Kenneth W. Dechert

The defendant was charged with failing to stop at a red light contrary to subsection 144(18) of the Highway Traffic Act.

A voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of statements made by the defendant to police at the scene of a motor vehicle collision.

The Crown sought to admit the statements as voluntary admissions.

The defendant argued the statements were involuntary and alternatively that they were statutorily compelled under the Highway Traffic Act, thereby violating the common law principle against self-incrimination.

The court found the statements were made voluntarily and that the defendant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that she honestly and reasonably believed she was required by law to make the statements.

The statements were admitted into evidence.

This is a ruling on a Charter application under subsections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The corporate defendants challenged whether their right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The court applied the Jordan framework and determined that the trial delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases.

The court found that while certain discrete exceptional events could be deducted from the total delay, the remaining delay still exceeded the ceiling and could not be justified by the complexity of the case.

Accordingly, the charges against all corporate defendants were stayed.

The defendant was charged with driving while holding a hand-held communication device contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant admitted to holding her cell phone while driving on the Queen Elizabeth Way but claimed the defence of necessity, arguing that the phone was slipping out of its dashboard holder and she feared it would fall to the floor and interfere with her ability to control the vehicle.

The court found that while the defendant perceived imminent peril, she had a reasonable legal alternative (pulling onto the shoulder) and the harm inflicted (distracted driving) outweighed the harm avoided.

The court also rejected the defence of due diligence, finding the defendant failed to take all reasonable steps to avoid the offence.

The defendant was convicted.

The defendant was charged with failing to stop for a school bus with flashing red signal lights while meeting it on a highway, contrary to subsection 175(11) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant argued that she was exempt from liability because the relevant portion of Sutton Street contained a median strip, which exempts drivers from the obligation to stop for school buses.

The court found that the defendant proved on a balance of probabilities that Sutton Street at the relevant location was a highway with a median strip, as it contained a physical divided barrier separating northbound and southbound traffic.

Accordingly, the defendant was found not guilty and the charge was dismissed.

The Halton Region Conservation Authority sought to amend charges against a corporate defendant relating to alleged interference with a wetland and watercourse.

The prosecution moved to expand the time frame of 30 charges from August 28, 2012 to September 26, 2012, to May 1, 2011 to September 26, 2012, and to add particulars regarding destruction of vegetation to three counts.

The court granted the motion, finding that the evidence of the defendant's farming activities supported the amendments, the circumstances were serious environmental protection matters, the defendant was not prejudiced, and the limitation period had not expired.

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle while holding or using a hand-held wireless communication device, contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

A police officer testified that he observed the defendant holding a cell phone in his left hand while driving on the Queen Elizabeth Way.

The defendant testified that his cell phone was mounted on a magnetic holder on the dashboard and that he did not hold it while driving.

The court applied the W.(D.) credibility test and found that the defendant's evidence, considered in the context of the totality of the evidence, raised a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with speeding at 105 km/h in a posted 60 km/h zone on Dundas Street in Oakville.

The prosecution relied on Lidar speed measurements taken by a trained police officer.

The defendant testified she was traveling at approximately 40 km/h due to traffic lights and her vehicle's standard transmission limitations.

The court found the defendant guilty of the included offence of speeding at 95 km/h in a posted 60 km/h zone, accepting the officer's evidence regarding the speed readings near Meadowridge Drive while finding reasonable doubt regarding the initial 105 km/h reading near Prince Michael Drive.

The defendant was charged with driving while holding a hand-held communication device contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The sole issue at trial was whether the black-coloured object observed in the defendant's hand was a cell phone.

A police officer testified that he observed the defendant holding what he identified as a cell phone while driving on the QEW.

The court found that while the prosecution established the defendant was holding an object on a balance of probabilities, it failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the object was a cell phone.

The officer's lay opinion was equivocal, lacking sufficient factual basis and containing internal inconsistencies.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendants brought a Charter application under subsections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that their right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed due to unreasonable delay in consolidated provincial offence proceedings involving 39 defendants and 812 charges under the Conservation Authorities Act.

The court applied the analytical framework established in Regina v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, distinguishing between individual defendants and corporate defendants.

The court found that the individual defendants' rights had been infringed and stayed their charges, while the corporate defendants' applications were dismissed based on the principle that prejudice to fair trial rights cannot be inferred for corporations and the application of the transitional exceptional circumstance.

A ruling on a voir dire concerning the admissibility of Approximate Regulation Limit (A.R.L.) maps created by the Halton Region Conservation Authority.

The prosecution sought to admit these maps as evidence to establish the regulatory jurisdiction of the Authority over properties at 7459 Auburn Road, Milton, Ontario.

The defendants challenged admissibility on hearsay grounds.

The court determined that the A.R.L. maps, created pursuant to Ontario Regulation 162/06, constitute part of the regulation itself and are therefore admissible under section 25 of the Evidence Act as copies of regulations.

The defendant was charged with five offences arising from operating a motor vehicle on a highway without proper documentation and insurance.

The charges included: failing to surrender a vehicle permit, failing to surrender a driver's licence, failing to surrender an insurance card, using an unauthorized number plate, and operating a motor vehicle without insurance.

The defendant did not appear at trial.

