Andrew Weafer

The accused pled guilty to fraud over $5,000, uttering a forged document, and committing theft under false pretenses in connection with an elaborate Ponzi scheme operated through Mac Glamour Inc. between 2015 and 2019.

The accused targeted members of her Filipino community, promising high investment returns on a fictitious lipstick manufacturing business.

A Gardiner hearing was held over 30 months to determine the quantum of loss and whether a fine in lieu of forfeiture should be ordered.

The court accepted a joint submission of 4 years imprisonment and ordered a fine in lieu of $610,856.00 based on losses that were readily ascertainable from documentation provided by certain victims.

The court rejected the Crown's submission that losses totaling nearly $5 million were proven, finding that many victim claims lacked sufficient documentation to meet the "readily ascertainable" threshold.

The accused, LB, was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference of his step-granddaughter AD, aged 10-15, between 2013 and 2018.

The Crown presented evidence from AD, her mother, and a police officer, while the defence called AD's brother and LB himself.

The court applied the W.(D.) principle, assessing the credibility and reliability of the witnesses.

While acknowledging the challenges of child witness testimony and delayed disclosure, the judge found significant unreliability in AD's evidence, particularly regarding inconsistencies and omissions of key details in her statements.

Coupled with the strength of LB's denials and explanations, the court concluded that the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

LB was acquitted on both counts.

The defendant was charged with failing to provide a suitable breath sample into an Approved Screening Device (ASD) contrary to s. 320.15(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown had to prove the ASD was in proper working order and that the defendant intentionally failed to provide a sample.

The court found the ASD was functioning correctly based on officer demonstrations.

Despite the defendant's testimony that he tried his best and was nervous, the court concluded, based on his repeated failed attempts and demonstrated ability to blow through a straw unattached to the device, that he purposely did not provide a suitable sample when the straw was inserted into the ASD.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with voyeurism for taking 'up-skirt' videos of women on public transit and at his workplace.

The accused claimed he hired escorts and had their consent to live out a fantasy.

The court rejected the accused's statement as inconsistent with the video evidence, which showed him quickly following unsuspecting women.

The court found that the recordings captured the anal region (buttocks) of the subjects, who had a reasonable expectation of privacy, and entered a finding of guilt.

The Crown applied under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code to admit the videotaped statement of the complainant, who was 17 years old at the time of the alleged sexual assault.

The defence objected to the admission, arguing that the police officer asked leading questions, the statement was unresponsive, and the video quality was poor.

The court reviewed the statement and found that it met the statutory requirements, as it was made within a reasonable time and described the acts complained of.

The court ordered minor edits to remove a few leading questions but otherwise granted the application to admit the statement.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought a section 8 Charter application seeking to exclude text messages seized from the complainant's cell phone.

The Crown requested that the case management judge summarily dismiss the application, arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in Marakah did not apply because the complainant consented to the police photographing the messages.

The court declined to summarily dismiss the application, finding that Marakah did not definitively resolve the impact of one party's consent on the other party's privacy interests, and therefore the application raised a live issue warranting a full hearing.

The offender was convicted of robbery with a firearm and related offences, which carried a mandatory minimum sentence of seven years.

He spent over three and a half years in pre-sentence custody at the Toronto South Detention Centre, enduring exceptionally harsh conditions including 491 days of lockdowns.

The court dismissed a request for a Charter stay of proceedings but granted significant enhanced credit for the oppressive pre-sentence custody conditions under the Duncan framework.

The offender was sentenced to 7.5 years plus one day, with 7.5 years of pre-sentence credit applied, leaving one day to serve followed by two years of probation.

Jaleel Williams was charged with robbery and other offenses.

He sought to exclude evidence seized during an investigative detention and search, arguing violations of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown sought to admit certain utterances made by Williams.

The court found that the detention and search violated ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter, as there was no objectively reasonable basis for the initial detention and the search exceeded the scope of a permissible pat-down.

This evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found no violation of Williams's s. 10(b) right to counsel and admitted his booking hall utterances as voluntary.

As a result of the exclusion of key evidence, the Crown tendered no further evidence, and Williams was found not guilty of the charges.

The applicant was convicted of robbery with a firearm and related offences.

Following conviction, the Crown brought an unsuccessful application for a psychiatric assessment for a dangerous offender application, and the defence brought a Charter application regarding pre-trial custody conditions.

The sentencing was delayed for 17 months post-conviction.

The applicant brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The court applied the Jordan framework to the post-conviction sentencing delay, finding a net delay of 32 months (24 months pre-trial and 8 months post-trial attributable to the system/Crown).

As this exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling, the court found a s. 11(b) violation and permanently stayed the proceedings.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm following a single-car collision on Highway 401.

The accused, driving a friend's car, approached another vehicle at a high rate of speed and made a sudden lane change to avoid a collision, losing control and striking the guardrails.

The passenger suffered significant injuries including a broken kneecap and concussion.

The court rejected the accused's claim that the passenger grabbed the steering wheel.

Applying the modified objective test, the court found the accused's excessive speed and sudden lane change constituted a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable driver.

The accused was found guilty.

The Crown brought applications pursuant to sections 540(7) and 486.2(1) of the Criminal Code seeking to admit a video-taped statement of an 11-year-old witness and to permit the witness to testify via closed-circuit television.

The defendant was charged with assault and mischief arising from incidents on August 20, 2016.

The witness had provided a statement to police describing witnessing the defendant assault his mother and assault him when he attempted to call 911.

The court admitted the statement under section 540(7), finding it met the threshold of reliability despite the officers' lack of training in child interviews.

The court also granted the Crown's application for closed-circuit television testimony under section 486.2(1), finding it preferable to a screen given the witness's age, relationship to the defendant, and the nature of the allegations.

The applicant, awaiting sentencing for armed robbery and other offences, brought multiple applications challenging his incarceration conditions and seeking production from government entities.

The court ruled that the prosecuting Crown is the only proper and necessary party, with other government entities acting as interveners or third parties.

The court established a sequence for the upcoming applications, beginning with an O'Connor application for third-party production from the federal government, followed by habeas corpus and Charter applications, and concluding with the sentencing hearing.

The Crown sought an order under section 752.1(1) of the Criminal Code to remand the defendant, Ammaan Charley, for a psychiatric assessment as the first stage in a dangerous or long-term offender application.

This followed Charley's conviction for robbery with a firearm, aggravated assault, and related firearm offenses.

The defense opposed the assessment and the unsealing of Charley's youth records.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that while the threshold for such an assessment is low, the defendant's criminal record, particularly when considering the diminished moral culpability of a youth offense, did not establish a sufficient "pattern of repetitive behaviour" or "persistent aggressive behaviour" to meet the statutory criteria.

The application to unseal youth records for sentencing was also dismissed.

The defendant was charged with racing a motor vehicle on a highway contrary to section 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, specifically for outdistancing or attempting to outdistance another vehicle while driving at a marked departure from the lawful speed limit.

The Crown's evidence, provided by a police constable, alleged the defendant was driving in the northbound lane at 110-120 km/h beside another vehicle.

The defendant testified he remained in the southbound lane at approximately 60 km/h, attempting to pass a stopped vehicle.

The court found the defendant's evidence credible and, when considered in context with all evidence, raised a reasonable doubt as to whether he was outdistancing another vehicle or driving at a marked departure from the lawful speed.

The defendant was acquitted of racing but convicted of the included offence of speeding.