Dr. Scott Woodside

The appellant challenged jury convictions arising from a series of violent offences and a police chase, arguing the verdict was unreasonable because the identification evidence was tainted and unreliable.

The court held that, although several eyewitness identifications had significant frailties, the jury was carefully instructed and there remained a safe path to conviction based on one potentially untainted lineup identification together with substantial confirmatory circumstantial evidence.

The appellant also challenged his dangerous offender designation on the basis that the sentencing judge did not expressly consider treatability and intractability at the designation stage.

Applying the framework in dangerous offender jurisprudence, the court held that any omission was immaterial because the sentencing judge’s findings at the penalty stage established there was no more than speculative hope of treatment reducing the appellant’s risk to an acceptable level.

The conviction appeal and sentence appeal were dismissed.

In a conviction appeal, the appellant sought production of a post-Hason Crown communication, plus a list of cases reviewed by the prosecution service concerning a forensic psychiatric expert and reasons for selection.

The court applied the two-step appellate production framework requiring a reasonable possibility the materials could assist a fresh-evidence motion and a reasonable possibility of eventual admissibility as fresh evidence.

It held the request was speculative, case-specific concerns from prior proceedings did not establish relevance in this record, and the requested internal review rationale was privileged.

The court further held that any standalone direction, divorced from justification, would not satisfy the relevance threshold.

The production motion was dismissed.

The accused was convicted of assault causing bodily harm following a trial on a charge of attempted murder.

The Crown initially sought a dangerous offender designation but abandoned this application following the Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Hason, which raised concerns about the reliability of expert psychiatric evidence.

The court accepted a joint submission sentencing the accused to an additional three years in the penitentiary (for a total of 9.75 years) and imposed a long-term supervision order for eight years.

The sentence was imposed to allow the accused to access treatment while in custody and to protect the public given the accused's extensive history of violent offences.

The Court addressed the test for fitness to stand trial under s. 2 of the Criminal Code and held that fitness requires capacity to make and communicate reality-based defence decisions, not capacity to make decisions in one’s best interests.

Applying that standard, the majority found no basis to disturb findings that the accused was fit despite fluctuating psychotic symptoms, because the record showed sustained reality-based participation and intelligible communication.

The majority also dismissed fresh and new evidence motions concerning post-trial psychiatric evidence and later judicial findings about the Crown expert’s practices, concluding the proposed evidence could not reasonably have affected the verdict.

A dissent would have admitted the fresh evidence, found a miscarriage of justice, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed J.C.'s appeal from a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, finding a miscarriage of justice due to the limited, non-adversarial role assigned to amicus curiae at the original hearing.

The Court held that, in light of subsequent Supreme Court guidance in R. v. Kahsai, the trial judge erred in principle by not appointing amicus with a broader, adversarial mandate to ensure fairness, given the appellant's self-represented and self-defeating position.

The Court ordered a new hearing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, his dangerous offender designation, and his indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the appellant was reckless and failed to take all reasonable steps to ascertain the underage complainant's age.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's discretionary decision under the Kienapple principle to enter a conviction for sexual assault rather than sexual interference.

However, the Court admitted fresh evidence demonstrating that the Crown's psychiatric expert employed a careless practice in preparing dangerous offender reports in another case.

Because the trial judge relied heavily on this expert's apparent thoroughness to impose an indeterminate sentence, the Court allowed the sentence appeal in part and ordered a new penalty hearing with a fresh psychiatric assessment.

The appellant, Quinnton Drake, appealed an indeterminate dangerous offender sentence.

He had pleaded guilty to multiple violent offences, including robbery with a firearm, and had a lengthy criminal record.

At sentencing, he conceded dangerous offender criteria but sought a long-term supervision order instead of an indeterminate sentence, arguing the judge failed to adequately consider his remorse and willingness to participate in treatment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge correctly applied sentencing principles, including public protection as primary, and properly weighed the appellant's evidence against expert testimony indicating a very poor prognosis for treatment success and high risk of reoffending.

The Crown appealed the sentencing judge's decision not to designate the respondent, who pleaded guilty to child pornography offences, as a dangerous or long-term offender.

The sentencing judge erred by requiring a "direct" or "root cause" of psychological harm for Serious Personal Injury Offence (SPIO) designation and by misinterpreting the risk of re-offending for long-term offender status.

The Court of Appeal clarified that child pornography offences can constitute SPIOs based on a broader causation standard and that the long-term offender criteria do not necessarily require a risk of violent re-offending.

The appeal was allowed, and a new hearing was ordered.

During a dangerous offender sentencing hearing, the Crown tendered a forensic psychiatrist as an expert witness.

The offender and amicus curiae challenged the expert's qualifications, arguing he exhibited professional credibility bias.

A voir dire revealed the expert's reports contained numerous significant errors, including copying large sections from a report about a different offender.

The court found the expert demonstrated professional credibility bias by failing to objectively reconsider his opinions when confronted with these errors.

The court excluded the expert opinion evidence, concluding that the risks of admitting the evidence outweighed its benefits.

The appellant, who suffered from schizophrenia and represented himself at trial, appealed his first-degree murder conviction.