The court found the defendant guilty of all charges, but applied the rule against multiple convictions to the insurance-related offences, entering a conviction on the more serious charge and a conditional stay on the lesser charge.

The defendant was charged with speeding 139 km/h in a posted 100 km/h zone on Highway 407 on October 12, 2014.

Following the prosecution's case, the defendant moved for a non-suit, arguing that the prosecution had failed to establish a prima facie case regarding the speed element of the offence, specifically challenging the reliability of the laser speed measurement device and the officer's testimony regarding its operation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the prosecution had met its evidential burden by presenting direct evidence of all essential elements of the offence, including the speed measurement obtained through a properly calibrated and operated laser device by a trained officer.

The defendant was charged with disobeying a "No U Turn" sign contrary to section 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

A police officer observed a grey four-door motor vehicle execute a prohibited U-turn at the intersection of Postridge Drive and Dalebrook Drive in Oakville and subsequently stopped a vehicle matching that description on Trafalgar Road, driven by the defendant.

The defendant's representative argued that the prosecution failed to establish continuity of observation and therefore failed to prove the defendant was the driver of the offending vehicle.

The court found the offence to be one of strict liability, accepted the officer's credible and reliable testimony regarding vehicle identification, and found the prosecution proved all elements of the actus reus beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant did not establish a due diligence defence and was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle on a highway while his driver's licence was suspended, contrary to section 53(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial proceeded in the defendant's absence.

The Crown proved the actus reus of the strict liability offence beyond a reasonable doubt: that the defendant was driving a motor vehicle on a highway while his licence was suspended for medical reasons.

The defendant failed to establish the due diligence defence on a balance of probabilities.

Although the defendant claimed to possess a doctor's letter permitting him to drive, he took no steps to verify his obligations regarding licence reinstatement and remained passively ignorant of the administrative requirements.

The court found the defendant guilty.

This is a ruling on a preliminary motion regarding the proper categorization of party liability offences under the Provincial Offences Act.

The defendants were charged with offences contrary to the Conservation Authorities Act, both as principal offenders and as parties to the offences.

The central issue was whether party liability offences based on aiding or abetting the commission of a regulatory strict liability offence should themselves be classified as strict liability offences or as mens rea offences.

The court examined the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in La Souveraine and concluded that party liability offences based on aiding (under paragraph 77(1)(b) of the POA) should be classified as strict liability offences, while those based on abetting (under paragraph 77(1)(c)) remain mens rea offences.

A voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of lay opinion evidence from a watershed enforcement officer regarding the freshness of topsoil observed at a property.

The officer opined that topsoil was "very fresh material" based on observations of construction equipment, lack of vegetation, and crisp bulldozer tracks.

The court applied the four-element test from Regina v. Graat to determine whether the lay opinion evidence was admissible.

The court found that all four elements were satisfied: the officer was in a better position than the trier of fact to form the conclusion; the conclusion was one that persons of ordinary experience could make when combined with the officer's experiential capacity; the officer had the necessary experiential capacity despite not being an expert; and the opinion was a compendious mode of stating complex facts.

The opinion was admitted into evidence.

The defendant was charged with racing a motor vehicle on a highway contrary to section 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, specifically for outdistancing or attempting to outdistance another vehicle while driving at a marked departure from the lawful speed limit.

The Crown's evidence, provided by a police constable, alleged the defendant was driving in the northbound lane at 110-120 km/h beside another vehicle.

The defendant testified he remained in the southbound lane at approximately 60 km/h, attempting to pass a stopped vehicle.

The court found the defendant's evidence credible and, when considered in context with all evidence, raised a reasonable doubt as to whether he was outdistancing another vehicle or driving at a marked departure from the lawful speed.

The defendant was acquitted of racing but convicted of the included offence of speeding.

The defendant was charged with driving while holding a hand-held wireless communication device (cell phone) contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

A police officer testified that he observed the defendant holding what appeared to be a cell phone in her right hand while driving on Highway 401.

The court found that while the officer was credible, his testimony was unreliable due to lack of memory clarity, inability to describe distinguishing features of the device, and internal inconsistencies in his identification.

The prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the object was a cell phone.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act and fail to remain at the scene of an accident contrary to section 200(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial proceeded ex parte after the defendant failed to appear.

The Crown proved that the defendant lost control of his vehicle while driving at 70-80 km/h in a 60 km/h zone on a curve, causing it to leave the roadway and roll down an embankment.

The defendant admitted to leaving the scene immediately and not returning until police contacted him.

The court acquitted on the careless driving charge, finding the speed excess of 10-20 km/h constituted inadvertent negligence rather than conduct deserving of punishment.

The court convicted on the fail to remain charge, finding all elements of the strict liability offence proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant was charged with three offences arising from an incident on November 18, 2013: speeding (120 km/h in a posted 60 km/h zone), stunt driving (excessive speed), and failing to have an insurance card.

The defendant did not appear at trial.

The Crown presented evidence from a police officer who used a Lidar laser speed measuring device to record the defendant's speed.

The court found the defendant guilty of all three charges but applied the rule against multiple convictions, entering a conviction for the more serious stunt driving charge and staying the speeding charge.

The insurance card charge conviction stood.