Thomas Michael Arnold

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment after the defendants failed to close on an agreement of purchase and sale for a residential property.

The defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to mitigate their damages by rejecting an offer to reduce the purchase price by $50,000 and subsequently selling the property to a third party for $298,000 less than the original contract price.

The court found that the plaintiffs acted reasonably in their mitigation efforts and were not obligated to accept a new bargain from the breaching purchasers.

Summary judgment was granted, awarding the plaintiffs $368,585.95 in damages, representing the difference in sale price and carrying costs, less the deposit.

The applicant brought a motion to set aside an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for the jointly held matrimonial home and sought punitive damages.

The applicant alleged fraud and deceit because the respondent did not disclose that the numbered company purchasing the home was owned by the respondent's parents.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant had executed the agreement, the identity of the purchaser was not a material term, no false statement was made, and the applicant suffered no damages as the offer was unconditional and above the list price.

The applicants and respondent are siblings who own adjacent properties that were previously owned by their parents.

The applicants sought declarations regarding their right to use a shared driveway, a septic system, and a French drain that encroached on the respondent's property.

They also sought a permanent injunction to prevent the respondent from building a fence along the property line, and a determination of rights under an Encroachment Agreement.

The court found that the applicants had an implied grant to use the shared driveway, the septic system, and the land where the French drain was located, as these were necessary for the reasonable enjoyment of their property and had been used continuously since the properties were unified.

The court granted a permanent injunction preventing the fence construction and ordered the applicants' company to remove certain buildings pursuant to the Encroachment Agreement.

Consultants retained by multiple landowners to assist in obtaining government approval for urban development entered into a Cost Sharing Agreement providing for hourly fees and a bonus payment upon formal adoption of a Regional Official Plan Amendment.

One landowner purported to terminate the Agreement unilaterally in 2004.

The Regional Official Plan Amendment was adopted in 2009 with all appeals exhausted in 2015.

The consultants commenced an action for the bonus in 2015.

The respondents moved to dismiss on limitation grounds.

The motions judge dismissed the action.

On appeal, the appellants argued the termination was ineffective because only collective termination was permitted and that the limitation period had not expired.

The Court of Appeal held that while individual termination was not permitted, the appellants had accepted the anticipatory repudiation through their conduct and inaction over 11 years, thereby accepting the termination and causing the limitation period to expire.

The plaintiffs commenced an action for payment under a Cost Sharing Agreement 11 years after the defendant terminated its involvement.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to stay their own action in favour of arbitration, while the defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action as statute-barred.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion, finding they could not stay their own proceeding under the Arbitration Act or the Courts of Justice Act.

The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the action was statute-barred by the two-year limitation period and that the plaintiffs were estopped by conduct and laches.

The moving party sought interim custody of the parties' three children, relying in part on an OCL clinical investigation recommending that all children reside with her.

The court held that on an interim custody motion the existing status quo will generally be maintained unless compelling reasons or exceptional circumstances justify immediate change.

Although the report contained relevant information, its recommendations were untested and some underlying facts were disputed.

Finding no urgency or exceptional circumstances, the court declined to make a substantive departure from the existing living arrangements and dismissed the motion.

The appellants appealed sentences imposed for violations of the Town of Milton zoning bylaw, specifically for operating retail sales and outdoor storage in a rural A-1 zone, and for parking oversized motor vehicles on agricultural property.

The appellants raised two grounds of appeal: that comments by the Justice of the Peace raised a reasonable apprehension of bias, and that the fines imposed were excessive.

The appeal court dismissed both grounds, finding that while certain comments were inappropriate, they did not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias when viewed in context, and that the sentences were reasonable and within the appropriate range given the regulatory nature of the offences and the need for general deterrence.

A child protection disposition hearing following a finding that three children were in need of protection due to emotional harm resulting from parental neglect and exposure to domestic violence and substance abuse.

The mother had exposed the children to crack cocaine use, domestic violence with an abusive boyfriend, serious school absences, and neglect of medical and dental needs.

The father sought custody.

The court granted final custody to the father under section 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act, finding that the children were thriving in his care and that the mother lacked insight into the harm caused and continued to pose risks through poor judgment and manipulation during access visits.

The court ordered supervised access initially, transitioning to unsupervised weekend and holiday access.

An elector brought an application under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act alleging that a municipal councillor failed to declare a pecuniary interest when voting on resolutions increasing municipal employee wages, which affected her spouse’s salary as fire chief.

The court held that the councillor had an indirect pecuniary interest through her spouse and breached s. 5(1) of the Act by participating in the votes.

The statutory exception for members of a volunteer fire brigade did not apply because the councillor herself was not a member of the brigade.

The court rejected the defence of inadvertence and found that the councillor had not exercised due diligence in identifying the conflict.

A penalty was imposed disqualifying the councillor from serving on council for six years.

The appellant secured creditor appealed an order permitting the respondent lien claimant to realize on proceeds from the auction sale of horses despite giving less than the two weeks' newspaper notice required by the Innkeepers Act.

The Court of Appeal held that estoppel by convention was available as a matter of law and was compatible with the statutory purpose of preserving a lien for unpaid horse-care charges.

The owner had notice and an opportunity to redeem, no public complaint arose, and the appellant knew of and was content with the sale proceeding as scheduled while intending to claim excess funds.

In those circumstances, the notice defect did not nullify the respondent's lien and the appeal was dismissed.

The corporate defendant was convicted of undertaking development without a permit in a development control area under the Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act, after constructing an armour stone wall.

The Crown sought a $4,000 fine, while the defence argued for a nominal $150 fine due to a history of compliance.

The court weighed the paramount goal of general deterrence for environmental regulatory offences against the defendant's prior compliance, ultimately imposing a $3,000 fine.

The Crown charged Timur Leckebusch with two counts of unlawfully undertaking development without a permit in a Development Control area under the Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act: construction of an earthen berm and construction of a retaining wall.

The Crown also charged 819743 Ontario Inc. with unlawfully undertaking development without a permit for construction of an armour stone wall.

The defendants argued that the structures were exempt from the permit requirement as accessory structures to general agricultural development under Ontario Regulation 828.

The court found that the Crown proved the actus reus of all three offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the court found that Leckebusch successfully established the exemption for both the berm and retaining wall on a balance of probabilities, resulting in acquittals on both counts.

The court found that 819743 Ontario Inc. failed to establish the exemption for the armour stone wall and was convicted.

The applicant sought judicial review of a penalty imposed by the Ontario Racing Commission for an EPO infraction.

The applicant argued that a Notice to the profession issued by the Commission constituted an error of law and that the penalty was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Notice was merely a declaration of intention to impose more severe penalties and that the Commission's penalty decision deserved deference.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant tenant appealed a decision interpreting a protective installations clause in a commercial lease.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the tenant was responsible for the costs of work required by a municipal authority, as the work comprised additions or alterations for the security of the tenant and its employees.

The court noted that under the lease, the tenant was required to satisfy itself that the premises were fit for occupation before entering into the lease.

The appellant law firm appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing its claim for an unpaid solicitor's account.

The trial judge had dismissed the claim solely because the account did not provide time dockets and an hourly rate.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that section 2(3) of the Solicitors Act permits lump sum billing provided there is a reasonable description of services rendered and a detailed statement of disbursements.

The court found the account was fair and reasonable, set aside the trial decision, and granted judgment for the unpaid account.