for sexual assault involving alleged sexual touching of a 13‑year‑old complainant.

The trial judge had accepted the complainant’s evidence and rejected the accused’s testimony, relying heavily on inferences that the accused had consumed significant alcohol which undermined his reliability.

On appeal, the court held that these inferences were unsupported by the evidence and amounted to speculative reasoning affecting the credibility assessment.

Because the trial judge relied on those unsupported conclusions in rejecting the accused’s denial, the verdict could not stand.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.