Tracey Vogel

Following a trial, the offender was convicted of attempted murder and breaching a recognizance for brutally assaulting a five-year-old child and leaving him for dead in an isolated area.

The Crown applied for a dangerous offender designation under section 753(1)(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The court rejected the dangerous offender application, finding that while the conduct was undoubtedly brutal, the psychiatric evidence did not compel the conclusion that the offender's future behaviour would be unlikely to be inhibited by normal standards of behavioural restraint.

However, the court imposed a life sentence based on the extreme brutality of the offence, the vulnerability of the victim, the breach of trust, the premeditated nature of the crime, and the offender's high risk of violent reoffending as established by actuarial assessment.

The court declined to impose a parole eligibility delay under section 743.6, finding that a life sentence adequately addressed the sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence.

Karson Benjamin, a youthful first offender, pleaded guilty to numerous serious offences including trafficking 27 firearms, 12 overcapacity magazines, 2 selector switches, over half a kilogram of fentanyl, and cocaine.

He was also found with a loaded handgun and proceeds of crime upon arrest.

The Crown sought a 15-year global sentence, while the defence argued for less than 10 years.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the nature and quantity of drugs and firearms, the combination of guns and drugs, and Benjamin's integral role, attenuated by his intellectual limitations.

Mitigating factors included his youth, lack of criminal record, difficult background, early guilty pleas, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

Applying principles of proportionality, parity, deterrence, denunciation, protection of the public, rehabilitation, and restraint, the court imposed a global sentence of 13 years, with specific counts running concurrently or consecutively, and credited 1458 days for pre-sentence custody.

The defendant, Quinnton Drake, pleaded guilty to multiple serious offences, including robbery with a firearm and dangerous driving.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application.

The court found the defendant to be a dangerous offender based on a pattern of repetitive violent behaviour and persistent aggressive behaviour, demonstrating a failure to restrain behaviour and a substantial indifference to foreseeable consequences.

Despite the defence arguing for a fixed-term sentence followed by a long-term supervision order, the court determined that an indeterminate sentence was required, as there was no reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public from the risk of future serious personal injury offences.

Ancillary orders included a mandatory DNA sample and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The accused was charged with firearm offences after being arrested during a police takedown of a target he was accompanying.

The accused brought Charter applications alleging arbitrary detention and excessive use of force, supported by independent video evidence showing police kicking him while he was handcuffed on the ground.

The court found the detention was arbitrary as police lacked reasonable grounds, and excluded the firearm under s. 24(2) due to the seriousness of the police misconduct.

The court also found the Crown failed to prove possession beyond a reasonable doubt due to severe police credibility issues, resulting in an acquittal.

Taylor Griffith was found guilty of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, trafficking in cocaine and crack cocaine, and failing to comply with probation and firearms prohibition orders.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the dangerous combination of guns and drugs, the quantity of drugs, and Griffith's prior record.

Mitigating factors included his youth, family support, remorse, and participation in rehabilitation programs while in custody.

The court also addressed a Charter violation claim for sentence reduction, finding no additional harm or prejudice connected to the breach of delaying contact with counsel.

A global sentence of 6 years imprisonment was imposed, with credit for 22 months of pre-sentence custody, resulting in a further 4 years and 2 months incarceration, along with a lifetime firearms prohibition and DNA order.

Taylor Griffith, charged with firearm and drug trafficking offenses, applied to exclude evidence seized during his arrest, alleging violations of his s. 8, s. 9, and s. 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found the arrest and incidental search lawful, with objectively reasonable grounds based on police surveillance and observed hand-to-hand transactions.

However, a breach of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) occurred due to a delay in facilitating contact with a lawyer until after search warrants were executed.

Applying the s. 24(2) Grant analysis, the court determined that while the police conduct in delaying counsel was serious, the impact on the accused's Charter interests was minimal as the evidence (loaded firearm and drugs) was seized prior to the breach and was real, reliable, and crucial.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The applicant, awaiting sentencing for armed robbery and other offences, brought multiple applications challenging his incarceration conditions and seeking production from government entities.

The court ruled that the prosecuting Crown is the only proper and necessary party, with other government entities acting as interveners or third parties.

The court established a sequence for the upcoming applications, beginning with an O'Connor application for third-party production from the federal government, followed by habeas corpus and Charter applications, and concluding with the sentencing hearing.

The Crown sought an order under section 752.1(1) of the Criminal Code to remand the defendant, Ammaan Charley, for a psychiatric assessment as the first stage in a dangerous or long-term offender application.