He argued he was unfit to stand trial and urged the Court of Appeal to overturn or modify the 'limited cognitive capacity' test from R. v. Taylor to require that an accused be capable of making rational decisions in their best interests.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Taylor test, clarifying that while an accused must have a reality-based understanding of their legal predicament and the ability to make decisions, they need not possess 'analytic capacity' to make decisions in their own best interests.

The Court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to the voluntariness of statements made to a Crown psychiatrist and refused to admit fresh psychiatric evidence to substitute a verdict of not criminally responsible.

The appellant, Nicholas Wong, appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

He was convicted of two counts of attempted murder with a firearm and other related offences.

The Crown sought the dangerous offender designation based on a pattern of repetitive and persistent aggressive behaviour, including prior firearm possession offences.

Wong argued the sentencing judge erred by considering firearm possession as part of the pattern and by admitting expert evidence on gang affiliation and prior gun use.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the sentencing judge's determination that Wong met the dangerous offender criteria, nor in the admission of the challenged evidence.

The appellant, Kirk Williams, sought leave to appeal his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence for sexual assault causing bodily harm and choking.

He argued the sentencing judge erred in finding the statutory pathways for designation were met and in assessing future harm and treatment prospects.

The Court of Appeal granted leave but dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's conclusions regarding the dangerous offender pathways, the consideration of medical treatments, or the assessment of recidivism risk.

The court upheld the indeterminate sentence as necessary for public protection.

The appellant, convicted of multiple domestic violence offences and designated a dangerous offender with an indeterminate sentence, appealed his conviction and sentence.

Grounds included reasonable apprehension of bias, errors in credibility findings, abuse of process regarding a breach of recognizance, and unreasonable post-verdict delay violating Charter s. 11(b) rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, affirming the trial judge's findings on credibility, the dangerous offender designation, and finding no bias or Charter breach due to the exceptional nature of dangerous offender proceedings.

The accused, who suffers from schizophrenia, attacked a co-worker without provocation, striking her repeatedly with a metal brake part.

He was charged with attempted murder.

The matter was converted to a trial on consent, and a finding of guilt was made.

A hearing was then held to determine whether the accused was not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's framework in Oommen, the court found that the accused's active psychosis deprived him of the capacity for rational perception and rational choice about the moral wrongfulness of his actions.

The accused was found not criminally responsible.

The accused drove a rented van down a busy sidewalk in Toronto, killing 10 people and injuring 16 others.

He admitted to the acts but raised a defence of not criminally responsible (NCR) under s. 16 of the Criminal Code, arguing that his Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) rendered him incapable of knowing his actions were morally wrong.

The court found that while ASD qualifies as a mental disorder under s. 16, the accused did not lack the capacity to rationally evaluate his actions.

He knew his actions were legally and morally wrong but chose to commit them to achieve notoriety.

The NCR defence failed, and the accused was found guilty of 10 counts of first-degree murder and 16 counts of attempted murder.

The defendant, Quinnton Drake, pleaded guilty to multiple serious offences, including robbery with a firearm and dangerous driving.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application.

The court found the defendant to be a dangerous offender based on a pattern of repetitive violent behaviour and persistent aggressive behaviour, demonstrating a failure to restrain behaviour and a substantial indifference to foreseeable consequences.

Despite the defence arguing for a fixed-term sentence followed by a long-term supervision order, the court determined that an indeterminate sentence was required, as there was no reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public from the risk of future serious personal injury offences.

Ancillary orders included a mandatory DNA sample and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The appellant, a dangerous offender, appealed an indeterminate sentence imposed for breaching his long-term supervision order (LTSO).

The breach involved pursuing a young woman without reporting contact, a behaviour similar to his past criminal harassment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly considered the principles of proportionality and mitigating factors, and reasonably concluded that an indeterminate sentence was necessary for public protection given the appellant's high risk of recidivism and history of non-compliance with treatment.

The court did, however, set aside a victim surcharge in accordance with R. v. Boudreault.

The Crown applied to have Derek Fellows declared a dangerous offender pursuant to section 753(1) of the Criminal Code.

The offender pleaded guilty to sexually assaulting a 10-year-old boy by luring him into a forest and attempting forced anal intercourse, possessing child pornography, and breaching two court orders prohibiting contact with children.

The offender had a prior conviction in 2005 for repeatedly sexually assaulting a 7-year-old boy and multiple convictions for possessing child pornography.

The court found that all statutory criteria for dangerous offender designation were satisfied and imposed an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender and long-term offender application following the offender's convictions for a series of violent, random attacks on women, including robbery, attempted sexual assault, and break and enter.

The court dismissed both applications, finding that the offender's risk of violent re-offence was moderate and did not meet the high threshold of intractability required for such designations.

The court imposed a global sentence of 14 years imprisonment, reduced to 6 years and 6 months net after accounting for pre-sentence custody and enhanced credit for harsh lockdown conditions.

The Crown applied for a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence following the defendant's guilty pleas to robbery and failure to comply with probation.

The defendant, who represented himself despite the court's urging that he retain counsel, presented a self-defeating defence and repeatedly stated his agreement with the Crown's position.

The court found that the defendant's pattern of repetitive robberies, escalating violence, substance abuse, and personality disorders established the statutory criteria for dangerous offender designation.

The court imposed an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment, while noting the defendant's tragic background and the possibility of eventual parole if he demonstrates genuine rehabilitation.