This followed Charley's conviction for robbery with a firearm, aggravated assault, and related firearm offenses.

The defense opposed the assessment and the unsealing of Charley's youth records.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that while the threshold for such an assessment is low, the defendant's criminal record, particularly when considering the diminished moral culpability of a youth offense, did not establish a sufficient "pattern of repetitive behaviour" or "persistent aggressive behaviour" to meet the statutory criteria.

The application to unseal youth records for sentencing was also dismissed.

The accused, Tryden Reis, was found guilty of aggravated assault, discharging a firearm with intent to wound, and using a firearm during aggravated assault.

The Crown sought a sentence of five to six years, noting the four-year mandatory minimum for discharging a firearm with intent to wound under s. 244(2)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Reis challenged the constitutionality of this mandatory minimum sentence under section 12 of the Charter, arguing it constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

The court applied the Nur/Lloyd two-step test, finding the mandatory minimum sentence was not grossly disproportionate, both generally and in the specific circumstances of the accused and reasonable hypotheticals.

The constitutional challenge was dismissed.

The court imposed a global sentence of six years imprisonment, concurrent for aggravated assault and discharging a firearm with intent to wound.

Credit for pre-sentence custody (45 days at 1.5:1, totaling 68 days) and house arrest (just under four months) was awarded, reducing the total sentence to five and a half years.

The charge of using a firearm during aggravated assault was stayed.

A DNA sample order and a lifetime weapons prohibition order were also made.

In a blended voir dire, the Crown sought to admit the accused's confessions regarding two armoured truck robberies, while the accused sought their exclusion under the Charter.

The court found the statements were voluntary and dismissed claims of arbitrary detention and initial right to counsel breaches.

However, the court found a s. 10(b) breach occurred when police failed to re-advise the accused of his right to counsel after questioning shifted to a separate, earlier robbery, which significantly changed his jeopardy.

Statements regarding the earlier robbery were excluded under s. 24(2).

The accused, Tryden Reis, was charged with attempted murder, possession of a loaded restricted firearm, discharging a firearm with intent to wound, aggravated assault, and using a firearm while committing aggravated assault.

The court addressed the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements from two key witnesses (Nicholas Gray and Kaion Brown) under R. v. Khelawon and R. v. B (K.G), admitting Gray's statement but rejecting Brown's due to its systematic deception.

An Edgar application to admit the accused's out-of-court utterance was dismissed, as Gray's question was an inquiry, not an accusation.

The primary defenses of accident and self-defense were rejected.

The court found that the victim, Tutu, was walking away when attacked, and the accused's subsequent shooting of Brown was neither in self-defense nor accidental.

Relying on Gray's police statement, video footage, and the accused's post-offence conduct (disposal of weapon and clothing), the court found culpability.

The Crown sought to admit an audio recording and transcript of a 911 call as *res gestae* evidence in a criminal trial for armed robbery.

The defence argued the call was not truly contemporaneous with the events and contained significant inconsistencies compared to other witness accounts and the caller's later police statement, thus lacking reliability.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay, finding the 911 call necessary for a complete picture of the alleged armed robbery and reliable due to its contemporaneous and urgent nature, which negated the risk of concoction or fabrication.

The court admitted the 911 call for the truth of its contents, noting that any inconsistencies could be addressed through cross-examination of the caller at trial.

In a trial for second degree murder, the Crown and defence brought pre-trial applications regarding the admissibility of evidence.

The defence sought to introduce evidence of prior violent acts by the deceased to support a claim of self-defence.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of the deceased's good character, the accused's bad character, and ante-mortem statements made by the deceased.

The court ruled that evidence of the deceased's prior violent acts was admissible.

The Crown's application to introduce the deceased's good character was largely dismissed, except for evidence of his non-violent disposition at work.

The Crown's application to introduce the accused's bad character was dismissed due to its prejudicial effect outweighing its probative value.

Most of the ante-mortem statements were ruled inadmissible hearsay, save for a statement of intention and lay opinion regarding the accused's tone of voice.

The defendant was charged with two counts of armed robbery and wearing a disguise with intent.

She admitted to being present during the robberies but raised the common law defence of duress, testifying that she was forced to participate by a violent co-accused who threatened her with serious bodily harm or death.

The court found the defendant's testimony credible, noting the co-accused's reputation for irrational violence and the defendant's reasonable fear that the threats would be carried out.

The court concluded the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defence of duress did not apply, and the defendant was acquitted on all counts.